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ABSTRACT
Some 400 years ago the French discovered what was to
become New France or French North America. Their effort of
colonization spread on a vast region stretching from present NovaScotia in Canada to the Great Lakes region and down the
Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico in Louisiana. Apart from the
latter, the two main northern Atlantic colonies were Acadia and
Canada (the name for the present Canadian province of Quebec).
French presence lasted in Acadia until 1710 and in the last two
(Canada and Louisiana) until the early years of the 1760’s when
the former was transferred to Britain and the latter to Spain. This
was the end of French presence in Northern America. But did
whatever one may call culture, and what is more legal culture,
survive in these three places? Answering that question is the
purpose of this article.
Before entering the heart of the matter, one must perform the
uneasy task of defining (?) what is meant by legal culture. I made
up my mind to call it “a collective, intuitive, spontaneous and
traditional perception” of what law means in a given society, be it
that of the people (the folk culture) or of the lawyers (the learned
culture). The anthropological side of my own self favoured the
former, my legal side the latter. Yet I decided to try to have a look
at both of them. Here is the result:
1) It is quite difficult in all three territories to speak of a
learned French culture. During the whole period, trained lawyers
existed in small number in Canada, in very, very small number in
Louisiana and they were none in Acadia. Furthermore, the lawyers
in Canada were essentially familiar with the Coutume de Paris
which, whatever its importance was, cannot be called French legal
culture in a time when scores of customs still existed and thrived in
France.
2) A folk legal culture undoubtedly existed in all three
territories, but to the best of readily available information, it was
not a French folk legal culture, but a provincial folk legal culture.
The best example one could find was perhaps Acadia and
Louisiana after the arrival of Acadians deported by the British after
1755. There is clear evidence of their reliance on customs from
Western France, especially Poitou, wherefrom they originally had
migrated to America. They kept these customs in spite of statutory
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provisions which imposed the Coutume de Paris throughout New
France.
If there is an influence of French legal culture in these regions
it is a learned one which only appeared in the 19th century in both
Louisiana and Quebec through the advent of codification which
sent back to the French Civil Code of 1804. Thus the tradition is a
quite recent one and cannot, in my view, be dated back to the
French colonial period.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. À propos de culture juridique
Le moins que l’on puisse dire de la notion de culture juridique
est que sa mise en évidence depuis quelque temps a pour résultat
son caractère hautement indéterminé. Les auteurs du dictionnaire1
qui lui a été consacré récemment semblent d’ailleurs avoir reculé
devant ce caractère en renonçant à consacrer un article au sujet
même de leur substantiel ouvrage. Tout au plus peut-on inférer de
leur avant-propos le fait que les juristes ne sont pas les seuls à
pouvoir se représenter leur propre culture2, lorsqu’ils précisent que
la consultation de leur ouvrage « invite à une réflexion sur les
représentations de leur propre culture qui sont celles des juristes ».
La remarque me semble particulièrement intéressante à titre
personnel dans la mesure où je serai à même de conclure que la
culture juridique française en Amérique du Nord – à supposer
qu’elle existe avant le XIXe siècle – est essentiellement une
perception collective de non-juristes.
Je viens d’évoquer le caractère hautement indéterminé de la
notion de culture juridique. Celui-ci se confirme dès que j’aborde
un autre dictionnaire, celui d’Arnaud3. Contrastant avec le vertige
causé par le vide du précédent, ce volume nous offre un embarras
de richesse. Quatre conceptions de la culture juridique s’y
succèdent qui font appel tantôt aux techniques des juristes, tantôt
aux opinions et appréciations du public, tantôt aux valeurs,
principes et idéologies des juristes et enfin aux différences
1. D. Alland et S. Rials (dir.), Dictionnaire de la culture juridique, Paris,
Lamy-PUF, 2003.
2. Idem, à la p. xi.
3. A.-J. Arnaud (dir.), Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de
sociologie du droit, (2e ed.), Paris, L.G.D.J., 1993, 139.
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nationales et locales entre systèmes juridiques. De celles-ci, je
retiens particulièrement la référence au public comme l’un des
lieux de la perception de la culture juridique aux côtés de celles du
monde des juristes.
Mais l’auteur avec lequel je me sens la plus grande empathie
en abordant le phénomène est sans conteste Garapon4. Même si le
propos de celui-ci n’apporte pas nécessairement à un esprit
cartésien (qui n’est pas nécessairement le mien) une définition qui
apaise sa soif de rigueur dans la clarté, il me paraît en effet
approcher le phénomène d’une manière qui correspond à une
certaine idée (à défaut d’une idée certaine) qui était la mienne au
moment où j’abordais la recherche qui conduira à ce texte. En effet
Garapon (je le prie de bien vouloir excuser ce montage condensé
de ce qui me parut essentiel dans un texte d’une richesse à laquelle
je ne puis que renvoyer le lecteur en lui suggérant un contact direct
avec celui-ci)5 décline en une succession de propositions (la
culture juridique serait un « implicite … si évident que cela va sans
dire », ou encore « un imaginaire … qui n’est pas seulement celui
des juristes » le constat fondamental selon lequel la culture
juridique ne serait que « l’expression d’intuitions … agissant
inconsciemment »6.
Lorsque je compare ces quelques éléments d`information à
l’intuition qui était la mienne au départ de ce texte, j’y retrouve – à
moins que mon impensé m’ait poussé à les y retrouver dans la
mesure où ils me convenaient – quelques traits de l’idée que je me
fais encore de la culture juridique au moment où j’écris ces lignes.
Je serais en effet tenté de la considérer comme une perception (qui,
comme chacun sait, est hautement relative) collective (que soit en
cause la collectivité des juristes ou toute autre), impensée (donc
qui vient spontanément à l’esprit sans effort conscient de la
volonté) et enfin traditionnelle (comme l’écrivait Portalis en
parlant du code, la culture se fait avec le temps, à proprement
parler, on ne la fait pas).

4. A. Garapon, « Qu’est-ce qu’une culture juridique ? », Juger en Amérique
et en France – Culture juridique francaise et common law (A. Garapon et I.
Papadopoulos, dir.), Paris, Odile Jacob, 2003, 17.
5. En y ajoutant, du même auteur, A. Garapon, « La culture juridique
française au choc de la mondialisation », Le juge et le jugement dans les
traditions juridiques européennes, (R. Jacob, dir.), Paris, L.G.D.J., 1996, 379.
6. Idem, aux pp. 380-382.
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La dernière parenthèse m’interpelle immédiatement. Si la
culture est, par essence, un fruit de la tradition, il doit être fort
difficile de prétendre en trouver l’origine, ce qui est, en principe,
l’objet même de ce texte. En fait nous allons faire de l’histoire à
rebours au départ d’un construit personnel actuel dont nous avons
pu mesurer à la fois le caractère indéfini et l’apparition
relativement récente au panthéon (pour ne pas dire au fourre-tout)
des paradigmes de la science du droit. Le processus est donc
nécessairement essentialiste et le risque est considérable de
commettre des anachronismes, ce péché mortel contre l’histoire
comme nous l’a appris Marc Bloch. Que répondre à ce double
caveat, si ce n’est que je suis parfaitement conscient du premier et
que j’assume complètement le second.
Dans cette tentative de remonter le temps, j’utiliserai quatre
catégories d’indices : d’abord la présence, dans chacune des trois
régions, d’un droit « français » puisque c’est bien de culture
juridique française qu’il s’agit ; ensuite de l’existence en ces
lieux de juristes, en tant que premiers intéressés par cette culture
particulière ; en outre, de la capacité ou de la volonté
d’intervention dans ce domaine des pouvoirs publics en tant que
représentants du pouvoir garant de l’administration de la justice,
laquelle doit être distinguée de la présence du droit ; enfin de la
nature des communautés en présence dans la mesure où je perçois
la culture juridique comme un phénomène collectif.
B. La culture juridique française, notion ambiguë ?
Le propos qui suit paraîtra peut-être sacrilège à plus d’un.
J’implore leur indulgence, sinon leur pardon. La référence à la
France telle qu’elle s’exprime dans l’adjectif « français »
m’apparaît en effet comme terriblement ambiguë, particulièrement
lorsqu’il s’agit de la branche du droit civil, domaine auquel j’ai
choisi de limiter mon propos. En outre j’ai privilégié une
conception globale du phénomène culturel qui entraîne
nécessairement que je le perçoive au niveau du droit dit français
dans l’ensemble des mécanismes juridiques constitutifs de la
notion et pas seulement du cadre géographique dans lequel elle
s’inscrit. Dès lors, en ce qui me concerne, la question est posée de
l’existence d’un droit civil français sur lequel s’articulerait une
culture juridique française avant la promulgation du Code civil en
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1804. Et, dans la mesure où langue et culture vont souvent de pair,
la question de la langue est également posée. Est-ce un pur hasard
si Dumoulin, dans son Oratio de concordia et unione
consuetudinum Franciae, pense à l’unification des coutumes de
France pour en faire un droit français au moment où du Bellay
estime nécessaire, dans sa Défense et illustration de la langue
française, d’aborder cet élément essentiel de la culture qu’est la
langue ? Je ne le crois pas. Et si la langue s’affirme comme facteur
de construction de la France, il faudra attendre 1804 en matière de
droit civil pour que l’on puisse parler droit français. Le grain semé
par Dumoulin mettra longtemps à produire les épis mûrs et blés
moissonnés chers à Péguy, malgré les efforts de Lamoignon,
Daguesseau et autres Pothier.
Si on accepte ce postulat de départ, l’objet même de mon
propos ne peut être une culture originaire de l’une quelconque des
régions de France, qu’il s’agisse, par exemple, de la Normandie, du
Poitou ou encore de la Prévôté et Vicomté de Paris. Certes, à partir
de 1580, les juristes cherchent à imposer progressivement cette
dernière comme un terme de référence national7, mais un examen
attentif de la situation permet néanmoins de risquer une conclusion
selon laquelle « le feu de l’usage couve sous la cendre des
coutumes rédigées »8. Le peuple n’accepte pas facilement qu’on lui
confisque sa qualité de producteur de droit à travers la coutume
pour le transformer en « sujet » d’un droit légiféré issu du cerveau
des juristes. Nous verrons que les données existant pour
l’Amérique du Nord française reflètent cet aspect fondamental des
choses de la vie du droit.
C. À travers l’espace et le temps
Le lecteur aura déjà compris que ma démarche se situe sur
deux axes, ceux de la comparaison et de l’histoire. Le premier met
en jeu une dimension spatiale dans la mesure où – nous allons le
voir – il concerne trois entités régionales distinctes à de nombreux
égards ; le second une dimension temporelle puisque – nous allons

7. Voir J. Vanderlinden, « La coutume dans le droit français des "pays de
coutumes" aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles », 53 Recueils de la Société Jean
Bodin 217 (1990), aux pp. 271-293.
8. Idem, à la p. 289.

2009]

CULTURE JURIDIQUE FRANÇAISE

7

le voir également – la présence française dans ces régions s’étend
sur des périodes fort variables.
Le simple fait que les Journées louisianaises de l’Association
Henri Capitant pour la culture juridique française se tiennent, en
2008, en Louisiane explique la dimension spatiale de mon propos.
J’avais d’abord envisagé de concentrer celui-ci sur l’histoire du
droit de cet état des États-Unis d’Amérique. Plus familier avec
l’histoire du droit de l’Acadie et du Canada, je me suis
immédiatement rendu compte de l’intérêt d’une comparaison entre
l’histoire juridique de ces colonies et celle de la Louisiane, et donc
d’étendre mon regard à l’ensemble de l’Amérique du Nord que
l’on peut, historiquement appeler « française », soit les colonies,
dans l’ordre alphabétique, de l’Acadie, du Canada et de la
Louisiane. Une comparaison entre elles conduit en effet à la mise
en évidence de profondes similitudes, mais aussi de spécificités qui
ne peuvent être ignorées dans le contexte de la recherche
d’éventuelles origines de la culture juridique française en
Amérique du Nord.
Du point de vue géographique, il importe notamment de
souligner immédiatement le décalage existant entre l’étendue
théorique de ces colonies et celle des espaces sur lesquels la France
exerçait effectivement une administration de la justice digne de ce
nom. Si la Nouvelle-France s’étend en principe, du Nord au Sud,
des rivages du Labrador à ceux du golfe du Mexique et, vers
l’Ouest, bien au-delà des Grands Lacs, les zones effectivement
occupées par une population civile se ramènent pour l’essentiel à
deux établissements substantiels [ceux de Port-Royal et de GrandPré (ou des Mines)] en Acadie, à la vallée du Saint-Laurent entre
Montréal et Québec au Canada et au delta du Mississipi et à
quelques établissements dispersés au nord et à l’ouest de celui-ci
en Louisiane. Les autres espaces sont au minimum « revendiqués »
suite au passage d’explorateurs, au maximum « exploités » par des
coureurs des bois ou visités plus ou moins régulièrement par des
missionnaires catholiques. Entre les colonies anglaises s’étendant
le long de la côte atlantique jusqu’à la Floride ou au départ de la
baie d’Hudson dans le Nord et les territoires revendiqués par la
France, s’étendent des espaces faisant l’objet de contestations
constantes entre les puissances européennes.
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Si, adoptant un ordre alphabétique de présentation des
territoires en cause9, nous prenons d’abord le cas de l’Acadie,
celle-ci est sans doute la colonie qui connaît l’histoire la plus
agitée du point de vue de la présence française dans le cadre de sa
rivalité avec l’Angleterre en Amérique du Nord. Après les
premiers efforts, extrêmement difficiles, de colonisation française,
le territoire devient écossais de 1628 à 1630, puis anglais de 1654 à
1670, avant de le redevenir en 1710 avant que le traité d’Utrecht de
1713 transfère définitivement la colonie à la Grande-Bretagne. À
ces transferts plus ou moins formels et réels de souveraineté,
s’ajoutent des épisodes plus brefs qui mettent en cause les Anglais
et en difficulté parfois considérable les Français présents en
Acadie : destruction de Port-Royal par Argall en 1613, prise de
Pentagouet et capture du gouverneur français emmené en captivité
à Boston en 1674 et prise du chef-lieu de l’Acadie par Phips en
1690, laquelle oblige les représentants du pouvoir français à se
réfugier dans des positions sur la rivière Saint-Jean totalement
excentrées par rapport aux populations et régulièrement attaquées
et détruites par les Anglais venant de Boston. Ces événements
fortement perturbateurs de la vie quotidienne d’une partie de la
population (celle installée sur les rivages ou sur un grand axe de
communication comme la rivière Saint-Jean) ne peuvent cependant
en aucun cas être qualifiés d’invasions10 ; en termes actuels, ces
attaques s’apparentent le plus souvent davantage à des raids.
Le Canada, qui s’étend de l’embouchure du Saint-Laurent aux
Grands Lacs est davantage en conflit avec l’Angleterre, puis avec
la Grande-Bretagne sur sa périphérie, là où les limites imprécises
de la Nouvelle-Angleterre touchent à celle de la Nouvelle-France ;
mais cela n’empêche pas des incursions militaires anglaises par la
voie du Saint-Laurent comme celle de 1629, entraînant
l’occupation de Québec jusqu’en 1632, ou encore celle, qui échoue
devant le chef-lieu du Canada en 1711. Plus importantes pour la
colonie sont les guerres avec les Iroquois ; la première dure de
1642 à 1667, la seconde de 1684 à 1701.
9. Ceci afin de ne pas faire croire au lecteur que nous établissons entre eux
une quelconque hiérarchie reflétant un intérêt plus grand pour l’un ou l’autre
d’entre eux par rapport aux deux autres, quel que soit le ou les critères retenus
pour la fonder ou l’ordre de présentation adopté pour les présenter.
10. Cette qualification se retrouve notament dans C. A. Brasseaux,
« Naissance et renaissance de la société acadienne louisianaise », 1
Francophonies d’Amérique 153 (1991), à la p. 154.
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Les choses sont fort différentes en Louisiane. Celle-ci ne voit
pas s’affronter de puissances européennes sur son sol ; son sort se
règle davantage dans les chancelleries européennes. Devenue
française en 1682 après que Le Moyne d’Iberville ait construit un
premier fort à l’embouchure du Mississipi et écarté les Anglais qui
s’apprêtaient à remonter le fleuve en 1699, la Louisiane demeure
française jusqu’en 1762 lorsqu’elle est cédée à l’Espagne par le
traité de Fontainebleau. Napoléon la ramène sous la souveraineté
française en 1800 avant de la revendre aux Etats-Unis en 1803. Sur
le plan interne, les conflits avec les Amérindiens occupant le pays
sont fréquents pendant la période française. Que ce soit le conflit
avec les Natchez (1729) ou avec les Chicachas (1736), ils sont
perdus par les Français et réduisent parfois le territoire sous
contrôle effectif du colonisateur aux environs du chef-lieu de la
colonie, la Nouvelle-Orléans, fondée en 1718. La déportation des
Acadiens en 1755 aura un impact indirect sur le peuplement de la
Louisiane à partir des années 1760 ; accueillis favorablement par
les gouverneurs espagnols, les Acadiens formeront rapidement une
majorité parmi la population locale d’expression française.
Ceci, en ce qui concerne les espaces en cause, donc la
comparaison.
Reste la dimension temporelle à laquelle il vient d’être fait
brièvement allusion au cours de l’examen de l’évolution de
l’espace français en Amérique du Nord. Comme les paragraphes
précédents le montrent clairement, la durée de la présence
française en Amérique du Nord est fort différente selon les
colonies et aussi loin d’être paisible dans la continuité. Ce constat,
combiné à ceux que nous pourrons éventuellement faire
ultérieurement, est susceptible de faire apprécier différemment la
mesure dans laquelle une tradition culturelle française a pu s’y
amorcer. Ainsi la présence française en Louisiane est-elle la plus
brève des trois exemples envisagés ; elle ne dure que 84 ans, 80
avant l’intermède espagnol d’un peu moins de 40 ans et 4 ans après
celui-ci. Par contraste, la France est souveraine au Canada
pendant un peu plus d’un siècle et demi, la seule césure anglaise
étant négligeable, puisqu’elle n’atteint pas quatre ans et se situe
dans le premier tiers du XVIIe siècle, près de 150 ans avant le
transfert définitif de la colonie à la Grande-Bretagne par le traité de
Paris de 1763. Reste alors l’Acadie, qui occupe une position
intermédiaire entre ces deux extrêmes, puisqu’elle est sous
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souveraineté anglaise pendant 20 ans sur les quelque 100 ans
d’exercice du pouvoir français sur son territoire.
C’est dans ce contexte spatio-temporel que s’inscrivent les
quatre éléments (dont trois acteurs) susceptibles de concourir aux
origines d’une éventuelle culture juridique française en Amérique
du Nord : le droit, les juristes, les gouvernants et les communautés.
II. LE DROIT
Quiconque envisage de retracer l’éventuelle origine d’une
culture juridique française en Acadie, au Canada ou en Louisiane,
peut légitimement s’interroger d’abord sur la place qu’occupait
dans ces colonies le droit français, même si, dans certains pays du
monde, un intérêt pour cette culture particulière se manifeste sans
que nécessairement le droit français y occupe une place importante
voire une place quelconque. Disons simplement que la présence du
droit français en tant que partie d’un système juridique quelconque
dans le monde crée une présomption de la possibilité de l’existence
d’une culture juridique française à cet endroit. Tel est bien le cas,
dans une mesure variable qu’il importe maintenant d’aborder, dans
les trois territoires qui font l’objet de ce texte. Sous quelle forme le
droit français s’y présente-t-il donc ?
A. Le code
Le code – et pour cause – n’est présent en Amérique du Nord
française qu’en Louisiane, le temps d’un instant. Et encore n’est-ce
que l’un des projets du code civil en marche vers la consécration
de 1804. S’il est bien question de codes en France dès le XVIe
siècle11, on n’en trouve guère de traces, sous ce nom du moins, en
Amérique du Nord, et encore n’est-ce qu’en 1808, sous deux
aspects formels. D’une part, la structure apparente du Digest of the
Civil Laws in force in the Territory of Orleans in 1808, combine
celle de l’un des projets français de l’époque et du Code civil des
Français de 1804. D’autre part, chaque fois que le texte de ces
deux documents présente une similitude suffisante avec le contenu,
principalement espagnol, du Digest, il est repris dans le texte de
11. Voir J. Vanderlinden, Le concept de code en Europe occidentale du
XIIIe au XIXe siècle – Essai de définition, Bruxelles, Éditions de l’Institut de
sociologie, 1967.
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celui-ci et comme point de départ de sa version anglaise12. Quant
au contenu de ce dernier, si une partie en est « française »,
l’essentiel en est espagnol, ce qui a permis à un éminent collègue
louisianais d’écrire que nous avions là « a Spanish girl in a French
dress »13. L’adoption ultérieure d’un code civil pour la Louisiane
en 1825 et de sa version révisée en 1870 accentuent l’influence
française dans la mesure où les ajouts qui interviennent à ces
moments sont fréquemment empruntés directement au code
français de 180414. Il faut toutefois mentionner que ce texte avait
été précédé en 1724 par un autre code, fort différent, le Code noir.
Il s’agit de ce qu’on pourrait appeler un code de sources, puisqu’il
rassemble, à identité et contenu constants, différentes lois (au sens
large du terme) relatives à une matière, en l’occurrence
l’esclavage. Au contraire le code civil serait un code de matière qui
réalise la fusion de toutes les sources du droit relatives à une
matière15. Si le Code noir représente un spécimen de l’un des
aspects de la culture juridique française de son temps qui subsiste
encore aujourd’hui – le code de sources – il n’eut pas de
successeurs en Amérique du Nord.
B. La loi
La législation est présente sous différentes formes dans les trois
colonies. Il s’agit de :
1. La législation française appliquée dans les colonies
Au premier rang de celle-ci figurent les coutumes des pays de
France, qu’elles arrivent en Amérique du Nord informellement,
aux semelles de ceux qui les pratiquaient en France avant leur
migration vers le Nouveau Monde, ou qu’elles soient
officiellement reçues comme l’a été, en 1664, la coutume de Paris.
Celle-ci est introduite par le biais de l’article 33 de l’ordonnance
de 1664 créant la Compagnie des Indes occidentales16. Sans doute
12. Voir R. A. Pascal, « Of the Civil Code and Us », 59 Louisiana Law
Review 301 (1998).
13. Idem, à la p. 303.
14. Idem, à la p. 305.
15. Au sujet de cette distinction, voir Vanderlinden, cité en note 11.
16. Voir S. Dauchy, « Stratégies coloniales et instruments judiciaires en
Nouvelle-France (1663-1703) », Le juge et l’outre-mer, (B. Durand et M. Fabre,
dir.), tome 1, Lille, Centre d’histoire judiciaire, 2006, 207-225, qui renvoie à J.
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le lecteur s’étonnera-t-il de voir figurer les coutumes dans une
section consacrée – son titre en fait foi – à la législation. Sans
entrer dans une controverse théorique, disons simplement qu’une
fois que la coutume est rédigée et, qui plus est, sanctionnée par le
pouvoir.
En ce qui concerne l’Acadie, celle-ci est, à ce moment, sous
contrôle de la Couronne d’Angleterre et donc la coutume de Paris
ne peut y être rendue applicable par le roi de France. Il est
possible, sinon vraisemblable, mais pas certain, qu’elle le soit
ultérieurement dans les faits, sans qu’on ait de traces de son
enregistrement au greffe du lieutenant civil et criminel après la
restitution de l’Acadie à la France en 1667. Ceci ne veut pas dire
qu’aucune coutume ne soit applicable dans la colonie. On peut
considérer que les habitants y apportent avec eux leurs coutumes
d’origine comme nous avons pu le montrer pour celles de l’Ouest
de la France, sans toutefois pouvoir préciser lesquelles
exactement17.
Au Canada, avant 1664, nous trouvons une situation
comparable à celle qui vient d’être décrite pour l’Acadie, si ce
n’est que les références rencontrées le sont, par exemple, aux
coutumes de Normandie ou du Vexin. En ce qui concerne la
première citée, cela n’étonne guère puisque, comme nous le
verrons, le pays normand fournit le quart des immigrants au
Canada avant 1664 ; comme leurs compatriotes d’Acadie,
pourquoi ceux-ci abandonneraient-ils spontanément leur coutume
ancestrale au bénéfice d’une autre ? Quant à la seconde, Dauchy
met clairement en évidence son importance aux débuts de la
colonisation en même temps qu’il ne craint pas d’affirmer ce qui
n’est, chez moi, qu’une intuition : « la primauté de la coutume de
Paris … est donc loin d’être établie au milieu du XVIIe siècle »18.
Nous nous séparons toutefois dans la mesure où il semble
considérer que le prescrit de l’ordonnance de 1664 a suffi à assurer
une application généralisée de la coutume de Paris dès que cette
ordonnance est enregistrée ; sur le papier, indiscutablement la

Vanderlinden, « La réception des systèmes juridiques européens au Canada »,
64 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 207 (1996), à la p. 222 et à d’autres
études antérieures en note 7.
17. Voir J. Vanderlinden, Se marier en Acadie française, Moncton, Éditions
de l’Acadie, 1998.
18. Dauchy article cité en note 16, à la p. 222.
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coutume de Paris devient un élément essentiel du droit applicable
dans la province. Le devient-elle pour autant dans la culture et dans
la pratique quotidienne de la majorité des habitants ? Observons en
outre que l’application de celle-ci est, en France, limitée à un
ressort, très large certes mais néanmoins déterminé, celui du
Parlement de Paris. Elle n’est, de plus, que supplétoire des autres
coutumes du royaume applicables dans les ressorts des autres cours
souveraines19, en cas de silence de celles-ci sur un point de droit.
Ce n’est donc pas, à proprement parler, du droit français qui est
introduit en Nouvelle-France. Il en va de même pour les coutumes
rédigées officiellement, importées au Canada et dont on y
rencontre des exemples d’application, qu’il s’agisse de celles de
Normandie ou du Vexin, avant 1664.
En Louisiane enfin, la coutume de Paris fut introduite comme
droit d’application générale dans la charte consentie à Antoine
Crozat en 171220. Elle cessa en principe d’être applicable en 1762
suite à la cession de la colonie à l’Espagne ; en pratique cependant
le temps mis par le premier gouverneur espagnol pour s’installer
sur place et organiser le nouveau régime en prolongea l’application
de plusieurs années21. En outre, comme nous le verrons, les actes
de la pratique en prévoiront l’application à certaines transactions
comme les contrats de mariage pendant de longues années encore
en vertu de ce qui apparaît comme un principe de personnalité des
droits, indépendamment de la difficulté souvent rencontrée de la
mise en œuvre d’un droit nouveau – en l’occurrence le droit
espagnol – dans des territoires dont l’organisation administrative et
judiciaire est le plus souvent très faible.
Les ordonnances ou édits royaux pris dans les métropoles sont
également un élément d’amorce éventuelle d’une culture juridique
inspirée du droit de celles-ci. On ne peut dire toutefois quelles
soient fréquentes.
En Acadie, il est difficile d’établir si les deux grandes
ordonnances de 1667 et 1670 y ont jamais été appliquées. Cette
19. Voir J. Vanderlinden, « La coutume dans le droit français des "pays de
coutumes" aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles », 53 Recueils de la Société Jean
Bodin 271 (1990).
20. Voir A. A. Levasseur, « The Major Periods of Louisiana Legal
History », 41 Loyola Law Review 585 (1995-1996), à la p. 586.
21. Voir ce qu’en écrit H. W. Baade, « Marriage contracts in French and
Spanish Louisiana : A study in "notarial" jurisprudence », 53 Tulane Law
Review 1 (1979), aux pp. 87-88.
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situation tient au fait que le premier gouverneur de la province,
restituée à la France en 1667, n’est nommé qu’en 1670 et que,
résidant à Pentagouet, ses fonctions sont essentiellement militaires,
comme le seront celles de ses deux successeurs immédiats, dont le
troisième finira son gouvernorat en France après avoir été
prisonnier des Anglais à Boston.
Au Canada, sont d’application les textes portant sur des
matières fondamentales, comme les ordonnances de 1667 et 1670,
dites respectivement civile et criminelle qui font partie des cinq
« grandes ordonnances » de Louis XIV avec celles de la marine, du
commerce et des eaux et forêts. Seule l’ordonnance de 1667 a été
enregistrée au greffe du Conseil souverain à Québec en 1679 après
que le Conseil du roi ait répondu aux remontrances du Conseil
souverain à son sujet. On soulignera le temps mis – douze ans –
entre la promulgation de l’ordonnance en France et l’accord donné
par le Conseil du roi à sa version « canadienne »22. Et aussi le fait
que le droit ainsi enregistré est adapté aux conditions locales, ce
qui peut contribuer à la constitution d’une culture juridique
différente de celle de la métropole. Les problèmes concrets visés
dans cette adaptation reflètent en effet l’environnement local, de la
même manière que celui-ci, – comme le souligne Jacques
Mathieu23, contribue à créer un « type social et culturel original » ;
j’y reviendrai. L’absence d’enregistrement n’empêche pas, comme
le constate Dauchy, que l’ordonnance criminelle soit
« scrupuleusement observée par le Conseil souverain »24.
Quant à la Louisiane, elle n’est organisée comme possession
française qu’en 1712 ; à ce moment¸ personne à Paris, ne semble
songer à l’intérêt d’y rendre explicitement applicables les grandes
ordonnances. Le prescrit général de l’édit de 171225 qui veut que la
législation royale soit d’application dans le territoire laisse
supposer – hypothèse ou conjecture – les ordonnances de la
monarchie y étaient applicables au même titre que le Code noir.
La distinction entre les ordonnances et les édits tient le plus
souvent au caractère plus général des premières, les seconds visant
une institution particulière. C’est le cas de l’édit portant
établissement de la Compagnie des Indes occidentales de 1664
22. Au sujet de cette version, voir les observations de Dauchy, cité en note
16, aux pp. 218-221.
23. J. Hamelin (dir.), Histoire du Québec, Saint-Hyacinthe, Edisem, 1977.
24. Dauchy, cité en note 16, à la p. 218.
25. Idem, cité en note 16, à la p. 222.
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introduisant la coutume de Paris, dont il a déjà été question ou
encore de l’édit du 14 septembre 1712, avec le même effet et
octroyant concession de la Louisiane à Crozat26.
Le contenu des arrêts du Conseil du roi est souvent plus
spécifique encore, bien qu’il soit fort difficile de le caractériser. Il
peut notamment résulter d’une demande d’intervention de la
Couronne introduite par un particulier sur un point spécifique qui
l’intéresse directement. La décision royale revêt alors autant un
caractère jurisprudentiel que législatif ; cette dernière forme d’arrêt
se rencontre notamment en Acadie dans une affaire concernant un
moulin revendiqué par Marie de Saint-Étienne en 1703, suite à un
arrêt plus général réglant le problème des attributions de fiefs dans
la province27. Peut-être sont-ce des arrêts de ce genre qui sont
susceptibles de contribuer à la constitution d’une certaine idée du
droit français dans l’esprit des habitants des colonies, davantage
que des textes de portée générale que la Couronne n’a pas les
moyens de faire respecter, comme c’est le cas pour ceux, sans
cesse répétés, ordonnant le défrichement des terres concédées ou la
construction de moulins sur celles-ci que l’on rencontre au
Canada. C’est en effet dans cette partie de la Nouvelle-France que
cette forme de législation apparaît de manière abondante et
diversifiée28 ; son analyse d’ensemble, complète et systématique,
ne semble jamais avoir été entreprise. Enfin, je n’en ai pas trouvé
de traces en ce qui concerne la Louisiane, mais il serait étonnant
qu’il n’y en ait pas eu.
2. La législation locale
La législation locale est essentiellement celle d’une part des
conseils, d’autre part des intendants.
En Acadie, l’état rudimentaire de l’administration royale, a
pour effet qu’un conseil n’y a pas de place29.
Pour le Canada, la situation est, de nouveau, totalement
différente et le constat est le même que pour les arrêts du Conseil
26. Idem.
27. Voir J. Vanderlinden, Le Lieutenant civil et criminel – Mathieu De
Goutin en Acadie française, Moncton, entre d’études acadiennes, 2004, 390 et
403 [Ci-après Le lieutenant civil et criminel].
28. Voir E.R. Fréchette, Les Édits, ordonnances royaux, déclarations et
arrêts du Conseil d’État du roi concernant le Canada, 3 vol., Québec, Revus et
Corrigés, 1854-1856.
29. Voir Vanderlinden, Le lieutenant civil et criminel, cité en note 27.
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du Roi, si ce n’est que la masse des textes à dépouiller pour avoir
une idée de l’activité du Conseil souverain, qui dépasse les simples
constats généraux, est bien plus considérable.
En Louisiane, la nature de la législation du Conseil supérieur
sont, mutatis mutandis, fort proches de celles du Conseil souverain
du Canada30. L’édit de 1712, qui le crée, prévoit qu’il sera
« semblable à ceux qui existent dans les autres colonies soumises à
notre puissance »31. Dans la pratique, le Conseil se serait surtout
occupé de matières relevant du commerce et de la police (au sens
le plus général du terme), ce qui comprenait tout ce qui concernait
l’esclavage. Cela ne l’empêcha pas de réglementer la vente des
immeubles32.
Pour ce qui est des intendants, nous ne possédons que
quelques-unes de leurs ordonnances relatives à l’Acadie. Elles sont
le fruit d’une visite de l’intendant de Meulles de passage dans la
province et souhaitant remédier à quelques maux qui l’ont
particulièrement frappé. Elles sont évidemment en rapport avec les
fonctions, très larges, de gestion administrative, économique,
financière et judiciaire de la colonie, sans exclure celle de
l’intendance militaire qui est importante mais ne donne que
rarement lieu à des mesures intéressant le public33. Quant à
l’Écrivain du roi, délégué de l’Intendant en Acadie, il ne semble
pas qu’il se soit jamais soucié de légiférer dans celle-ci ; ses
fonctions administratives semblent être essentiellement celles en
rapport avec l’intendance militaire.
Au Canada, par contre, la fonction d’intendant en même temps
que les qualités (souvent à la hauteur de leurs défauts) de ses
titulaires, font de celle-ci la première fonction dans la gestion de la
colonie. L’ensemble de son activité mériterait donc une
appréciation d’ensemble critique qui n’existe pas encore.
En ce qui concerne la Louisiane, nous y rencontrons le
Commissaire-ordonnateur, équivalent de l’Intendant, comme
l’Écrivain du roi l’était en Acadie, sinon qu’il n’était pas considéré
comme soumis à l’autorité de l’intendant du Canada ; il semble
30. Voir V.V. Palmer, « Historical Notes on the First Codes and Institutions
in French Louisiana », 8-9 (à paraître prochainement ).
31. Idem, trad. par J. Vanderlinden, à la p. 7.
32. Voir idem, aux pp. 8-9.
33. Voir P.-G. Roy, Ordonnances, commissions, etc., etc., des gouverneurs
et des intendants de la Nouvelle-France, 1639-1706, 2 vol., Beauceville,
l’Éclaireur, 1924.
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toutefois que son activité législative passait nécessairement par le
canal du Conseil supérieur34.
3. La jurisprudence
Indépendamment d’occasionnelles décisions du Conseil du roi
de France dans le cadre de son activité juridictionnelle, les
décisions du Conseil du roi constituent une amorce éventuelle
d’une culture juridique de même origine. Leur petit nombre et leur
spécificité ne les prédisposent cependant pas à ce rôle au niveau de
la population dans son ensemble. En outre, le fait qu’elles soient
l’expression d’un pouvoir souverain extérieur à la colonie jouent,
nous le verrons, également contre elles. Plus intéressantes est la
jurisprudence des juridictions locales.
De celle de l’Acadie, une lieutenance civile et criminelle, nous
ne savons pas grand-chose, pour ne pas dire rien35.
Au Canada, nous rencontrons de nouveau l’embarras de
richesses après la pénurie. Indépendamment de celle du Conseil
souverain, nous avons celle des juridictions de première instance
de Montréal, Québec et Trois Rivières et surtout celle des
tribunaux de seigneurie qui se maintiennent jusqu’à la fin de la
période française et sont, en outre, les plus proches des individus ;
ces derniers sont donc également davantage susceptibles de
générer en eux le sens d’une appartenance collective à une certaine
idée du droit. Nous nous trouvons toutefois également devant un
manque apparent de traitement systématique de l’ensemble des
données jurisprudentielles disponibles ce qui en rend l’accès
difficile et, a fortiori, toute conclusion particulièrement hasardeuse
sur un plan général. Un champ immense est donc ouvert au
chercheur de demain. Je souligne immédiatement, comme je l’ai
déjà dit et avant d’y revenir dans la section suivante, combien la
jurisprudence me semble susceptible, à la condition de présenter
une certaine cohérence, d’être génératrice de culture juridique dans
la mesure où les individus se sentent davantage concernés par
l’image du droit qu’elle offre.
Le même raisonnement devrait s’appliquer à la Louisiane, où,
indépendamment d’une jurisprudence du Conseil supérieur, les
décisions des cours locales situées dans les postes extérieurs à la
34. Voir V.V. Palmer, cité en note 30, à la p. 9.
35. Voir Le Lieutenant civil et criminel, ci-dessus en note 27.
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Nouvelle-Orléans pourraient jouer pour le chercheur un rôle
comparable à celui des juridictions seigneuriales au Canada.
4. Les actes de la pratique
Les brèves considérations qui figurent en fin de la section
précédente s’appliquent particulièrement aux actes de la pratique
dès lors qu’on envisage une culture juridique de caractère
populaire. Ces actes sont en effet l’espace de liberté que la
réglementation juridique laisse aux individus pour exprimer ce
qu’ils pensent que leur droit doit être.
C’est ainsi qu’en Acadie, les quelques contrats de mariage qui
ont survécu aux avatars subis par les archives notariales, nous ont
permis de mettre en évidence l’existence, malgré la lettre des actes
qui se réclamait de la coutume de Paris, la persistance des
coutumes de l’Ouest de la France36 dans la mentalité d’une partie
substantielle de la population acadienne, dont la plus grande partie
de celle-ci était originaire de cette région ; on y trouve notamment
l’affirmation des conjoints de voir leurs biens gouvernés dans le
cadre d’une communauté universelle (complétée d’ailleurs par
d’autres dispositions étrangères à la coutume de Paris),
caractéristique des pays dont les parties sont originaires37.
Au Canada, la doctrine existante38 consacrée aux contrats de
mariage à Montréal pour la période antérieure à l’imposition de la
coutume de Paris fait état d’une prédominance de fait de celle-ci
alors que la population d’origine parisienne n’atteint pas les 6,5%
du total des habitants du pays et que, par contre, la population
d’origine normande en atteint les 25% et que les habitants en
provenance de l’Ouest de la France apparaissent en nombre égal.
L’auteur de l’étude précise toutefois, sans expliquer pourquoi, que
les époux de souche normande sont minoritaires parmi ceux qui
contractent. À première vue, mais ce n’est là qu’une conjecture, il
serait étonnant que les habitants de cette province « oublient »
systématiquement leur coutume d’origine au bénéfice d’une
36. Voir J. Vanderlinden, Se marier en Acadie française, précité en note
17 .
37. Idem.
38. Elle est relativement mince. Voir notamment un article relatif aux
contrats antérieurs à 1665 qui ne concerne que Montréal : J.-M. Augustin, « Les
premiers contrats de mariage à Montréal de 1648 à 1664, et la coutume de
Paris », 30 R.J.T. 3 (1996).
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coutume qui leur serait étrangère par la seule magie d’un article
dans une ordonnance royale ou encore suite à un respect strict par
la totalité de la profession notariale des prescrits d’une coutume
particulière. Nous manquons d’études sur ce point. Acceptons la
doctrine qui conduirait à penser que le régime de la coutume de
Paris serait effectivement celui de la totalité des contrats de
mariage du Canada39, mais faisons-le sous bénéfice d’inventaire.
De nouveau, un constat s’impose : nous manquons d’études de
fond relatives au contenu des actes de la pratique dans la vallée du
Saint-Laurent.
En Louisiane, enfin, on constate qu’il pourrait en aller de
même qu’en Acadie, après un premier regard indirect jeté sur les
contrats de mariage de cette colonie après l’arrivée des Acadiens
dans la région à partir des années 1760. Selon les données
fragmentaires fournies par une étude relativement récente40, on y
retrouve – sans apparemment que l’auteur se soit rendu compte de
cette nécessaire distinction – un certain nombre de (pour ne pas
écrire trop rapidement de nombreux) contrats comprenant des traits
indicatifs des coutumes de l’Ouest de la France et, notamment, la
communauté universelle de biens inconnue de la coutume de Paris.
Ceci
nonobstant
la
déclaration
dans
les
contrats
(vraisemblablement selon le modèle du Parfait Notaire que leur
fournit sous une forme particulièrement accessible les éditions
successives de l’ouvrage de Claude de Ferrière) que la coutume de
Paris s’applique au contrat41. D’une part il ne m’a pas été possible
d’identifier les origines des parties à ces contrats, d’autre part je
n’ai pu voir certains contrats du poste d’Attakapas – haut-lieu
d’immigration acadienne – qui auraient pu être révélateurs dans la
mesure où ils étaient conclus entre des Acadiens de souche42.

39. On en trouve un exemple – dont on souhaiterait qu’il se multiplie – dans
la thèse de G. Postolec, Mariages et patrimoines à Neuville, de 1669 à 1782.
40. Voir Baade, cité en note 19.
41. Idem, aux pp. 59-60 (pour le poste de Natchitoches), à la p. 63 (pour
celui de la German Coast), à la p. 64 (pour celui de Pointe coupée), et à la p. 68
(pour celui de Ste Geneviève).
42. Dans cette recherche, j’avais sollicité les lumières d’un collègue
louisianais réputé grand spécialiste de l’Acadie devant l’éternel en lui exposant
longuement et clairement l’objectif de mes recherches et leur importance pour
moi. J’eus le très grand privilège – dont je lui serai toujours reconnaissant – de
recevoir une réponse négative de six mots qui ne répondait pas totalement à mes
questions et était envoyée par une fonctionnaire de l’université où il enseigne.
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5. Conclusion
Les sources du droit en vigueur en un lieu sont certainement
susceptibles de donner une première indication quant aux chances
d’y trouver l’origine d’une culture juridique donnée, sans que pour
autant leur présence soit indispensable à cette fin. D’un autre point
de vue, la distinction entre culture des juristes et culture populaire
semble pertinente de ce point de vue en première conclusion des
paragraphes qui précèdent. Il existe en effet des indices certains –
que seules des études plus systématiques et approfondies
pourraient confirmer ou infirmer – que les coutumes sous le régime
desquelles les immigrants en Amérique du Nord vivaient en France
se maintiennent dans le nouveau monde et survivent même à une
double transplantation comme le montrerait le cas de certains
Acadiens de Louisiane. L’hypothèse selon laquelle la coutume qui
a gouverné des gens pendant des siècles en les imprégnant de leur
naissance à leur mort ce maintient dans un monde nouveau n’est
pas étonnante ; qu’elle se maintienne après un second déplacement
– forcé celui-là – me parait davantage dans l’ordre des choses que
les voir adopter un droit nouveau, fort différent, et imposé à travers
un texte qui en déclare l’application par référence comme le font
les édits relatifs au Canada ou à la Louisiane. Ceci dit, que, dans
ces conditions, il ne puisse, en Amérique du Nord, être question
d’emblée d’une culture juridique française est évident. Ou encore
qu’elle soit limitée aux « élites » susceptible de prendre
connaissance des sources à vocation « française » émanant du
pouvoir métropolitain et de les appliquer ; tel serait, par exemple,
le cas de l’ordonnance civile de 1667 qui serait à l’origine d’un
élément de culture juridique française qui se répandrait dans la
population à travers son application par le biais des tribunaux et
des praticiens du droit. Pour le reste, au niveau d’une grande partie
du vécu quotidien de la population, les origines éventuelles d’une
culture juridique seraient soit locales à travers les sources émanant
des autorités coloniales et tendant à régler des problèmes
spécifiquement acadiens, canadiens ou louisianais, soit régionales
suite à l’importation par chaque individu ou groupe d’individu de
son patrimoine culturel et juridique d’origine tel qu’il se reflète
dans la coutume rédigée et, peut-être, dans des usages plus
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particuliers dont « le feu … couve sous la cendre de la coutume
rédigée »43.
III. LES JURISTES
Nous avons vu, dans l’introduction à ce texte que certaines
définitions de la culture juridique la concevaient comme étant par
excellence celle des juristes ; cela paraît l’évidence même. Nous
avons vu également que, à côté de cette évidence, la dimension
anthropologique et historique de mes intérêts personnels me portait
davantage vers la culture juridique des populations, en incluant
dans ce terme les diverses communautés qui les constituent. Et
bien entendu, sans vouloir aucunement ignorer l’interaction de ces
dernières sur celle, particulière, de la communauté (les marxistes
diraient la classe) des juristes et vice-versa. Or, en Amérique du
Nord, la référence aux juristes dans ce sous-titre suppose soit un
mauvais emploi (si on n’inclut dans le mot que ceux qui ont reçu
une formation au droit, le plus souvent à travers un enseignement
universitaire), soit une acception large (si on y englobe, comme
certains dictionnaires, toute personne connaissant ou pratiquant le
droit). Je choisis cette dernière, dans la mesure où, comme l’écrit
Dauchy44, en parlant du Canada, « la grande majorité d’entre eux
ne possédait pas le moindre diplôme universitaire », ce qui
s’explique d’autant plus facilement que, rapidement, se constituent
des dynasties judiciaires locales dont les descendants n’ont pas
l’occasion de se former académiquement sur place. Il convient
enfin de préciser que le problème des qualifications juridiques
n’est pas le premier souci des instances métropolitaines. Non
seulement celles-ci ont décrété une interdiction générale de
présence d’avocats et procureurs dans les colonies en cause dans la
mesure où elles estiment qu’ils sont sinon à la source des litiges en
justice, en tout cas à celle de leur durée et de leur coût pour les
justiciables. Qui plus est leurs instructions aux intendants leur
assignent, comme tâche première en matière judiciaire, de
« prévenir les contestations et les estoufer dès leur naissance »45.
C’est pourquoi Talon, dans un de ses premiers rapports, pouvait
43. Voir Vanderlinden, ci-dessus note 19, à la p. 289.
44. Pour les deux points qui suivent, voir Dauchy, cité en note 16, à la p.
223.
45. Idem, à la p. 216.
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écrire « j’ay accommodé jusques a [présent] toutes les affaires et
tous les procez qui sont venus pardevant moy »46.
A. Les juristes patentés
Je viens d’écrire, sur base de ce qu’écrit un collègue dont la
qualité des travaux alimente ma confiance en ce qu’il écrit, qu’il
convient d’étendre le sens du terme juriste lorsqu’on aborde
l’Amérique du Nord. Pareille affirmation semble se vérifier au
niveau des juridictions supérieures, même si ce dernier terme peut
paraître peu adéquat en ce qui concerne l’une des colonies
constitutives de la Nouvelle-France.
L’Acadie, en effet, ne possède – nous l’avons vu – pas de
conseil. Un seul magistrat, le lieutenant civil et criminel, dit aussi
lieutenant général, nommé par la Couronne et venant directement
de France, exerce en principe seul la justice dans la colonie. Il
existe cependant, à partir du moment où l’établissement des Mines
se développe indépendamment du chef-lieu, sis à Port-Royal, un
juge propre à cet établissement dont, au vu des archives
disponibles, il est difficile de savoir comment il a accédé à cette
fonction. Son nom de juge est également le reflet d’une position
de fait davantage qu’un titre de la nomenclature judiciaire
officielle. Enfin, on ne constate jamais l’existence d’une hiérarchie
entre ces deux juridictions. Ceci dit, pas plus le lieutenant général,
que le juge des Mines, ne possèdent de qualifications juridiques.
Au Canada, le hasard de mes recherches – sans aucune
prétention à l’exhaustivité ni à la vérification de ma source47 – m’a
mis en présence d’intendants dont les titres juridiques semblent
incontestables : ce sont dans l’ordre chronologique de leur exercice
de la charge, Raudot (père), Bégon, Dupuy, et, vraisemblablement,
Bigot, ce qui fait le tiers de la douzaine d’intendants de la
Nouvelle-France ayant exercé une fonction qui comprenait la haute
main sur la justice dans la colonie. À cette qualification s’ajoutait
le plus souvent une carrière respectable soit dans un parlement, soit
dans une administration, le plus souvent les finances ou la marine.
Ceci sans compter, last but not least, la faveur royale, directe par
un service sans reproche ou indirecte à travers l’insertion dans une
46. Cité dans sa notice au Dictionnaire biographique du Canada, accessible
sur la toile sous http://www.biographi.ca/FR/, [en abrégé, ci-après, DBC].
47. Idem, Le DBC, cité en note précédente.
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famille de courtisans au sens neutre du terme. Est-ce à dire, pour
autant, qu’ils aient marqué leur mandat par leur connaissance du
droit ? Rien n’est moins certain sur base des maigres données en
ma possession. Je ne possède pas de renseignements au sujet
d’éventuelles qualifications juridiques des membres du conseil
souverain ou des personnes occupant le siège des tribunaux
inférieurs.
En Louisiane, il ne semble pas que le Conseil supérieur ait
jamais compté plus de deux membres juristes, encore que seul l’un
d’entre eux soit identifié, le Procureur-général Cartier de Baune,
antérieurement conseiller au parlement de Paris48.
B. Les praticiens du droit
Ainsi qu’il vient d’être écrit, la grande majorité des praticiens
du droit, que ce soit en Acadie, au Canada ou en Louisiane et
quelle que soit le niveau de leurs fonctions dans l’administration de
la justice, n’ont pas été formé à cette discipline au moment où ils
accèdent à leur poste. Ils y apportent donc, chacun à sa manière au
gré de son expérience personnelle, une certaine connaissance (que
j’appellerais volontiers populaire) du droit, étant entendu que leur
niveau d’éducation générale permet parfois de qualifier cette
connaissance de fait de culture juridique d’un niveau certain.
Quelques-uns d’entre eux en font d’ailleurs la preuve dans diverses
fonctions ; un exemple en est fourni par Louis-Théandre Chartier
de Lotbinière, successivement procureur fiscal et lieutenant général
de la Sénéchaussée de Québec, procureur général au Conseil
souverain et enfin lieutenant général de la Prévôté de Québec49. En
outre, s’ils possèdent une culture juridique générale acquise sur le
tas, celle-ci est également une culture juridique spécifiquement
française pour ceux d’entre eux occupant les postes les plus
importants aux débuts de la mise en place de l’organisation
judicaire.
En Acadie, Mathieu de Goutin, premier lieutenant civil et
criminel au sujet duquel nous ayons quelque renseignement (mais
pratiquement aucun sur sa vie antérieure à son arrivée en Acadie)
est nommé à ce poste pour avoir apparemment bien servi une
48. Voir V. V. Palmer, « Historical Notes on the First Codes and
Institutions in French Louisiana », cité en note 30, aux pp. 12-13.
49. Voir sa notice au DBC, cité en note 46.
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famille influente à la Cour ; rien ne permet de croire qu’il ait reçu
une formation juridique50. Il en va de même pour le lieutenant civil
et criminel, qui l’a précédé, le juge qui a fonctionné aux Mines, les
greffiers, les notaires ou les procureurs du roi (certaines de ces
fonctions sont souvent cumulées par la même personne) qui s’y
sont succédé de puis les origines de la colonie.
Au Canada, les qualifications du premier Procureur-général
près le conseil souverain sont éloquentes. Jean Bourdon est en effet
sommairement décrit comme étant « seigneur, ingénieur arpenteur,
cartographe, commerçant, procureur-syndic de la ville de Québec,
commis général de la Communauté des Habitants, explorateur » et
enfin, cerise sur le gâteau, procureur-général. Il occupe le poste de
1663 à sa mort en 1668 si on excepte deux interludes assurés par
Chartier de Lotbinière dont il a déjà été question. Progressivement,
ils seront remplacés par des praticiens de souche canadienne et
choisis selon des modalités variables, au cas par cas,
vraisemblablement selon leur réputation ou leurs accointances,
familiales ou autres, dans les différents cercles du pouvoir colonial
local. La culture de ces derniers sera, peut-être, plus familiale et
canadienne que celle de leurs prédécesseurs, encore que l’on
assiste à des métissages culturels intéressants du point de vue qui
est le nôtre. On en trouve un excellent exemple dans l’accession au
poste, toujours de procureur général, de François Ruette d’Auteuil
de Monceaux, qui succède à son père Denis Ruette d’Auteuil ;
celui-ci, anobli par Louis XIII à l’âge de 26 ans, émigre au Canada
cinq ans plus tard et devient en 1663 l’un des premiers membres du
Conseil souverain. Après avoir cessé ces fonctions dès 1664, il
devient procureur-général en 1674 jusqu’à son décès en 1679. À ce
moment, son fils a 22 ans et, à l’occasion d’un séjour en France, y
a acquis une licence un droit et été admis en qualité d’avocat au
parlement de Paris avant de revenir à Québec travailler aux côtés
de son père. Celui-ci, « sentant venir sa fin prochaine », a obtenu
de Colbert un brevet en blanc lui permettant de faire désigner un
substitut par l’intendant. Sur cette base et malgré les objections du
gouverneur Frontenac, qui fait remarquer que l’intéressé n’a pas
atteint l’âge de la majorité légale fixé à 25 ans, le Conseil
souverain nomme François Ruette procureur général, d’abord à
titre intérimaire, puis à titre définitif ; il occupera le poste pendant
27 ans. Dans son chef, est posée la question de la nature exacte de
50. Voir Le lieutenant civil et criminel, ci-dessus en note 27.
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sa culture juridique. Je la qualifierais de métissée dans la mesure
où la formation de l’intéressé dans l’université française et sa
pratique professionnelle, même brève, ont dû l’influencer, comme,
par ailleurs, son travail après de son père a dû lui faire prendre
conscience des spécificités d’une éventuelle culture juridique
canadienne propre aux élites judiciaires locales. Enfin, comme
pour les juristes patentés, la mission du praticien du droit au niveau
le plus élevé est définie dans ses lettres de nomination comme
devant « empesch[er] autant qu’il pourra de playder en faisant à
leur esgard [il s’agit des justiciables] plustôt fonction d’arbitre que
de juge »51. Il serait intéressant d’analyser l’évolution du respect de
ce prescrit au fil du temps au sein de la classe judiciaire
canadienne.
Indépendamment de ce qui a été écrit ci-dessus au sujet de
Cartier de Baune, je ne possède pas de renseignements au sujet des
membres du Conseil supérieur de Louisiane.
Ces indications au sujet du personnel judiciaire non patenté
seraient incomplètes si je ne mentionnais pas les plaintes des
justiciables quant à l’irrégularité de leur présence au siège et leur
capacité à exercer leurs fonctions que ce soit par ignorance ou en
raison de leur état physique. Mes recherches sur l’Acadie
rejoignent sur ce point celles de Dauchy pour le Canada52.
C. Les notaires
Les notaires, qu’ils exercent leur ministère auprès d’un
seigneur ou sur base d’une charge royale, constituent le trait le plus
ancien et le plus permanent du paysage juridique de l’Amérique du
Nord française. Dans une société où le taux d’illettrisme demeure
élevé pendant les XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, ils sont les
intermédiaires indispensables entre les populations et le droit. La
seule exigence posée à l’exercice de leur fonction est de savoir
écrire dans des sociétés largement analphabètes, quelle que soit la
province considérée. En outre, il ne faut pas espérer trouver en leur
sein des juristes patentés. Leur vade-mecum est le manuel du
Parfait Notaire de Claude de Ferrière53 qui, dès le XVIIe siècle
51. Lettres de nomination de Mathieu de Goutin en qualité de lieutenant
civil et criminel en Acadie. Voir idem, cité en note 27, à la p. 310.
52. Idem, à la p. 309 et Dauchy, cité en note 16, aux pp. 220-221.
53. Ferrière C. de, La science parfaite des notaires ou le parfait notaire, 2
vol., Paris 1771.
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assure la réputation et la fortune de son auteur et de ses
successeurs. L’essentiel est qu’entre les prescrits légaux affirmés
en tête des actes et la vision que les justiciables ont du droit leurs
actes offrent des interstices dans lesquels celle-ci peut se glisser et
devenir droit, voire même aller contre ceux-là.
En Acadie, le premier notaire rencontré est Guillaume Le Bel
qui nous a laissé, daté de 1649, un remarquable acte de concession
de terre à un tenancier ; l’historien du droit français pourrait le
prendre comme document représentatif de tels actes pour son
enseignement, alors qu’il est passé à quelques 6 000 kilomètres à
vol d’oiseau de la métropole ; il semble en outre rédigé sans
recours à un formulaire préétabli54. Le dernier notaire, le seul
nommé par la Couronne est Loppinot55, qui opère dans les
dernières années de la période française ; il ne nous a laissé qu’un
bref portefeuille d’actes déposés chez le lieutenant général, ce qui
leur permit d’échapper aux incendies successifs ayant dévasté le
domicile du notaire au cours de cette période.
Le Canada connaît son premier notaire dès 162156. Sa fonction
première est celle de greffier de la juridiction de Québec ; de celleci, il glisse à celle de tabellion, puis de notaire sans qu’il y soit
formellement nommé. Le premier notaire officiel ne sera
commissionné qu’en 1649, donnant le coup d’envoi d’une
multiplication de la fonction au niveau des seigneuries et des trois
villes de la colonie, Montréal, Québec et Trois-Rivières. On
distinguera dès lors le notaire royal, nommé par le Conseil
souverain du notaire seigneurial, nommé par le seigneur.
En Louisiane, greffier et notaire apparaissent dès 1712 et se
confondent à l’origine dans leur fonction et dans leur titre57.
D. Conclusion
Ceux que j’ai appelés (un peu indûment diraient certains) les
juristes, quels qu’ils soient, sont évidemment susceptibles de
contribuer à la constitution d’une culture juridique. Dans le
contexte de l’Amérique du Nord, je serais tenté d’effectuer en leur
54. Le texte en est repris dans Vanderlinden, Le lieutenant civil et criminel,
à la pp. 266.
55. Voir idem, à la p. 338.
56. Sur ce point et ceux qui suivent, voir A. Vachon, Histoire du notariat
canadien, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 1962.
57. Voir Palmer, cité en note 30, aux pp. 14-15.
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sein une distinction évidente en soi : elle sépare ceux qui ont
effectivement acquis des qualifications juridiques, lesquelles sont
nécessairement obtenues en France et parfois complétées par une
expérience professionnelle dans la métropole de ceux qui sont
dépourvus de ces qualifications. La culture des premiers sera sans
doute davantage teintée de « science » que celle des seconds qui
relèvera davantage d’un « savoir » populaire. Les premiers
occuperont en outre souvent des positions élevées de par la volonté
de la Couronne. Quant aux seconds, ils formeront la base du
personnel judiciaire, mais il leur arrivera de rejoindre les premiers
au sommet du pouvoir judiciaire en tant que membres des conseils,
voire en tant que dépositaires des plus hautes fonctions, ce qui
semble cependant relativement rare ; celles-ci ne concernent par
ailleurs qu’un très petit nombre de personnes, à savoir les
intendants et les procureurs généraux. Une fois de plus le constat
s’impose de la nécessité d’études globales et systématiques de ces
professions et de leurs mentalités, sans oublier les évidents points
de contact qui existent entre elles que ce soit institutionnellement
(elles se mélangent au sein des Conseils) ou socialement. ces
points de contact, qu’ils soient conflictuels ou consensuels dans
leurs résultats, génèrent une dynamique dont il est essentiel de
tenir compte.
IV. LES GOUVERNANTS
Il vient d’être question dans les dernières lignes du paragraphe
précédent des « dépositaires des plus hautes fonctions ». Leur rôle
symbolique, généré par leur position dans le système judiciaire ou,
mais dans une mesure moindre, dans la structure politique (on
pense immédiatement au gouverneur) peut constituer un facteur
d’entraînement en faveur de telle ou telle culture juridique. Tel a
bien été le rôle déterminant de certains rois de France dans la
construction progressive d’une identité nationale et, plus
particulièrement, d’une culture juridique française. Les ont
accompagnés des juristes comme Dumoulin dont l’Oratio de
concordia et unione consuetudinum Franciae est contemporaine de
la Défense et illustration de la langue française de du Bellay.
En Amérique du Nord, ces gouvernants sont essentiellement,
au sommet, au nombre de trois : le gouverneur général (ou le
gouverneur en Acadie et en Louisiane), l’intendant (ou l’Écrivain
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en Acadie et le Commissaire en Louisiane) et le procureur général
(procureur du roi en Acadie), auxquels il convient d’ajouter les
membres du Conseil qu’il soit souverain ou supérieur pour le
Canada et la Louisiane respectivement. Pouvoir parallèle, mais
considérable, l’Église catholique est omniprésente dans la vie
juridique (tous les problèmes du mariage sont de sa compétence),
mais aussi politique, que ce soit sous la forme de missionnaires
(comme en Acadie) ou d’un évêque et des ordres puissants
(comme au Canada). Je ne dirai pas grand-chose de ces
gouvernants. L’examen de la manière dont ils ont exercé leurs
fonctions révèle qu’ils constituent, par leur seule existence et leurs
rivalités internes, le principal ferment de dissensions dans leurs
ressorts respectifs. Ils contribuent ainsi à écrire une histoire riche
en rebondissements qui remplit en grande partie leurs biographies.
Que l’un ou l’autre d’entre eux parviennent encore à matérialiser
une quelconque politique étonne l’observateur extérieur.
Pour les départager, il y a, bien sûr, la Couronne et ses
ministres. En résulte un va-et-vient fréquent entre la colonie et la
métropole, que ce soit en personne ou par épouse interposée. Il est
en effet hasardeux de se fier au courrier. Un an est le minimum
requis pour qu’une réaction formelle parvienne dans la colonie à
une plainte écrite. Souvent, en outre, quel que soit celui qui la
signe, la réponse est le fait de personnes d’autant moins au fait de
la situation locale que leur rang dans la hiérarchie métropolitaine
est élevé. Et tant de choses peuvent se produire tant à Québec qu’à
Paris dans l’intervalle que rien ne remplace un messager personnel
auquel on puisse se fier.
De notre point de vue – celui de l’amorce d’une culture
juridique française – ces péripéties de la vie politique locale
seraient peut-être sans intérêt si elles ne s’accompagnaient d’un
clivage qui sépare les hauts fonctionnaires venus directement de
France des « élites » locales, à base seigneuriale et fortement
représentées aux niveaux inférieurs de la hiérarchie judiciaire et, au
sommet, au sein du Conseil souverain. Ces seigneurs ont une base
rurale dans leurs seigneuries, mais tous ne résident pas
constamment dans celle-ci ; certains, un tiers environ, répartissent
leurs activités entre la ville et la campagne, tandis que les deux
autres tiers se répartissent également entre ces deux habitats. Cette
proportion semble se modifier au cours du temps, puisqu’en 1754,
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on donne le chiffre de 55 000 habitants dans la province, dont
42 000 à la campagne58.
Le clivage ne se limite d’ailleurs pas au monde du droit. Celui
des affaires est également touché ; deux groupes s’y affrontent,
ceux des marchands locaux dont l’investissement se fait sur place
et ceux des « capitalistes » français qui organisent de véritables
« circuits » dans lesquels – et cela est relativement logique – seul
compte leur intérêt en métropole. En fait ces derniers représentent
un âge qui s’efface progressivement, celui des premières
compagnies de colonisation dot l’intérêt se situait (et continue à se
situer) en dehors de la colonie. La bourgeoisie locale expatriée, au
contraire vit au Canada, s’y reproduit, s’y développe et tolère de
moins en moins que les bénéfices de son activité profite aux seuls
« forains », c’est-à-dire aux commerçants français qui viennent
chaque été faire leurs affaires dans la colonie dans des conditions
où la libre concurrence est loin d’être présente à la fois dans les
faits et en droit59. En résultent leur réputation d’individus cupides
prospérant sur les guerres coloniales et des plaintes fréquentes
auprès des plus hautes autorités locales, rapidement accusées de ne
pas les prendre en considération en raison de leur récente origine
« française » et des attaches qu’elles maintiennent avec leurs
racines culturelles, économiques, politiques et sociales dans la
métropole. Quant aux revendications auprès de la Couronne, elles
demeurent sans écho, les forains et leurs commanditaires étant
assurément mieux en cour que les « Canadiens » ; j’y reviendrai.
V. LES COMMUNAUTÉS
Le fait qu’une partie importante de l’Amérique du Nord aient
été originellement peuplée d’immigrant venus de France sur des
terres revendiquées et occupées encore aujourd’hui, en proportion
variable, par certains de leurs descendants parlant encore le
français, conduit inévitablement à s’intéresser à la contribution des
communautés constituées de ces immigrants aux origines d’une
culture juridique française dans la région. Alors que, dans les deux
sections précédentes, il a été question des juristes – premières
58. Voir G. Frégault, La société canadienne sous le régime français,
Ottawa, Société historique du Canada, 1954, à la p. 12.
59. Voir le site, en linge : Nouvelle-France – Horizons nouveaux sous
http://www.champlain2004.org/ dans le chapitre « Commercer », paragraphe
« Les marchands forains ».
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personnes susceptibles « naturellement » d’être à l’origine d’une
culture juridique – puis des gouvernants, dont le droit est, avec la
force et la persuasion, l’un des outils privilégiés de leur action
(d’autres diraient la superstructure d’un pouvoir, celui de la France
coloniale en l’occurrence) – les communautés d’individus – ceuxci étant dits sujets de droit par les juristes, de la même manière que
les gouvernants les déclarent sujets de la Couronne – sont
également susceptibles de développer une culture juridique
coutume. Celle-ci, qui s’exprime à travers une source de droit, la
coutume, caractérisée par le fait quelle s’exprime à travers le
comportement des individus, est spontanée et se confond souvent
avec le droit dès sa naissance. Je serais presque tenté d’écrire que
si, dans le cas des juristes et des gouvernants le droit précède la
culture juridique, dans les communautés, la culture juridique
précède le droit proprement dit. C’est évidemment ma face cachée
d’anthropologue juridique qui m’inspire cette conjecture. Mais si
pareille hypothèse se vérifie, elle entraîne un corollaire : il ne peut
être question d’une culture juridique française qu’à la condition
que la France forme réellement une communauté, une nation, une
patrie dont l’amour sacré conduise les bras vengeurs de ceux qui à
son appel sont prêts à vivre, voire à mourir pour elle.
Cette culture éventuelle est aussi, à l’époque qui nous intéresse,
une culture de « laboureurs », comme on les appelle en Acadie
dans les premiers recensements60. Ils y constituent 99% de la
population, même s’ils complètent leur production agricole par un
élevage de gros ou petit bétail et une activité de petite industrie
(moulins notamment) pour quelques-uns d’entre eux.
Si la population du Canada en 1754, on donne le chiffre de
55 000 habitants dans la province, dont 42 000 à la campagne.
Enfin les communautés de Louisiane sont essentiellement
rurales.
Dans les lignes qui précèdent, j’ai déjà posé quelques jalons sur
la voie conduisant à une vérification de l’existence de pareille
hypothèse en ce qui concerne l’Acadie. Nous y trouvons en effet
une communauté dont l’origine est essentiellement l’Ouest de la
France ; elle compte, en 1686 – un demi-siècle à peu près après les
premières arrivées en groupe – environ 900 personnes (hommes,
60. Voir J. Vanderlinden, « Regard sur le juge colonial en Acadie
française », Le juge et l’outre-mer, (B. Durand et M. Fabre, dir.), tome 1, Lille,
Centre d’histoire judiciaire, 2006, 305, à la p. 305.
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femmes et enfants) ; elle a vécu une alternance de gouvernants
(français-écossais-français-anglais-français) et s’apprête à en vivre
une autre ; elle est gouvernée à ce moment par trois expatriés
récents (ce sont le gouverneur, le lieutenant civil et criminel – qui
est aussi l’écrivain du roi – et, enfin, le procureur du roi – qui est
aussi le notaire) ; elle assiste enfin, étonnée, aux conflits entre ces
trois « Français », arbitrés par un lointain ministre de la Marine
soumis aux pressions de l’un ou l’autre courtisan ayant pris parti
pour l’un ou l’autre des protagonistes, comme aux différends qui
opposent les uns ou les autres au clergé local. Pour couronner le
tout, l’ensemble de cette communauté se rend compte de ce que la
France n’est pas prête à fournir l’effort nécessaire à sa défense
contre les incursions des colons anglais de Boston. Que cette
population se perçoive, après un demi-siècle et, a fortiori, pendant
le quart de siècle qui lui reste à vivre sous le régime français,
comme une communauté distincte de la mère-patrie n’a rien
détonnant. Que la correspondance des gouverneurs avec
l’administration métropolitaine ne manque pas de commentaires
négatifs à son égard et la considère comme constituée de
« mauvais sujets dont la France se débarrassoit » ou de
« républicains » se comprend également. Que ces Français
d’Acadie se considèrent davantage comme des Acadiens ne peut
dès lors surprendre. Il ne faudra plus alors que survienne la
dramatique et redoutable épreuve de la déportation de masse pour
que ce peuple en devenir se transforme en ce qu’il est aujourd’hui,
« la tête en Acadie et les pieds en Louisiane ». Le paradoxe est
sans doute qu’il ait conservé le drapeau tricolore de la république,
mais en prenant soin de le frapper d’une étoile d’or dans le bleu.
Le cas du Canada est fort différent dans son évolution, même
s’il semble aboutir à résultat fort proche. La société canadienne
apparaît, dès le départ, plus composite sur le plan juridique que
celle de l’Acadie. Elle comporterait, en effet, en 1663, un peu plus
d’un quart de personnes gouvernées par les coutumes de l’Ouest de
la France, près d’un quart de Normands dont le coutume présente
des particularités vraiment originales (dont l’absence de régime de
communauté) et seulement 6,3 % de « Parisiens ». À partir de
1663, cette diversité est, d’un trait de plume, remplacée par un
droit unique, celui de la coutume de Paris. Indépendamment de
toutes les situations acquises sous le régime antérieur dont on peut
se demander ce qu’il en advient pendant quelques années encore,
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est-il vraisemblable, sinon possible, que l’ensemble des mentalités
locales se modifie par le seul effet de l’article 33 de l’édit de 1664
? C’est difficile à admettre comme une présomption irréfragable.
Certes l’existence de tribunaux inférieurs dans les trois principaux
centres urbains du pays (Montréal, Québec et Trois-Rivières)
encourage la vocation à l’unité. Probablement aussi le peuplement
important au cours des décennies qui suivent modifie-t-il la
structure des mentalités locales au détriment de celles des débuts
de la colonisation. La coutume de Paris trouverait ainsi un terreau
plus fertile dans lequel s’implanter d’autant plus facilement que le
sommet politique de la colonie est occupé par des gouvernants
arrivant le plus souvent directement de France. À ces facteurs s’en
opposent d’autres liés à une évolution majeure de la société locale ;
celle de ce qu’on pourrait appeler sa « canadienneté » croissante.
La distinction entre la population de souche, les « Canadiens », et
les « Français » qu’ils soient au sommet du gouvernement ou
entendent contrôler le monde des affaires, déjà rencontrée en
Acadie (mais pour des raisons totalement différentes) apparaît ainsi
qui oppose deux communautés au fur et à mesure que la société
coloniale prend conscience de son identité61. Comme l’écrit fort
pertinemment Jacques Mathieu, ce mouvement aboutit à définir un
« un type social et culturel original »62, caractérisé, aux yeux des
« Français » par son « indocilité » et son esprit d’«
indépendance »63. Ou, encore, ces constats de Français
contemporains des derniers temps de la présence française dans la
province : « Il semble que nous soyons d’une nation différente,
ennemie même » et « Il aurait toujours un défaut originel, il est
canadien », dans la bouche de Montcalm parlant du dernier
gouverneur, Vaudreuil le jeune64. Pour de nombreuses raisons,
donc, et pour d’autres aussi que notre collègue et d’autres mettent
clairement en évidence. Mais si une culture originale se développe,
qu’en est-il de ses aspects juridiques ? Le conflit entre les
représentants d’une culture française en place au plus haut niveau
61. Voir, sur le double mouvement d’opposition à la métropole et
d’intégration interne, T. Berthet, Seigneurs et colons de Nouvelle-France :
l’émergence d’une société distincte au XVIIIe siècle, Cachan, École nationale
supérieure, 1992, à la p. 8.
62. Hamelin, cité en note 23.
63. Les deux termes sont repris dans Frégault, précité en note 58, ibidem.
64. Cités dans R. C. Harris, The seigneurial system in early Canada, a
geographical study, 2d ed., Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1984,
respectivement aux pp. 190-191, 198.
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du gouvernement de la colonie et privilégiant leur culture d’origine
– celle de la coutume de Paris – et les membres des élites locales,
notamment judiciaires65, soucieux de donner à leur vie une cadre
juridique qui encadre leur identité nouvelle n’est-il pas
nécessairement producteur d’un cadre juridique nouveau, sans
doute largement inspiré de la coutume de Paris, mais néanmoins en
passe de devenir, lui aussi, « canadien » ? La question semble être
rarement – pour ne pas dire jamais – posée.
Vient enfin la Louisiane, dans laquelle la situation est fort
différente des deux autres colonies. Son peuplement est difficile et
ne bénéficie certainement pas d’un effort comparable à celui
effectué pour le Canada. Il n’atteint pas, en chiffres de population
et après quelques décennies, un niveau comparable à celui de
l’Acadie ; la colonie compte 550 habitants en 1717. D’où le
recours, dans le premier quart du XVIIIe siècle, à quelques milliers
de colons allemands qui s’installent sur la Côte des Allemands.
Simultanément, quelque six mille esclaves sont importés d’Afrique
; ils constitueront pendant longtemps la fraction la plus importante
de la population. Leur arrivée justifiera l’introduction dans la
colonie du Code noir en 1724 ; il y restera quelque cent cinquante
ans en vigueur jusqu’à l’achèvement de la guerre de Sécession.
Mais il est évident que, pas plus que la communauté allemande,
celle des esclaves ne contribue aux origines d’une éventuelle
culture française. Reste la population venue de France qui, à part
quelques commerçants, fonctionnaires ou soldats serait constituée
de déportés, de forçats libérés, de pensionnaires d’asiles ou de
prostituées, si on en croit certains66. L’apport « français » qui
laissera le plus de trace est celui des Acadiens67. Dispersés à
travers les colonies anglaises d’Amérique, dans les Antilles ou en
Europe suite à la Déportation, les premiers Acadiens arrivent en
Louisiane venant de New York en mars ou avril 1764 ; il s’agit
d’une vingtaine de personnes, membres de quatre familles. Il est
important de noter que la Louisiane est, à ce moment possession
espagnole depuis plus de trente ans. Le premier établissement
groupé et stable est la paroisse de St. Jacques de Cabannocé en
1765 ; il résulte de l’arrivée de quelque 200 personnes en
65. Idem, à la p. 190.
66. Palmer s’en fait l’écho dans son texte cité en note 30, à la p. 2.
67. Voir le site, en ligne : http://www.thecajuns.com/acadians.htm, et C. A.
Brasseaux, The Founding of New Acadia, Louisiana State University Press,
1987.
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provenance de Saint-Domingue et conduit par une personnalité
acadienne bien connue, Joseph Broussard, dit Beausoleil. Les
nouveaux arrivants vont progressivement se disperser dans la
colonie, particulièrement dans les postes des Attakapas et
d’Opelousas. Le flot des arrivées fut régulier au cours des années
suivantes et comprendra environ 1 600 immigrants acadiens
revenant de France en Amérique du Nord. Les derniers Acadiens à
immigrer en Louisiane y arriveront en 1809, alors que leur nombre
total avoisine les 5 000. Si on excepte les esclaves, ils forment à ce
moment la plus forte communauté louisianaise, d’autant plus qu’ils
ont virtuellement absorbé la communauté de langue allemande. Par
contre leurs relations avec les communautés amérindiennes,
créoles et africaines semblent avoir été difficiles et, par ricochet,
avoir contribué à renforcer leur isolement et leur identité68. À côté
d’eux, la communauté française de la Nouvelle-Orléans est
évidemment minoritaire. Mais elle comprend de nouveau un petit
nombre de personnes qui se considèrent comme étant « de
qualité » et qui sont peut-être davantage à même que les Acadiens
de contribuer au développement d’une culture juridique française,
alors que ceux venus d’Acadie pourraient bien avoir conservé,
contre vents et marées, leur culture juridique des pays de l’Ouest
de la France. Dans la diversité ethnique qui vient d’être mise en
évidence, il semblerait qu’ait prévalu une « empreinte française »
qui se serait conservée malgré la cession à l’Espagne et au-delà de
celle-ci69.
A. Conclusion
Les données relatives aux communautés sont celles qui posent
à l’historien du droit les plus grandes difficultés. Elles lui offrent
une masse de sources dont le seul traitement quantitatif effraie plus
d’un. Elles sont dispersées en des lieux multiples sans qu’il soit
toujours possible d’y accéder aisément. Elles supposent un
traitement presque exhaustif afin de permettre une représentation
satisfaisante de la perception qu’ont du droit les individus. Leur
interprétation a posteriori, enfin, expose constamment le chercheur
aux risques de l’anachronisme. Mais il me paraît que ces obstacles
68. Voir ce qu’en écrit Brasseaux dans « Naissance et renaissance de la
société acadienne louisianaise », cité en note 10, à la p. 162.
69. Voir Palmer, dans son texte cité en note 30, à la p. 2.
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sont surmontables comme l’ont prouvé tant d’études brillantes des
mentalités. En tout cas, ignorer les attitudes des communautés face
au droit, particulièrement lorsqu’on aborde la culture juridique
dans une perspective historique et dans des temps fort différents de
ceux que nous vivons, m’apparaîtrait comme regrettable. En outre,
comme je l’ai souligné dans les conclusions relatives aux juristes et
davantage encore en ce qui concerne celles-ci, chacune d’entre
elles ne vit pas isolée des autres ; l’assimilation de certaines
communautés d’origine allemande à celles d’origine acadienne le
montre à suffisance. Il est donc essentiel d’étudier le phénomène
dans sa dynamique et de ne pas le limiter à l’analyse de ses aspects
statiques.
VI. CONCLUSION
À PROPOS DE CULTURE JURIDIQUE, DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE
FRANÇAISE, NOTION AMBIGUË, À TRAVERS L’ESPACE ET LE TEMPS
(BIS)
Au moment de clore ces quelques pages introductives aux
origines de la culture juridique française en Amérique du Nord, j’ai
le sentiment très net que mes lecteurs estimeront que je ne leur ai
guère apporté de grandes lumières sur le sujet et peut-être même
que le nombre de questions que je me pose ne fait qu’obscurcir
certaines idées qu’ils pouvaient avoir nourries sur ce problème.
Entre les sources du droit et la perception que se font de celui-ci
les individus, entre le commandement du pouvoir et la pratique
sociale, entre l’impensé des élites et celui des populations, entre les
attentes des unes et celles des autres, au sein des élites entre celui
ou celles des gouvernants et celui ou celles des juristes, ou encore
des forains ou des locaux, on rencontre un kaléidoscope (en ce
compris le mouvement perpétuel propre à cet instrument)
d’éléments constitutifs de la culture juridique. Bien fol sans doute
est celui qui commettrait, comme moi, l’erreur d’accepter de s’y
attaquer et surtout, ayant écrit cela, se risquerait à une conclusion
sur le sujet. Et pourtant la vocation du chercheur n’est-elle pas
d’essayer d’avancer de question en intuition, d’intuition en
conjecture, de conjecture en hypothèse et d’hypothèse en
suggestion ? Je suggérerais donc que, au début du XIXe siècle :
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(1) du point de vue qui est le nôtre, l’Acadie se distingue
nettement des deux autres provinces françaises d’Amérique. Les
dramatiques événements qui s’y déroulent dans la seconde moitié
du XVIIIe siècle conduisent en effet à une oblitération complète de
la culture juridique française dans la province, même si on peut
penser qu’elle ne s’éteint que progressivement dans la mesure où,
encore au XIXe siècle, nous possédons des traces du rôle actif que
continue à jouer le clergé catholique dans la résolution des conflits
entre ses paroissiens. Si tel est bien le cas, la question est posée du
contexte juridique dans lequel cette activité juridictionnelle non
officielle se situe. Ce n’est certainement pas la common law, seul
droit existant en principe dans les provinces de Nouvelle-Écosse
ou du Nouveau-Brunswick. Est-il possible que ce soit des
survivances de coutumes de France ? Nous n’en savons rien dans
l’état actuel des choses. Toujours est-il qu’il n’existe plus
aujourd’hui de traces d’une culture juridique française dans ce qui
était autrefois l’Acadie, même si la langue française y a une place
bien plus importante qu’en Louisiane et même si le drapeau
français frappé d’une étoile d’or dans le bleu y flotte en de
nombreux endroits aux côtés de ceux de la province et de l’État
fédéral canadien. Peut-on, en pareil cas, parler de l’origine d’une
culture juridique française en Amérique du Nord. Je ne le pense
pas, même si l’expérience acadienne a, un temps, fait partie de
l’histoire de cette culture entendue dans un sens extrêmement
large.
(2) au Canada, les choses sont aussi différentes que le sont
l’histoire culturelle, économique et politique de l’Acadie et de la
Belle Province. Le Canada, tout en devenant différent
culturellement de la France, a conservé contre vents et marées un
symbole qui le rattachait à la France (mais peut-être pas un droit
français au sens strict du terme) sur le plan du droit : la coutume de
Paris. Celle-ci lui a servi de terme de référence et de point de
ralliement autour d’un héritage lorsqu’il a été question de
gouverner les relations de droit privé de ses habitants par un
système juridique qui leur était totalement étranger. Se vérifie ainsi
le constat de Garapon relatif à l’importance des symboles
qui sont susceptibles d’avoir autant de valeur « que tous
les non-dits sous-jacents de la vie [ou de la culture ? ]70

70. Mon ajout entre crochets.
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juridique »71. Mais la question est posée de la mesure dans laquelle
la coutume de Paris représente effectivement dans sa forme et son
contenu une culture juridique française. Au moment des
conclusions, j’en reviens ainsi à l’une mes interrogations de
départ : qu’est-ce qu’une culture juridique « française » ?
(3) en Louisiane, enfin, la place occupée par une culture
juridique française doit s’apprécier prudemment à la fois en
fonction du facteur temps et du facteur lieux. Les temps d’abord :
avant l’adoption du Code civil des Français en 1804, parler d’une
culture juridique « française » ne me paraît possible que dans la
mesure où, comme au Canada, on considère comme « française »
la culture juridique issue de la coutume réformée de Paris de 1580
telle que « reçue » dans la province. Les lieux ensuite : sur cette
base, qui repose entièrement sur le sens à donner à l’adjectif, il est
évidemment possible de parler d’une influence « française »
certaine à la Nouvelle-Orléans et dans la région qui en est proche.
Ce constat doit toutefois être soigneusement nuancé dans les
parties rurales de la province, notamment dans la mesure où y
subsistent de fortes influences des coutumes de l’Ouest amenées
par les Acadiens à partir de leur arrivée sur les lieux. Après 1804,
la Louisiane n’est plus française. Ceci n’empêche pas qu’une
culture juridique française soit perceptible d’une part, d’une part,
de manière ténue, dans la forme que va prendre la première
codifications locale du droit civil (Digeste de 1808) et d’autre part,
de manière plus qu’évidente, aussi bien dans la forme que dans le
fond du Code civil de 1825.
En ce qui concerne le fond, le seul élément de culture juridique
française présent dans le Digeste est formé par les rares références
à l’œuvre de Domat, Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel, qui
concerne davantage le droit romain que le droit à proprement
parler français. Que cette oeuvre fasse partie de la culture juridique
française est admissible ; en conclure qu’elle joue effectivement un
rôle significatif dans le droit louisianais de l’époque est plus
discutable. Pour le reste, le contenu du Digeste reflète bien
davantage une culture juridique espagnole. La culture juridique
française explose par contre, tant dans la forme que dans le fond au
niveau du code civil de 1825. Le paradoxe qui accompagne cette
explosion est peut-être seulement que le document qui la
71. A. Garapon, Bien juger, Essai sur le rituel judiciaire, Paris, Odile Jacob,
1997, à la p. 150.
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symbolise se développera désormais par le canal d’une langue qui
ne sera plus celle de son modèle, le français, ouvrant ainsi, la
première face d’un diptyque inversé dont la seconde sera
constituée, un siècle et demie plus tard, par l’enseignement de la
common law en français en Acadie.
Nous aboutissons ainsi à un constat fondamental : si toute
référence à une culture implique qu’elle se situe dans une tradition,
se référer à une culture juridique française en Amérique du Nord
remonte au premier quart du XIXe siècle en Louisiane, à la
seconde moitié de ce siècle au Canada, devenu dans l’intervalle le
Bas-Canada avant de devenir le Québec. Quant à l’Acadie, elle en
serait totalement dépourvue. Est-ce dire pour autant qu’elle en soit
totalement absente ? Nous avons le sentiment que non.
L’inclination de certains juristes acadiens d’aujourd’hui vers la
culture française dans son ensemble pourrait fort bien aboutir au
résultat que la dimension juridique de celle-ci s’infiltre dans la
common law telle qu’elle se pratique au Nouveau-Brunswick.
Ainsi se constituerait ce que j’ai proposé à mes collègues de
l’Université de Moncton d’appeler une common law « à leur
image »72.
Le caractère relativement récent des manifestations de
l’existence d’une culture juridique française en Amérique du Nord
ne diminue en rien sa vigueur dans cette région du monde. La
réunion qui s’ouvre demain73 en porte le témoignage.

72. Voir Étudier et enseigner le droit, hier, aujourd’hui et demain,
Cowansville-Bruxelles, Éditions Yvon Blais, Bruylant, 2006, aux pp. 271-316,
dans lesquelles ce thème est abordé par M. Doucet et P. Foucher.
73. Ce texte est le développement d’un discours prononcé le 18 mai 2008 à
Bâton-Rouge (Louisiane) en ouverture aux Journées internationales 2008 de
l’Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture juridique française.
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One of my first wishes, as the newly appointed director of the
Center of Civil Law Studies (in August 2005), was to invite
Professor Saúl Litvinoff to give the Thirty-third Tucker Lecture.
However, Don Saúl had his own agenda and his wish was to have
me deliver the lecture! I could not start in my new function by
contradicting my highly respected and distinguished predecessor.
He offered me the splendid opportunity of giving an inaugural
lecture here at LSU. I dedicated this lecture to him, as a tribute to
his outstanding achievements, as a vibrant homage to his
contribution to the development of the civil law inside and outside
of the state of Louisiana. In addition to being a highly learned man
of science, a walking encyclopedia of the civil law in so many
∗

Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair,
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University; formerly Professor of Law, Université Jean Moulin
Lyon 3 and Director of the Edouard Lambert Institute of Comparative Law.
This is the text of the 33rd John H. Tucker, Jr. Lecture in Civil Law, given
at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center, on March 16th, 2006. It was first published in
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAÚL LITVINOFF 605-632 (O. Moréteau, J. Romañach, A.
Zuppi, eds., Claitor’s, Baton Rouge, 2008). Though substantially edited, it keeps
some of its oral style. The author is grateful to Paul R. Baier and Robert A.
Pascal for their inspiring comments and to John Bihm, Jeff J. Keiser, Agustín
Parise, and Tsvetanka Spassova for the editing.
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languages, a prominent comparatist, Don Saúl is what we call in
French un Grand Seigneur and, as some still know, nobility is
before all a quality of the heart.
In 1938, on the occasion of the Dedication of our “old” Law
Building, standing at the top of the outdoor steps between the six
high columns, Roscoe Pound presented his thoughts on the
influence of the civil law in America.1 It was published seventy
years ago as the first article in the first issue of the Louisiana Law
Review; I gave my Tucker Lecture in 2006, on the centennial of
the Paul H. Hebert Law Center; this was the 33rd Tucker Lecture, a
third of a century, the year where I celebrated my 50th birthday, a
half of a century. All these are nice signals inviting us to look
again where we stand, collectively and individually. Roscoe
Pound has influenced legal thought not only in America but also in
France, through his friendship and long-lasting intellectual
relationship with Edouard Lambert, the founder in Lyon of one the
very first Institutes of Comparative Law ever created on the planet
Earth. I feel bound to say this because a friend and colleague of
mine in Lyon, Hervé Croze, recently published a book on Law on
the Planet Mars.2 Pound and Lambert exchanged ideas on
standards, on the principle of proportionality, and on a number of
other things that have made their way into the jurisprudence of
both jurisdictions.3
In 1938, Pound described a civil law tradition threatened by too
much nationalism, especially in Europe. He said that the
development of comparative law could give the civil law a future
in America, even outside Louisiana where it was then experiencing
a renaissance.4 Today, many civil law jurisdictions feel under
threat, but this time the enemy is globalization, which seems to
promote the American common law as a model all over the world,
at least in the field of commercial law. The World Bank complains
about too much rigidity and some inadequacies in nations that

1. Roscoe Pound, The Influence of the Civil Law in America, 1 LA. L. REV.
1 (1938).
2. PHILIBERT LEDOUX, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT MARTIEN: LE PREMIER
ROMAN JURIDIQUE (2006).
3. Olivier Moréteau, Le standard et la diversité, in LAW AND HUMAN
DIVERSITY, 71, 80 (Mauro Bussani & Michele Graziadei eds., 2005).
4. Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law in Time and Space, 4 AM. J. COMP. L.
70, 77 (1955).
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happen to have a civil law system.5 Also, everything around us is
changing so fast that some may wonder, especially outside civil
law jurisdictions, whether codification may still offer a satisfactory
framework in the 21st century. Let me say first that the problems
the World Bank is complaining about have little to do with Codes
as such, but relate mostly to bureaucracy and corruption and aim
mostly at some former French colonies in Africa and the
Caribbean.
Louisiana is a civil law island in a common law ocean; France
sees its once revered Napoleonic tradition threatened by new
models, the German one being strongly promoted by many
working on the project of a European Civil Code. Both in France
and in Louisiana, there is this growing feeling amongst civilians
that the French model of codification may not resist.6 I do believe
that the reaction cannot be local. In France it is all too often
provincial.
Coming back from the splendid conferences
commemorating the bicentennial of the Code Napoleon,7 Rodolfo
Sacco noted: “the French may accept a European Civil Code but
on three conditions,
-

Firstly, it must be written by the French;

-

Secondly, it must be written in French;

-

And thirdly, it must be the French Civil Code itself.”

The reaction must be open, and comparative, as Pound
indicated. It is a strong sign that my two French predecessors
giving the Tucker Lecture were great comparatists: René David in
19738 and André Tunc in 1978.9 This Law School always
understood the importance of comparative law, with a decisive
5. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION
(2004).
6. Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Sara Patris-Godechot, LE CODE CIVIL
FACE À SON DESTIN 195-198 and 220-223 (Louisiana) (2006); SHAEL HERMAN,
THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY FOR THE UNITED STATES
(1993); Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of Codification in America, 40
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 407 (1996).
7. Impressive collections of papers have been published: LE CODE CIVIL
1804-2004, LIVRE DU BICENTENAIRE (2004); 1804-2004, LE CODE CIVIL UN
PASSÉ, UN PRÉSENT, UN AVENIR (2004).
8. René David, The Civil Code in France To-day, 34 LA. L. REV. 907
(1974).
9. André Tunc, A Codified Law of Tort–The French Experience, 39 LA. L.
REV. 1051 (1979).
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impetus under the leadership of Chancellor John Costonis, whom I
would like to acknowledge as a man of vision. It is therefore no
surprise that I should present a comparative outlook on the
situation of the Civil Codes after two hundred years of codification
in these two jurisdictions.
It is fair to keep loyal to a tradition, to cherish one’s roots and
be proud of one’s past and ancestors. In this period of doubt we
are going through, we are meant to focus on what makes us strong
in the global competition. To do that, let us revisit the function of
codes in the civil law tradition, adopting a comparative approach.
We may then be able to see more clearly some mistakes we
should avoid if we want to keep our tradition alive, and also if we
want it to grow in the future. Because Louisiana is a multicultural
and bijural state, it is our responsibility to give the civil law a
chance to diffuse and permeate other traditions in a global world,
which is more and more a mixed or hybrid, as Don Saúl would put
it.
Let me get at these two points in turn: revisiting the function
of codes in the civil law tradition and imagining the place of codes
in a multicultural world.
I. REVISITING THE FUNCTION OF CODES
IN THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
In 1994, during a short visit to the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, I gave a talk on codes, which was published under
the title of “Codes as Strait-Jackets, Safeguards and Alibis: The
Experience of the French Civil Code.”10 My point was to dispel
some misconceptions about codes in the common law world,
showing a common law audience that codes are not strait-jackets
but are meant to safeguard people’s rights. I also pointed out that
in France, the generality of many code articles not only helps to
keep the law flexible but also serves as an alibi to activist judges,
who decide cases on the basis of new doctrines, often invented by
scholars, then finding some vague provision to support the ruling.
Let us revisit these ideas, looking at them alternatively with
civilian and common law eyeglasses, to show that codes are not
strait-jackets but safeguards, at least in the French and Louisiana
10. Olivier Moréteau, Codes as Strait-Jackets, Safeguards and Alibis: The
Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C.J. INT’L & COM. REG. 273 (1995).
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tradition, and then to decide whether it is right or wrong to use
them as alibis.
A. Codes are not Strait-Jackets but Safeguards
As I said in my UNC address, “Lawyers in common law
countries tend to consider the codified civil law systems as
restrictive and mechanical.”11 I cited Roscoe Pound, who said:
As a critic has put it, the theory of the codes in Continental
Europe in the last century made of the court a sort of judicial
slot machine. The necessary machinery had been provided in
advance by legislation or by received legal principles and one
had but to put it in the facts above and take out the decision
below. True, this critic says, the facts do not always fit the
machinery, and hence we may have to thump and joggle the
machinery a bit in order to get anything out. But even in
extreme cases of this departure from the purely automatic,
the decision is attributed, not at all to the thumping and
joggling process, but solely to the machine.12
What happens here is that common-law lawyers13 project their
conception of the detailed and specific statute on their vision of
Civil Codes. But the reality is different: most codes in civil law
countries contain open-textured provisions, general rules and
principles, and they are seldom too detailed even in specific
provisions. Saying this, I have in mind Civil Codes rather than
Tax Codes or Town Planning Codes, the latter proving that
civilians, when they lose their distinct qualities, can be as bad as
common-law lawyers in producing lengthy detailed provisions.
To cite a couple of examples from the Civil Code:
Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and may be
dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on
grounds provided by law. Contracts must be performed in
good faith.14

11. Moréteau, supra note 10, at 273.
12. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 170-171 (1921).
13. In my oral presentation, I used the traditional term common-lawyer, but
I have been led to understand that it is perceived as derogatory in the United
States.
14. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1983 (2007); C. CIV. art. 1134 (FR.).
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Any act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.15
We should pay attention to the way we civilians communicate
concerning the use of our Codes, which may cause more prejudice
rather than reduce it. When we claim: “our Codes are so well
made, they can apply to situations of all kinds,” we refer to the
generality of the Code that allows application to situations the
drafters could not even have imagined at the age of the stagecoach,
such as flying airplanes or sending e-mails. But the common-law
lawyer is likely to understand: “This Code must be packed with so
many rules! How may Napoleon have thought of everything that
could happen on earth?” And who knows, our common-law
lawyer might even think further: “If not reformed constantly, their
Code must be outdated in so many respects, not a law for the 21st
century, but a strait-jacket for retarded or crazy civilians!”
To show that this is not the case, I come now to the political
and philosophical reason why the French Civil Code was written
the way it still is, even after decades of reforms. The style is
simple; sentences are short and easily readable. Some of them are
nearly as easy to memorize as old Roman law maxims. The
vocabulary is largely non-technical.
This style is an indication of the drafters’ intention to protect
the citizen against the wrongful interference of the judiciary, which
had been abusive during the centuries preceding the Revolution.
As I once wrote, the Code is “almost free of the legal jargon often
used by professionals to establish their authority and protect their
power. Like the text of a constitution, it is meant to be understood
by ordinary citizens, without the interference of verbose lawyers,
who sometimes strive to make the law more complicated than it
really is.”16
The French Civil Code has been represented to be the “civil
constitution” of the country. It is meant to safeguard people’s
rights. France may have had some thirteen constitutions; it is still
living under its original Civil Code (of course substantively
amended), as much as the Americans live under their original
Constitution. The Civil Code largely performs the functions of a
constitution, at least if defined in the American sense, and it easily
15. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2007), C. CIV. art. 1382 (FR.).
16. Moréteau, supra note 10, at 279.
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compares to the United States Constitution by its generality and its
style.
Book I of the French Civil Code, entitled “Of Persons,”
presently starts with a Title 1, “Of Civil Rights,” where we find the
following articles:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private life.17
Everyone has the right to respect of the presumption of
innocence.18
Article 16, introduced in 1994, deals with human dignity. The
articles that follow deal with the protection of the human body.
Of course there is much else in a Code, like rules on the forms
of testaments, on prescription and on transfer of obligations. The
point is that with Code articles so clear, making frequent use of
plain language, it should not be possible for judges to distort the
meaning and make unpredictable judgments. The rights of the
citizens therefore are safeguarded from the risk of judicial abuse.
This leads us to the great paradox of French law. Judges can
play a much more creative role when applying the Civil Code than
when construing detailed legislation. In fact, in the opinion of
Portalis, the most prominent of the Code’s draftsmen, judges were
clearly intended to play such a role. Portalis is well known in
Louisiana. Shael Herman has translated his Preliminary Discourse
to the Civil Code19 and Alain Levasseur wrote a splendid article
entitled “Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?”20
Portalis was a political moderate and also an impressive
philosopher. In his Preliminary speech, he explained the two
extremes that legislators should avoid: oversimplification, “leaving
citizens without rule or guarantee concerning their greatest
interests,” and going too far into details.21
Extremely detailed rules, it was thought, could not resist
evolution and would have to be amended too often, which creates
insecurity. Portalis tells the judge how to deal with legislation:

17. C. CIV. art. 9 (FR.). (Law n° 70-643 of July 17, 1970).
18. C. CIV. art. 9-1 (FR.) (Law n° 93-2 of January 4, 1993).
19. Shael Herman, Excerpts from a Discourse on the Code Napoleon by
Portalis, 18 LOY. L. REV. 23 (1972).
20. Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV.
762 (1969).
21. Levasseur, supra note 20, at 769.
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When the legislation is clear, it must be followed; when it
is obscure, we must carefully analyze its provisions. If
there is no particular enactment, custom or equity must be
consulted. Equity is the return to natural law, when
positive laws are silent, contradictory, or obscure.22
This was never written into the French Code but made its way
almost verbatim into the Louisiana Civil Code, in original article
21,23 replaced by article 4 in the 1987 revision, with a regrettable
abandonment of the reference to natural law, under the pretence
that “the term ‘natural law’ in article 21 of the 1870 Code has no
defined meaning in Louisiana jurisprudence.”24 With due respect,
the term is meaningful in all civil law jurisdictions, as it is also in
the common law world. But it is rejected as contentious by
positivists in both systems.
Portalis then made this magnificent statement:
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and
the former does not resemble the latter. The legislator's
science consists in finding in each subject the principles
most favorable to the common good; the judge's science is
to put these principles into effect, to diversify them, and to
extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application, to
private causes; to examine closely the spirit of the law
when the letter kills.25
And he concludes on the value of experience: “It is for
experience gradually to fill up the gaps we leave.”26 This echoes
with O.W. Holmes: “The life of the law has not been logic, it has
been experience.”27
The value of experience should be
acknowledged in all legal systems.
Portalis invites the judge to contribute to the evolution of the
law through judicial interpretation. The judge is meant to
complement and update the work of the legislator. But the text is
there, general and clear. It cannot be so easily distorted and is
therefore a good safeguard.

22. Id. at 771.
23. Located at the same place in the Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870.
24. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 cmt. (b) (2007).
25. Levasseur, supra note 20, at 772.
26. Id. at 773.
27. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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Then, looking at the Civil Code with Portalis’ eyes, how could
one get the idea that Code articles may serve as alibis?
B. May Civil Code Provisions Serve as Alibis?
This is probably the point where the French experience and the
Louisiana experience differ most, due to a different vision of what
the Civil Code is. The French Civil Code marked the unification
of French law, for which the kings of France had been striving,
without much success. The draftsmen reached this remarkable
compromise between the rich Roman law heritage, chiefly applied
in the South of France, and the profuse and diverse customary laws
(yet with a predominant and highly sophisticated custom of Paris)
applied mostly in the North. They also managed to reconcile some
Ancien Régime values with Revolutionary ideas, thereby
strengthening this fundamental constitutional nature of the Code.
The Ancient law was abolished, which indicates a break with the
past, but the break is not complete, the Code borrowing much
substance from preexisting laws, especially the royal ordinances,
and the books of Domat and Pothier.28
In Louisiana, the Civil Code was not meant to change the
preexisting law. It was called a Digest of the Civil Laws in force in
the Territory of Orleans. It was meant to restate Spanish Law in
force at the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, borrowing the
style and the structure of the French Civil Code and also its
substance when it expressed Spanish law as well as the French.
Here too a remarkable compromise was achieved between the
French and Spanish legal traditions, in producing what Robert
Pascal, in his 1998 Tucker lecture, pleasantly and accurately
described as a “Spanish girl in French dress.”29
Consequently, when French judges referred to the Ancient law
in order to apply a new provision, it was safe for them to hide that
part of the reasoning and to refer exclusively to the intention of the
legislator, claiming they were doing the exegesis of the Code. On
the other side of the Atlantic, their Louisiana colleagues would
openly refer to the ancient Spanish law not only in order to explain
the rule as it appeared in the Code, but upon the understanding that
28. See for a comprehensive historical approach, JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN,
THE CIVIL CODE (David W. Gruning trans., 2000).
29. Robert A. Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301, 303
(1998).
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this was the proper manner to complement the Code provision
when too general or incomplete, the now two hundred year old
Civil Code of 1808 being meant to be a Digest of preexisting
laws.30 Article 3521 of the Civil Code of 1825 repealed the
preexisting law on all matters covered by that Code. Article 3521
resembles the repeal clause adopted in the Act promulgating the
French Civil Code.31 The absence of such a repealing clause in the
Digest of 1808 made the experience of codification a different
story in France and in Louisiana. Further studies may be needed to
check to what extent this difference has been increased by the fact
that, more often than not, the Louisiana Civil Code was applied by
judges trained in the common law.32
In 19th century France, judges hid behind the letter of the Code
when referring to Ancient law. In 19th century Louisiana, the letter
of the Code was sometimes seen as printed on transparent windows
opening to the past, pretty much like the English codifying statutes
of the Victorian age, the presence of common law trained judges
being of course instrumental.
Again, through a civilian perspective, this appears as sheer
loyalty to the Code in both France and Louisiana. Having
identified the law to the general will of the people, and legislation
as the privileged expression of that general will, the French claim
that the exegesis of the Code leaves no room to judicial creativity
but is based on the research of the intention of the legislators.
Working on a similar premise, the Louisianans feel justified to rely
on pre-code authorities, the Code being meant to be a restatement
of such authorities.
Now, how do things appear if looked at from an outsider’s
perspective? It is easy to trace what the Louisiana judge is doing,
since judgments are drafted almost the same way as in common
law jurisdictions. In France, however, the Cour de cassation
writes extremely brief and not informed judgments, where one
30. Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93 (1817); see RICHARD KILBOURNE, A
HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1803-1839
(1987).
31. French Law of March 21, 1804 re-promulgating the Civil Code as a
whole.
32. The Bicentennial of the Louisiana Digest of 1808 is generating such
studies, the Center of Civil Law Studies at LSU having commissioned a world
expert on codification to work out the problem. See JACQUES VANDERLINDEN,
LE CONCEPT DE CODE EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE DU XIIIE AU XIXE SIÈCLE, ESSAI
DE DÉFINITION (1967).
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hardly gets information about the facts and never reads a single
reference to previous cases or to doctrinal sources. Code articles
are interpreted in paragraphs of three lines, creating the impression
that the solution flows directly from the article. It takes legal
expertise to understand a Court of Cassation judgment, and one has
to rely on comments written by scholars or distinguished
practitioners to understand where the jurisprudence goes.
The Cour de cassation acts covertly, using the visa of the
article like a Mardi Gras mask. It often goes far beyond the text or
the spirit of the Code, sometimes for the good, sometimes wrongly.
It may be argued that when, in the law of contract, it introduced the
doctrinal distinction between obligations to provide a certain result
(obligations de résultat) and obligations to provide certain means
(obligations de moyens), finding some support in the articles of the
Code, it acted within the spirit of the Code.33 But when it
implements a shift from liability based on fault, as provided for in
article 1382 (corresponding to article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil
Code), to liability based on a supposed necessity to guarantee
victim’s rights, creating multiple cases of strict liability wherever
the damage is caused by a thing the defendant had under his
custody, it then denies the spirit of the Code and interferes with the
exercise of legislative power.34
Interpretation based on exegesis already gives judges an
immense latitude, yet legitimated by the spirit of the Code.
Inviting them to go further, in the guise of “free scientific
research” as recommended by Gény and Saleilles some hundred
years ago, may sometimes lead to a denial of the principle of
separation of powers, although supposedly revered by the French.
Saleilles’s celebrated formula, “au delà du Code civil, mais par le
Code civil,” inviting to go “beyond the Civil Code but through the
Civil Code,” is an elegant pirouette, providing a smart alibi.35 It is
a very fertile strategy, enabling judges to go well beyond the text
and also sometimes beyond the spirit of the Code. It is to be
remembered that until 1993, it was a criminal offence in France for
33. Moréteau, supra note 10, at 284-287.
34. Id. at 287-288.
35. Raymond Saleilles, Preface to Francois Geny, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE
EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1913). I owe to Paul Baier the origin of this famous
phrase, modeled on Jhering’s words: durch das römische Recht über das
römische Recht hinaus. Rudolf von Jhering, Unsere Ausgabe, 1 JAHRBÜCHER
FÜR DIE DOGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS
52 (1857).
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a judge to decide a case on the basis of general rules or principles
devised by the courts.36 Until then, many Court of Cassation
judges would have been in prison if not allowed to wear elegant
Mardi Gras masks.
My point is not to blame Gény and Saleilles, two giants who
have made a huge contribution to the development of the civil law,
promoting the jurisprudence whilst keeping the codes alive. As
Paul Baier puts it, “Life after text frees the judge.”37 Rather, I
would blame the French for this to be done in some hypocritical
way, more than two hundred years after the Revolution. We allow
the Cour de cassation to dress up its ruling as if flowing naturally
from the text of the Code, even when it is not so. The French
jurisprudence is a world of fiction. On the one hand, the literature
and the teaching in the law schools deny that jurisprudence may be
a direct source of the law, and on the other hand, everyone seems
to accept the existence of an activist, uncontrolled jurisprudence.
To me, it is a social wrong to allow the jurisprudence to be
formulated covertly, without the court disclosing its reasoning, its
sources. The late André Tunc, who gave the 7th Tucker Lecture at
LSU,38 once urged for fully argued and reasoned judgments,
However, nobody
especially at the Court of Cassation.39
demonstrated in the streets of Paris to fight for more transparency
in judicial opinions: things stayed more or less where they were.
Yet, under the enlightened presidency of Guy Canivet, the Court of
Cassation made substantial progress in disclosing the arguments
supporting its rulings.40
36. Article 5 of the Civil Code states that “judges are forbidden, when
giving judgement in the cases which are brought before them, to lay down
general rules of conduct....” C. CIV. art. 5 (FR.). A judge who violated this
prohibition was guilty of a criminal offense. Code pénal [C. PEN.] art. 127 (FR.)
(repealed by the new Penal Code which came into force on April 1st, 1994).
Article 5 was intended to prevent judges from returning to the old practice of
making arrêts de règlement, i.e., stating in a judgment a general rule to be
applied in forthcoming cases.
37. La vie après le texte libère le juge: Paul Baier, The Supreme Court,
Justinian, and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 LA. L. REV. 489,
514 (2007); footnote 81 offers a stimulating translation exercise.
38. Tunc, supra note 9.
39. Touffait & Tunc, Pour une motivation plus explicite des décisions de
justice, notamment de celles de la Cour de cassation, [1974] REV. TRIM. DR.
CIV. 487.
40. Guy Canivet was Premier Président between 1999 and 2007. He has
promoted the use of foreign sources and transparency. See Guy Canivet, La
pratique du droit comparé par les cours suprêmes, Brèves réflexions sur le
dialogue des juges dans les expériences françaises et européennes : en
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Using Civil Code articles as alibi to judicial activism is not as
easy in Louisiana. The Louisiana judge is bound to give and
develop arguments in the judgment and one may believe that any
betrayal of the letter or the spirit of the Code would not go
unnoticed. Yet, this does not prevent Louisiana judges from
injecting rules or principles that are not based on the Civil Code.
To conclude this section, I regard transparency in public affairs
as a virtue and I disapprove of alibis, even when dressed up with
French elegance. Here are some recommendations to keep our
Civil Codes healthy for a better future. I will venture four, of
unequal importance.
1. We must clarify our speech when we talk about the
sources of the law. When addressing the matter from the
top end of the pyramid of norms, it may be right to say that
legislation and custom are the direct sources of the civil
law. Both are based on the will of the people, as expressed
by their representatives in the case of legislation, and as
produced and evidenced by the people in their daily life in
the case of custom. But when considering the matter from
the people’s viewpoint, turning the pyramid top down,41 it
may be wrong to say that legislation and custom are the
only sources. We must acknowledge that the law is shaped
by a number of other actors or factors. In good days, our
belief in higher values often referred to as “natural law,”
“equity,” and “general principles of the law” shapes
positive rules established by legislation, influences judges
when deciding cases in the absence of applicable law and
also trumps positive laws when courts sanction an abuse of
right or apply the maxim fraus omnia corrumpit, fraud
corrupts everything. The teaching and publications of law
professors, referred to as “doctrine” in the civil law
tradition, shape the way laws are made, applied,
interpreted. The decisions of judges, referred to as
“jurisprudence,” have a direct impact on the people,

commentaire de l’article de Sir Basil Markesinis et Jörg Fedtke Le juge en tant
que comparatiste, 80 TUL. L. REV. 221 (2005).
41. This metaphor is used by Jacques Vanderlinden, Réseaux, pyramide et
pluralisme ou regards sur la rencontre de deux aspirants-paradigmes de la
science juridique, 49 REVUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D’ÉTUDES JURIDIQUES 11
(2003).
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whether judges apply the Code, distort it or create rules ex
nihilo. The acts and deeds of practitioners referred to as
“practice” also have a tremendous impact on the people, for
the good and occasionally for the bad. All these shape the
rules we apply, in such a way that Rodolfo Sacco came to
call them “legal formants.”42 Acknowledging the existence
and the role of all actors and factors helps us to have a
better understanding of what is going on in the civil law, as
in all other legal systems. The development of the law is
indeed based on the interaction of such actors and factors.
Making that clear would no doubt help us to have a better
grasp of what the law is. This helps to identify the driving
forces, which are at times customary, legislative,
jurisprudential or doctrinal and very often a combination of
all, including legal practice. This way we would enrich,
rather than revise the doctrine of sources, being mindful of
a duality of perspectives, distinguishing the law as it ought
to be (the upstream lawmaker’s perspective or formalistic
doctrine of sources) and the law as it is applied and
perceived by those subjected to the rule (the downstream
citizen’s perspective or pluralistic doctrine of sources).
This way of looking at things may also help transcend a
narrow positivist approach, the moral dimension of norms
and judgments being inescapable in both perspectives.
2. Those civil law countries–I mean France and the
countries following the French model–not imposing on
their higher courts the duty to give reasoned opinions
together with their judgments should be pressed to do so.
3. We should insist on what makes the strength and the
value of Civil Codes: being written in clear and precise
style, free of legal jargon, wherever it appears suitable to
state the law in advance, ex ante (e.g., testaments,
matrimonial regimes, securities), and as clearly but less
precisely, in the form of general rules or principles, where
the law may not be very detailed in anticipation of a great
variety of events, such as in the case of civil liability or
42. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: a Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law, 39 AM J. COMP. L. 1 (1991).
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torts, where most rules happen to be developed by the
courts ex post, once particular events happen. It may be
enough there for the Code to give a framework in order to
safeguard people from sometimes obscure doctrines that
never got a chance of being discussed publicly.
4. We should also be able to identify these driving forces
and principles in common law jurisdictions. I could cite
quite a few cases, mostly English, where wise and learned
judges reject a proposed distinction, insisting that the
principle underlying the precedent does not allow such a
distinction to be accepted.
Such principles innerve
codifying statutes such as those adopted in England in the
late 19th century. They innerve the Uniform Commercial
Code and also the United States Constitution. I am not sure
this is a civil law influence. This may simply be in the very
nature of what a legal system is.
We would then be better equipped to promote the French and
Louisiana model in a multicultural environment.
II. IMAGINING THE FUTURE OF CODES
IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD
Talking about the place of Civil Codes in a multicultural world,
I would like to stress the following point. My insisting on the civil
law and common law traditions does not mean that I tend to ignore
other legal traditions. They do exist and have a huge impact
outside western societies and should not be ignored inside western
societies.43
I will make four points here, some very brief.
1. Codification, under different forms, is a predominant
technique to harmonize the laws in mixed jurisdictions.
2. A true Code may bring homogeneity only if linguistic
problems are properly taken into account.
3. Comparative law should help identify principles common to
diverse human societies and identify the underlying values.

43. See my comments in Olivier Moréteau, Post Scriptum to Law Making in
a Global World: From Human Rights to a Law of Mankind, 67 LA. L. REV.
1223, 1223 (2007).
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4. Then, the civilian method of interpretation may be promoted,
even outside civil law jurisdictions.
A. Codification, Consolidation, and Harmonization
The European Union is spending significant amounts of money
on research projects that may lead to a unification of the civil law
(in the sense of private law, excluding commercial law). Had I
believed in the suitability and feasibility of a European Civil Code,
who knows, I might have stayed in Europe to try to dispute with
others the glory of being called the European Portalis!
However, I am a European federalist and a legal pluralist,
believing that we should allow Member States to keep their own
private laws, in all fields not regulated by the Union, as is the case
in the United States.
Ongoing projects give an idea of what could be the features of
a European Civil Code. Professor Christian von Bar of the
University of Osnabrück is piloting a flotilla of working groups in
different areas of private law.44 This may work only if groups and
sub-groups communicate well and if someone keeps an overall
view.
The Commission on European Contract Law, chaired by
Professor Ole Lando, of the Copenhagen Business School, already
produced the Principles of European Contract Law.45 More
recently, the European Group on Tort Law published the Principles
of European Tort Law.46 These are great achievements, based on
careful comparative studies, but they lack the comprehensiveness
of an overall view of the law of obligations, a major input of the
civil law tradition.47 Only a comprehensive and comparative

44. Visit the website of the Study Group on a European Civil Code:
http://www.sgecc.net/ (last visited October 17, 2009).
45. THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PARTS I AND II (Ole
Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1999); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,
PART III (Ole Lando, Eric Clive, André Prüm & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
2003). See http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/
(last visited October 17, 2009).
46. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW,
TEXT AND COMMENTARY (2005); see also http://www.egtl.org/ (last visited
October 17, 2009).
47. Olivier Moréteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone between Contract and Tort:
The Role of Estoppel and Reliance, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004, 60, par. 4-6
(Helmut Koziol & Barbara Steininger eds., 2005).
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approach may help to clarify issues. It is essential to have an
overall view when making a Code.
Now, these sets of Principles are not Codes in the traditional
sense, meaning that they lack this comprehensive character of Civil
Codes. Also, they are purely doctrinal. In a recent article, I called
them “doctrinal codes.”48 They have been compared to the
American Restatements of the Law. Like in the Restatements,
articles are followed by a comment. By the way, I am somehow
astonished to see the almost binding force recognized to the
comments under the revised articles of the Louisiana Civil Code.
This reminds me of the comments Boissonade, a French scholar of
the 19th century, wrote under the articles of his project of a Civil
Code for the Empire of Japan, a text that remains very influential
despite the adoption of the German model.49 A commentary is
certainly suitable in a doctrinal code, but is it right to have it in a
Civil Code? I do not think so.
However, these sets of Principles do share some features of the
traditional codes: the so-called principles take the form of rules
that are phrased in a rather general and brief style, avoiding heavily
technical terms; they are organized in a rather systematic way, with
some cross-references and some basic principles. One may
question the legitimacy of such codes. They are the work of
scholars and never received the approval of a legislature. Actually,
they are model laws that may inspire the European and national
legislators, or judges where they do not find clear guidance in their
domestic law.
They are much more than compilation, and it is to be wished
that if the European Union pushes the idea of a European Civil
Code, they will look in the direction of such projects rather than
produce a huge compilation of European Rules and Regulations,
which would only be a code in name.
The French are fearful of such projects. Part of it is nostalgia,
but France is less and less loyal to the model of its ancestors. The
new codes are mere consolidations (codification à droit constant)
and some of them, like the Consumer Code, are pumping substance
out of the Civil Code. France also fears too strong a German
influence. In my view, the German Civil Code cannot be the
48. Olivier Moréteau, Boissonade revisité: de la codification doctrinale à
une langue juridique commune, in DE TOUS HORIZONS, MÉLANGES XAVIER
BLANC-JOUVAN, 103, 116-117 (2005).
49. Id. at 109-113.
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model of a European Civil Code. The BGB is too much a product
of abstract legal science; it addresses the lawyers and not the
citizens. Only lawyers can find their way around this code. It may
contain very scientific and refined concepts, it may be much more
precise and systematic than the French Civil Code, yet it lacks this
quality France and Louisiana once considered paramount: it is not
an accessible and easily readable code.
My point here is that we should keep promoting the ideal of
Codes accessible to citizens, even if we know that citizens often
need lawyers to explain and defend their rights. We do not want to
make their situation any worse. A plurality of good models, of
national codes and doctrinal codes, will no doubt help towards the
improvement of national codes and European legislation, and it
may be helpful elsewhere in the world.
B. Linguistic Challenges
I will not be long on linguistic challenges, although it is a
central field in my scholarship.50 They may be daunting when one
has to deal with a transystemic approach (civil law and common
law) in too many languages: the EU now has to cope with more
than twenty official languages. In my opinion, it is wise to have a
limited number of working languages and we should develop a
standard or transystemic terminology that would then translate
easily in different languages.
I will just say that Louisiana offers the rest of the world a rich
contribution as to expressing the civil law into English. The
translations from French into English of the Codes of 1808 and
1825 may contain a number of mistakes, using “door” where the
50. Olivier Moréteau, Can English become the Common Legal Language in
Europe?, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 405 (Reiner
Schulze & Gianmaria Ajani eds., 2003). See also, in French, L'anglais pourraitil devenir la langue juridique commune en Europe?, in LES MULTIPLES LANGUES
DU DROIT EUROPÉEN UNIFORME 143 (Rodolfo Sacco & Luca Castellani eds.,
1999); Le prototype, clé de l’interprétation uniforme: la standardisation des
notions floues en droit du commerce international, in L’INTERPRÉTATION DES
TEXTES JURIDIQUES RÉDIGÉS EN PLUS D’UNE LANGUE (Rodolfo Sacco ed., 2002);
La common law en français et l’Europe, 5 REVUE DE LA COMMON LAW EN
FRANÇAIS 135 (2003); Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits, in
JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS; JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW
AND LANGUAGE 407 (Jean-Claude Gémar & Nicholas Kasirer eds., 2005); O.
Moréteau & D. Lamèthe, L’interprétation des textes juridiques rédigés dans
plus d’une langue, REV. INT. DR. COMP. 327 (2006).
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French says “croisée,” a term meaning window,51 and yet the
Louisiana civilians have been very inventive in developing a
breadth of new English terms. I started promoting the Louisiana
legal terminology in the area of comparative obligations,52 and will
keep working on this, since it is so useful in the context of the
European Union and globalization.
C. Identifying Principles and Values
In civil law countries operating on the French model, principles
are clearly articulated and easy to find in the codes and literature,
and the lawyer’s job is often to look for exceptions. It is not so in
the Germanic model where rules are more explicit and precise, and
less accommodating for exceptions. However, there are some
fundamental principles in German law as well, like for instance the
fundamental concept of wrongfulness in tort law, whereby
compensation may be due only where something wrong was done
to the plaintiff. I avoided a doctrinal war with the Germans when
accepting the reference to wrongfulness in the Principles of
European Tort Law:53 I believe this principle should also underlie
French law, even if not expressed in the Code and abandoned by
the Cour de cassation.
In the common law, principles do not appear upfront. Legal
reasoning is built on the facts of the case. This does not mean that
principles do not play a role. They are to appear faintly in the
background. If thrown forward in the judgment, they will be
described as obiter dictum on account of their generality, but they
are there: the comparatist sees them.
The principle in the Code is part of what we civilians call the
rule. In the common law judgment, it is not so, if you look at
things from a formalistic point of view. The principle is not a
technical part of the rule, it is not part of the ratio decidendi or
holding, but functionally it commands the rule to be applied. For
instance, we may say that there is, in the law of negligence, a
51. See Louisiana Civil Code art. 2716, before the 2004 Revision, and Shelp
v. National Surety Corp. 333, F.2d 431 (5 Cir. 1964), discussed in
L’interprétation des textes juridiques rédigés dans plus d’une langue, supra note
50, at 341-342.
52. Project to Reform the Law of Obligations (Catala Project): One
Project, Two Translations, France, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2006, 196, 196-197
(Helmut Koziol & Barbara Steininger eds., 2007).
53. Art. 1:101, supra note 46.
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general rule that the defendant must compensate the victim of the
tort if found in breach of a duty of care. And there is a principle
that such a duty exists wherever the defendant was in a position
reasonably to foresee that an act or omission of his may harm the
plaintiff. Technically, this is not binding, but we have to accept
that it is there in all cases where the defendant is found liable.
Some lawyers do not like to be reminded of these principles,
may be because they are too indicative of the values that underlie
the rules. The famous dictum by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v.
Stevenson, where the learned judge referred to the moral principle
that one must love one’s neighbor, becoming in law a rule that one
must not injure one’s neighbor is found embarrassing by some.54
Lawyers, especially in America, claim that laws are legitimate
when matching the needs of a liberal economy. French lawyers
refer constantly to some social values which often end up in the
questionable protection of particular groups.
Lawmakers are
today acting under the pressure of lobbyists and the general idea of
a public good is too often left aside, because it may contradict
some strategies and private interests.
The great Civil Codes of France and Louisiana cannot be
reduced to a body of positivist norms. They are inspired by a
vision of law as social order promoting the public good, in the best
interest of individuals who would otherwise fight and litigate
endlessly. Legal judgment is value based: the respect of human
dignity on the one hand, and the future of mankind as a whole on
the other hand, are for me the two landmarks we should never
forget in any judgment on human affairs. They are our best guides
to decide the trickiest cases, especially those linked to environment
or bioethics.55
I cannot defend the French and Louisiana Civil Codes if
reduced to a positivist norm. But I do believe they offer mankind a
suitable model if we read them and apply them with Portalis’ eyes,
or if we project into them the sense of human values that great
judges of the 19th and early 20th centuries developed into AngloAmerican jurisprudence.
Then, the methods of interpretation that civilians have inherited
from their Roman law ancestors can make sense, to interpret

54. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 532 (H.L.).
55. Moréteau, supra note 43.
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whatever code, constitution or charter that will be written in clear
and simple terms.
D. The Civilian Method of Interpretation
Regrettably, we do not spend much time talking to our students
about the common good and shared principles. My experience is
that all over the world, students want to master the rules and learn
them like recipes. Easy and effortless learning is as popular as
fast-food.
We do not spend enough time exploring the civilian method of
reading and interpreting the codes. At least in my Law of
Obligations class I try to do so, prolonging what I taught in Legal
Traditions. My students are sometimes bemused when I ask them,
in a case, how the judge applied or interpreted an article of the
Code. Their spirit rather jumps from one case to the other, like
their appetite from the burger to the freedom fries.56
Judges in France and Louisiana, like those in any other civil
law jurisdiction, apply some traditional rules of interpretation that
sometimes sound mysterious to common-law lawyers. Specialia
generalibus derogans: where two rules seem to control the same
facts, the specific rule controls and the general rule is to be left
aside.
Yet, if this specific rule creates an exception to the general
rule, it is to be construed restrictively, and no extension by analogy
is permitted.
Another rule is more difficult: ubi lex non distinguit, non
distinguere debemus. The judge is not supposed to introduce in a
text a distinction that is not there. For instance, if Code provisions
state that the victim of a tort is entitled to compensation for the
whole damage, and constantly refers to damage without breaking
down the concept into various categories of damage, a court may
not exclude mental suffering or pure economic loss if no such
exclusion appears in the Code. The common-law lawyer is at a
loss there, because of mental structures based on the by-gone
system of the writs, opening remedies only in particular types of
cases. The writs are gone, but the mental structure remains, like
when you remove the cake from the form, as I described with
56. Again recognized as French fries after the election of President Nicolas
Sarkozy as President of the French Republic.
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Jacques Vanderlinden in our work on the structure of legal
systems.57 The endless discussions on compensation of pure
economic loss would give a good illustration, but may take us too
far.
Wherever we find a Code, a Charter, a Bill of Rights, a
Constitution written in general terms, the civil law tradition brings
adequate tools to interpret or to work out definitions. I remember a
workshop with my Boston University colleagues where we
discussed the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the United
States Constitution and their amazement when I told them: let’s
first try to define the term and find out what falls into it by nature.
If agriculture or industry do not fall into the definition of
commerce, does the phrasing of the Constitution, and its spirit,
allow for analogies? How may we work out these analogies?
Well, we are back to Roscoe Pound and his plea for a comparative
approach, to show the relevance of the civil law in America.
To conclude, we may go much further showing that system
building is not creating strait-jackets but safeguarding rights, if we
legislate in simple terms and agree to look at the reason behind the
words (the ratio legis) and ultimately, the principles or values
behind the legal systems (ratio iuris). A body without a soul is a
corpse. A Code or Constitution without a spirit is just a maze of
dead words. We may be trained in the civil law or in the common
law, but what is the point of what we do if we do not bring life into
it?

57. Rapport Général, in LA STRUCTURE DES SYSTÈMES JURIDIQUES 13, 4548 (Olivier Moréteau & Jacques Vanderlinden eds., 2003); also published in
CONVERGENCE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, GENERAL REPORT
TH
DELIVERED AT THE XVI INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
BRISBANE 2002, 167, 196-199 (2006).
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of Allah’s will. Its primary sources of law are the Koran and the
wisdom of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet, in practice, these two
systems have developed surprisingly similar approaches toward
duties of disclosure and the doctrine of caveat emptor. The
similarities between the above mentioned legal systems’ approach
to caveat emptor and duties of disclosure are uncanny. Regardless
of whether the issue is dealt under the heading of mistake,
misrepresentation, or error and fraud, there is a commonality of
approach that cannot be missed. Despite this obvious diversity of
methods, traditions and styles, it is possible to notice an element,
or better, a tendency common to the examined regulations, that
may be found more in operational rules than in principle
statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Looks can be deceiving. At first glance, Louisiana law and
Islamic law have nothing in common. Louisiana, at least
superficially, adheres to the great civil law tradition that the
legislature is supreme. Its primary sources of law are legislation
and custom. Islamic law is divine in origin, a direct manifestation
of Allah’s will. Its primary sources of law are the Koran and the
wisdom of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet, in practice, these two
systems have developed surprisingly similar approaches toward
duties of disclosure and the doctrine of caveat emptor.
Caveat emptor means literally “let the buyer beware.”
Although stated in the language of the great Roman Empire, the
phrase caveat emptor is not a product of Roman Law.1 In fact, it

1. It should be noted, however, that Roman law originally contained a rule
similar to caveat emptor.
See A. ARTHER SCHILLER, ROMAN LAW:
MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT 22 (Mouton 1978). Yet the Roman law
eventually moved towards a warranty based system to protect purchasers. In
contracts of purchase and sale (emptio venditio) the seller (venditor) is in breach
if the thing sold (res vendita) is defective. The edict of the aediles curules, the
Roman officials or magistrates charged with the supervision of public markets,
introduced a warranty against latent defects with a view to protecting the
interests of the purchaser (emptor) who could not be expected to be aware of
such defects. In terms of this aedilitian edict, the seller was liable for any defect
that wholly or substantially impaired the utility or effectiveness of the thing
sold. The purchaser could claim full restitution by means of the actio
redhibitoria or a diminution of the purchase price by means of the actio quanti
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was the common law of England that gave birth to this often used,
yet widely criticized, Latin phrase. First appearing in legal use
around the end of the 16th century,2 the maxim eventually came to

minoris. In later Roman law, the actio empti (the action arising from the
purchase) could be used instead of the aedilitian actions.
Specifically, during the Roman Republic, these magistrates in their edicts,
made rules about the sale of slaves or beasts of burden in the public markets that
required the seller to disclose any illness or defect (be it a physical defect or a
character defect). Also, in regard to slaves, the seller had to disclose if the slave
was a wanderer, fugitive, or suspected of some crime or delict for which his
master might be liable.
The actio redhibitoria (to be brought within six months of the contract of
sale) foresaw the restitutio in integrum, returning the object to the seller and
receiving back the price. While the actio quanti minoris (to be brought within
one year of the contract of sale) sought a decrease in the purchase price,
retaining the object of sale but obtaining the return of part of the price to reflect
the decrease in value of the object. The seller was liable whether or not he knew
of the defect and also if he had made claims that were not true (i.e. that the
object of the sale was free from particular defects or possessed particular
qualities).
Under Justinian, these actions were available generally for all objects of
sale, whether or not the item was sold in a public market. Moreover, the actio
empti could be used to achieve the same result of these actions, making them
superfluous though they still existed.
The first application of the aedilitian remedies is based upon the general
principle that the seller is under a duty to disclose, and assume liability for, all
latent defects which make the thing sold unfit for its intended purpose. F. DE
ZULUETA, THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 50 (1957). For an account of the evolution
and operation of this edict in Roman Law and its role in modern Roman Dutch
Law, see A.M. Honoré, The History of the Aedilitian Actions from Roman to
Roman Dutch Law, in D. DAUBE, STUDIES IN THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 132-159
(1959). A full discussion of Roman law is, however, beyond the scope of this
article.
2. W.H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L. J. 1133
(1931); A.M. Musy, Disclosure of Information in the Pre-Contractual
Bargaining: A Comparative Analysis, 1 CARDOZO ELECTRONIC LAW BULLETIN
16,
4
(1995),
http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Contract/Musy1995/musy1.htm (last visited September 20, 2009); A. PROTON, FROM CAVEAT
EMPTOR TO CAVEAT VENDITOR IN SALES OF DEFECTIVE HOMES: TOWARD A
CONSENSUS BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES? 13, 15 (1992). Caveat emptor first appeared in print in a discussion
involving horse trading. Hamilton, supra at 1164. It was written that, “If [the
horse] be tame enough and have been rydden upon, then caveat emptor,” and
referring to situations where a horse was sold with no warranty, then such a sale
was said to be “at the other’s peril, for his eyes and his taste ought to be his
judges.” Id. Apparently, around the same time, a Lancaster ordinance, while not
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dominate English policy on the seller’s duty of disclosure. That
dominance can be said to have begun in the case of Chandler v.
Lopus in 1603.3
In Chandler, a goldsmith sold a purported bezoar stone4 to
an uninformed buyer.5 The buyer later discovered that the stone
was not, in fact, a real bezoar.6 The purchaser brought an action in
trespass in the case7 to recover the value he had paid for the stone.8
The court held that “the bare affirmatio n that it was a bezarstone[sic], without warranting it to be so, is no cause of action.”9
The court further stated that it was immaterial that the goldsmith
knew that the stone was not a bezoar because so long as he does
not warrant such a quality, a buyer does not have cause of action.10
Chandler is an example of caveat emptor in its purest form. A
seller has no duty to disclose defects in the item he is selling (even
if he knows of the defect); while the buyer has a right to inspect the
item he is purchasing to ensure it is free from any defect. In effect,
it is a policy choice on the burden of inspection. The buyer has the
burden of making sure he is getting what he wants. If the buyer
fails to fully inform himself about the item he is purchasing, it is
his own fault if he gets something other than what he intended.
While caveat emptor once reigned supreme in the Western legal

employing the word caveat emptor, dealt with malt purchases by stating, “let
their eye be their champion.” Id.
3. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1166. This, however, was not the first case to
deal with the issue of caveat emptor. In fact, two years earlier it was argued in
Moore v. Hussey that a law quoted incorrectly as “Caveat emptor, qui ignorari
non debuit quod alienum jus emit” applied in a case dealing with the law of
estates and the value of a marriage; the judge dismissed the claim as irrelevant.
Id. at 1165.
4. A bezoar stone is any “various calculi found chiefly in the gastrointestinal organs and formerly believed to possess magical properties.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com
(last visited September 20, 2009).
5. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603).
6. Id.
7. “At common law, an action to recover damages that are not the
immediate result of a wrongful act but rather a later consequence. This action
was the precursor to a variety of modern-day tort claims, including negligence,
nuisance, and business torts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (8th ed. 2004).
8. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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tradition, changing notions of fairness have softened its effect.
Modern legal institutions, which include items such as implied
warranties and pre-contractual duties of disclosure, have shifted
much of the buyer’s duty back onto the seller. Thus, caveat
emptor is largely an echo of an age past.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to give
an accurate depiction of the approach toward pre-contractual duties
of disclosure in two legal systems, the Islamic law and Louisiana
Law. Secondly, it attempts to juxtapose these two systems so as to
highlight their similarities and differences. Overall, the authors
hope to use this comparison to show that the rule of law has
evolved in surprisingly similar ways through two drastically
different legal systems.
II. SOURCES AND APPLICATION OF LAW
Islamic law is generally called Shari'a, which refers to the set
of divinely revealed rules that Muslims must comply with to
perform their religious duties. The Shari'a aims to fulfil the
spiritual and material welfare of the 600 million humans who
follow Islam, nearly a sixth of entire population of the world.11 At
the same time, the Shari´a seeks to regulate the entire lives of
those under its authority.
The crucial difference between the law in Islam and the law in
the countries that follow the western legal tradition is their source
of validity. In the western tradition, the legislator or judge is
supreme, depending on whether a particular country belongs to the
civil or common law tradition. For instance, in Louisiana, as in
many systems belonging to the Western tradition, the primary
sources of law are legislation and custom.12 Legislation is the sole
11. The academic publications regarding Islamic law are numerous. To
quote the ones with a comparative approach see R. DAVID & C. JAUFFRETSPINOSI, I GRANDI SISTEMI GIURIDICI CONTEMPORANEI (R. Sacco ed., 5th ed.,
2004) and the original French text in R. DAVID & C. JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, LES
A.
GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS (10th ed. 1992); and
GAMBARO & R. SACCO, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI (2d ed. 2002).
Regarding the specific topic of the law of obligation see D. SANTILLANA, I-II
ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO MUSULMANO MALICHITA CON RIGUARDO ANCHE AL
SISTEMA SCIAFIITA (1926-1938).
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2009). Louisiana is considered a mixed
jurisdiction, made up of a combination of both civil and common law.
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expression of legislator’s will and custom, although a primary
source of law, cannot trump a legislative mandate.13 Islamic law,
however, is the direct manifestation of the will of the Almighty; it
is not given by a human lawmaker. Hence, Islamic law is
immutable and because God is the source of authority and the sole
sovereign lawgiver, all human legislation must conform to the
divine will.14
The primary written source of Islamic law is the Koran, Islam’s
holiest scripture, which regulates both legal and non-legal issues.
The second written source of Islamic law is the Sunna, a
compilation of the conversations,15 actions, affirmations,
aphorisms, characteristics, and deeds attributed to the Prophet
Muhammad.16 Beyond these sources, the Shari'a as a discipline
was formed over the centuries through the systematic scholarship
developed by jurists of competing schools of law. In this sense,
Sharia is a jurist’s law just as the common law is a judge’s law and
the civil law is the law of a legislator.17
Islamic law is applied through a method very similar to the
civil law. Through the science of fiqh, jurists determine a rule of
law by first consulting the sacred sources and then by applying
their own reasoning.18 To prevent the risk of having a huge

However, only in the absence of legislation and custom can a judge step in to
make law, and in that instance the legislature requires him to rule based on the
equitable notions of justice, reason, and prevailing usages. See id. at art. 4.
13. See id. at arts. 2, 3.
14. F. Kutty, The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration,
28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 565 (2006).
15. The conversations are also known as the hadith.
16. The elements of the Sunna were reported after Muhammad’s death by
his companions and collected by scholars over the centuries. The process of
hadithcompiling for the Sunnis is restricted to the work of six main compilers:
Bukhari (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 251/865), Ibn Majjah (d. 273/886), Abu
Dawud (d. 274/888), Tirmidhi (d. 279/892) and Nasa'i (d. 302/915). Kutty,
supra note 14, at 585.
17. See U. MATTEI & P. G. MONATERI, INTRODUZIONE BREVE AL DIRITTO
COMPARATO (1997).
18. Fiqh is case law and its products are the result of the jurist's intellectual
construct. With English common law it shares the inductive method by
adducing a number of examples out of which some more general principles can
be drawn. It does not posit, as in the civil law tradition, a set of principles from
which application derives. But fiqh is different from both in that it is eminently
casuistic, whilst these cases are not necessarily based on precedents in real life.
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number of opinions, a perpetual issue in common-law systems, AsSafi, a famous jurist,19 created the doctrine of the four roots of
Islamic law to give jurists a fix and common method of finding
law.20 The first root is, of course, the Qu’ran the second is the
Sunnah; the third is the Ijma (the consensus reached by the Islamic
community); and the fourth is the qiyas (analogy).21 The four roots
are widely accepted in the Islamic community and have suffered
only slight changes through history. One such change has practical
relevance: a proposition can be regarded as a rule of law if at any
time legal scholars agreed on the issue (something like the Roman
idea of the communis opinio prudentium).22
The Islamic tradition affirms that the Holy Law is not given to
man ready-made, to be passively received and applied. Rather, it
is to be actively constructed on the basis of those sacred texts,
which are its acknowledged sources. The bulk of Shari'a is based
on al ijtihad, the science of interpretation and rule-making based
on the principle that if the sunnah and Qur'an are silent on an
issue, local custom and scholarly opinion may be used as long as
they are consistent with the Qur'an and the sunnah. It means,
therefore, that it is permissible and possible to supplement
religious-based law with customary law and interpretation.23 The

I. GOLDZIHER, INTRODUCTION OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 36 (1981). A.G.
Muslim, Islamic Laws in Historical Perspective: An Investigation into Problems
and Principles in the Field of Islamization, 31 ISLAMIC Q. 69 (1987). THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 288 ( J.L. Esposito ed., 2003). Fiqh is “human
efforts to codify Islamic norms in practical terms” and such “human generated
legislation is considered fallible and open to revision.”
19. As-Safi died in 820. See generally F. CASTRO, DIRITTO MUSULMANO
(2006).
20. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, 1 INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO 378
(Barbara Pozzo trans., 1992) and the origial German text in K. ZWEIGERT & H.
KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES
PRIVATRECHTS (2d ed. 1984).
21. A. Hasan, The Definition of Qiyas in Islamic Jurisprudence, 19 ISLAMIC
STUDIES 1, 22 (1980); see also J. Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic
Law, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 63 (1985); W.B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic
Law and the Common Law: Logic and Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79 (1985).
See generally W.B. Hallaq, Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical
Qiyas, 36 ARABICA 286 (1989).
22. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 20, at 378.
23. According to Bernard Weiss:
The Holy Law is the totality of rules which God has laid down for the
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authority of the jurist is derived from the authority of God, but
there is no authority in the jurist himself.24
Shari’a does not expound general principles in Islamic law and
follow them with their detailed application but rather consists of a
succession of separate issues and topics because it was recorded
“exactly as it had grown up.”25
In a certain sense, like Common law, Islamic law is not written
law. “In the writings of Muslim jurists, the rules of law are rarely
set forth directly and in abstract terms the way they are in a code
elaborated in the civil law tradition or in a statute enacted in a
common law country.”26 The rules of Islamic law are more often
expounded upon in connection with specific cases, and for the
deduction of a generally applicable rule to be expressed in abstract
terms would call for a more or less full survey of the existing case
law.27 Indeed, it is when there is no appropriate legal authority or
the texts are not clear on an issue, the Muslim judge is then
authorized to apply an accepted principle or an assumption that in
his opinion would fit best the issue at hand: Qyas.28

governing of Man's behaviour; it is the aggregate of ahkam shai’ya.
Though ordained by God, few of these rules have been precisely
spelled out for man's convenience; rather, man has the duty to derive
them from their sources. In the standard Islamic metaphor, the rules
themselves are “branches” (furu') or “fruit” (thamara), which grow out
of “roots” (usul), that is, from the sources. Only the roots are given; the
branches or fruit are not - they must be made to appear; and for this to
happen human involvement - we may call it, in keeping with the above
metaphor, human husbandry - is required.
B. Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihd, 26 AM J. COMP.
L. 199, 201 (1978). The five main schools of thought are the Hanafi, Maliki,
Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Ja'fari schools of jurisprudence. Id.
24. For a discussion on how Shari'a is slow to change in some respects, see
A. E. Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO. L. REV. 1015 (1991). and D.B.
MACDONALD, DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM THEOLOGY, JURISPRUDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1913).
25. N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 47 (1978).
26. G.M. Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM. J.
COMP. L. 187, 189 (1978).
27. Id.
28. C. Moccia, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," 13 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 649, 652 (1989/1990); see also ABDU’R–RAHIM, I PRINCIPI DELLA
GIURISPRUDENZA MUSULAMANA SECONDO LE SCUOLE HANIFITA, MALEKITA,
SCIAFEITA E HANBALITA (Cimino trans., 1922).
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Likewise, a Louisiana lawyer would determine a rule of law
studying a similar list of sources, or roots. First, he would consult
the Civil Code or a relevant revised statute. He would then
analyze the case law interpreting the pertinent article or statute.
Next, he would study scholarly opinions on the issue. Finally, he
would use analogy to advocate for, or against, a particular
decision. Thus, just as the Islamic jurist works his way from the
Koran to the gysas, the Louisiana lawyer starts at the civil code
and ends with an analogy, be it a case or a law.
III. GOOD FAITH, CONTRACTS, AND A DUTY TO DISCLOSE - MAYBE
An Islamic based contract is somewhat different from what we
know in the West.29 Under Shari'a principles, a contract is divine
in nature and there is a sacred duty to uphold one's agreements:
O you who believe fulfil any contracts [that you make] . . .
Fulfil God's agreement once you have pledged to do so, and
do not break any oaths once they have been sworn to. You
have set God up as a Surety for yourselves.30
This idea is best stated by the Islamic maxim, “Al Aqd Shari'at al
muta'aqqidin,” which essentially states, “The contract is the Shari'a
or sacred law of the parties.” This makes it clear that the
contractual relationship is viewed strictly under the Shari'a and

29. See generally N. Saleh, The Law Governing Contracts in Arabia, 38
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 761 (1989); Describing the concept of a contract in Islamic
society. The list of specifications in the Qur'an covering commerce is long: it
includes contracts, the necessity of their certainty, the central importance of
ethics, the strict requirements of honouring one's obligations, of putting them in
writing, the importance of trade, in addition to the famous sentence in the
second chapter explaining how trade has been allowed by God, but riba (interest,
usury) forbidden. “Honour your contracts,” v:1, xvii:34; “put your debts in
writing,” ii:282, “woe to the fraudsters,” lxxxiii:1; “God has allowed commerce
and prohibited riba,” ii:275. C. Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East:
Between Classical Transactions and Modern Business, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81,
91 (2000).
30. QUR'AN 5:1; see also QUR'AN 16:91. See, THE HOLY QU’RAN:
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY (A. Yusuf Ali trans., American Trust
Publication 2d ed. 1977).
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clearly would disapprove of the “efficient breach” theory.31
Indeed, all contractual obligations32 must be specifically
performed, unless it would contravene the Shari'a or some
legitimate public policy devised in conformity with the Shari'a.33
This approach is manifested in contemporary legislation in much
of the Muslim world.34 The practical effect is that a contract is
enforceable if it is not contrary to Islamic norms.35
Although it is not supported by an express sanction from God,
Louisiana law, like any other legislation following the French
model of the Code Napoléon, takes a very similar approach to the
sanctity of contract. Louisiana Civil Code article 1983 provides
that “[c]ontracts have the effect of law between the parties and
may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on
grounds provided by law.” Like Islamic law, Louisiana law allows
a person to contract with another for any reason or ‘cause,’ unless
that reason is unlawful because performing the contract would
produce a result that is illegal or against public policy.36 Thus,
Louisiana takes an equally strict view toward contractual

31. S.H. AMIN, COMMERCIAL LAW OF IRAN 64-65 (1986). (Explaining that
the Shari'a views a breach of contract as a religious breach; thus, it is a very
serious matter).
32. See generally J.N. Anderson & N.J. Coulson, The Muslim Ruler and
Contractual Obligations, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 923-28 (1958); S. Habachy,
Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 458-72
(1962); S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN
LEGISLATION IN KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 91-100
(1991); F.E. VOGEL & S.L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION,
RISK AND RETURN 67-68, 97-102 (1998); M. Zahraa, Negotiating Contracts in
Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws, 13 ARAB. L.Q. 265, 274-77 (1998).
33. AMIN, supra note 31, at 64.
34. See e.g., Egyptian Code Civil art. 89 (1958). (“[A] contract is created,
subject to any special formalities that may be required by law for its conclusion,
from the moment that two persons have exchanged two concordant intentions.”).
Similar provisions are contained in the legislation of other Middle Eastern
nations. See N. Majeed, Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the
Shari'a, 20 ARB. INT'L 97, 103-04 (2004).
35. For example, the position in Saudi Arabia is derived from the Hanbali
jurist Ibn Taymiya, who wrote, “The rule in contracts and provisions is that
anything is permitted which is valid and that only that which is forbidden or set
aside by one of the text or the ‘Qiyas' (reasoning by analogy) is forbidden.”
Mallat, supra note 29.
36. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1967-68 (2009).
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relationships; the only practical difference being that Louisiana
does not give contracts a sacred or religious effect.
A. Good Faith
The duty to act in good faith is the essence of Islamic contract
law. But over and above good faith, there is extensive legal
scholarship elaborating clear principles of Islamic contract law. In
fact, commentators have highlighted the inherent flexibility in
Islamic law that allows it to accept modern transactions. Indeed,
“the principle of pacta sunt servanda . . . is recognized by all
Muslim jurist-theologians.”37 Clearly the emphasis on the notion
of freedom of contract and the stress on good faith are in line with
Western conceptions. At the same time, the sanctity of contracts38
37. M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 204 (1955).
38. Similar reverence for the ideal of sanctity of agreements (covenants),
designed to provide a secure transactional framework, informs all schools of
Islamic jurisprudence: In fact, under traditional Islamic (sharia) law, there is a
much stronger presumption than in most legal systems for leaving the
contractually formalized bargain undisturbed. This is in accordance with the.
Chapter (sura) 5 of the Qur'an, sometimes called the Chapter of Contracts
(Surat al-Uqud), begins “with an appeal to fulfil, as sacred, all obligations,
human and divine . . .”
In defining obligation, Ali wrote:
The Arabic word implies so many things that a whole chapter of
Commentary can be written on it. First, there are the divine obligations
that arise from our spiritual nature and our relation to Allah . . . But in
our own human and material life we undertake mutual obligations
express and implied. We make a promise; we enter into a commercial
or social contract; we enter into a contract of marriage; we must
faithfully fulfil all obligations in all these relationships. Our group or
our State enters into a treaty; every individual in that group or State is
bound to see that as far as lies in his power, such obligations are
faithfully discharged.
THE HOLY QU’RAN, supra note 30, at 276 n.682.
This is particularly so, because a large number of transnational transactions
(for example, oil and mineral concessions, production sharing projects, joint
ventures, transfer of technology, construction and operation of public utilities as
well as loan and other financing agreements), on which the economy of the
Western world so vitally depends, have been the subject-matter of many
international commercial disputes and arbitrations. These have in turn involved
an interplay of the notions of fairness with the Islamic veneration of the
stipulations voluntarily inserted by the parties, that is, ufu bil uqud (honor your
contracts). See generally P.N. Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on
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in Islamic law and the public policy regarding which contracts are
void and unenforceable may produce results that differ from
Louisiana.
Under the pure doctrine of caveat emptor, the buyer is afforded
the opportunity to examine the goods to be purchased to ensure
the goods are free from defects). As a result, the seller is not
obliged to disclose the item’s defects; hence, let the buyer beware.
In Islamic law, the pre-contractual stage is known as Musawama,
“talks or bargaining,” and is based on the principle of good faith
and fair dealings.39 During this stage of letter exchanges and
drafting of future contracts, Islamic law limits some freedoms of
contract that are familiar in Louisiana.40 For example, in Louisiana
a party can freely withdraw from contractual negotiations until he
accepts a binding agreement.41 In contrast, Islamic law provides
for compensation under certain circumstances when one party
breaks off negotiations.42 Additionally, Muslims under the
Islamic law are less free to determine the terms of their
agreements.43 They are limited by such principles as riba,44

Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Systems: The Formation and Binding
Force of Contracts, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 384 (1970).
39. D. Elkarkouri, “Pre-Contractual Liability in Islamic Construction
Contracts,” INT. CONST. L. REV. 545-6 (1992).
40. See THE CONFERENCE ON COMPARATIVE LINKS BETWEEN ISLAMIC LAW
AND THE COMMON LAW, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1986); see also for a more
complete reference C. Chehata, Islamic Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 138-142 (1976); and H. Afchar, The
Muslim Conception of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, 84-106 (1976).
41. This rule also prevails in most common law countries. See generally
P.N. Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern
Legal Systems: The formation and Binding force of contracts, 2 COLUM. J.
TRANS’L L. 384 (1970).
42. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 546.
43. S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN
LEGISLATION IN KUWAITI, BAHRAIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 23
(1991).
44. Riba (lit. increase) any increase in a loan or sale transaction which
accrues to the lender, seller or buyer, without the provision of an equivalent
counter-value to the other party. Riba encompasses various types of illicit gain,
of which banking interest is one example. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM,
supra note 18.
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gharar45 or any other Sharia restrictions.46
Like under Islamic law, good faith is considered the foundation
of all obligations under Louisiana law, especially contractual
obligations. For instance, Louisiana Civil Code article 1759
provides that “[g]ood faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor
and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation.”47 Article
1983 then places good faith at the basis of the contractual
relationship as “[c]ontracts must be performed in good faith.”
However, for good faith to apply, there must be at least a preexisting obligation. As yet, there is no general obligation under
Louisiana law to negotiate in good faith. As a result, Louisiana
courts have been unwilling to use the good faith principle to
impose a pre-contractual duty of disclosure. Thus, good faith has a
much more limited role in Louisiana than in Islamic law, having
effect only after a contract or obligation has come into existence.
B. A Duty of Disclosure and a Common Idea of Defects
Islamic law has both jurisprudential and codal duties of
disclosure. In Islamic jurisprudence, the idea of disclosure is
embodied in the Khiyar or option. The option literally allows a
party, under certain circumstances, to unilaterally decide whether
to rescind or uphold a contract.48 Within the realm of disclosure
45. Gharar is uncertainty in a contract of exchange as to the existence of the
subject matter of the contract and deliverability, quantity, or quality of the
subject matter. It also involves contractual ambiguity as to the consideration
and the terms of the contract. Such ambiguity will render most contracts void.
There are a number of Hadith that forbid trading in gharar, often giving specific
examples of gharhar transactions (e.g., selling the birds in the sky or the fish in
the water, the catch of the diver, an unborn calf in its mother’s womb, the sperm
and unfertilized eggs of camels, etc.). K.M. Kahn, Juristic Classification of
Islamic Law, 6 HOU. J. INT’L L. 23, 23-25 (1983). Contrast this with the
aleatory contracts in Louisiana, such as the sale of a hope: “Thus, a fisherman
may sell a haul of his net before he throws it. In that case the buyer is entitled to
whatever is caught in the net, according to the parties' expectations, and even if
nothing is caught the sale is valid.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2451 (2009).
46. It is very interesting to consider the parallel with another religion
oriented legal system. See J.R. Wagner, Islamic and Talmudic Jurisprudence:
The Four Roots of Islamic Law and Their Talmudic Counterparts, 1 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 25 (1982).
47. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1759 (2007) (emphasis added).
48. Center of Muslim-Jewish Engagement at University of Southern
California,
Vol.
3,
Book
34,
Num.
322,
available
at
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duties, there are two types of options: the option for defect (Khiyar
al-ayb) and the option of inspection (Khiyar al’Ru’yyah). These
options are available to buyers in sales contracts, as well as in
other commutative contracts and function as an implied warranty
against defects.49 The option of defect is “a right given to a
prospective purchaser to revoke or to accomplish a contract
because of a defect discovered in the subject matter.”50 Or, as
stated by an Islamic jurist, “A purchaser has a right of option on
account of defects in the thing bought, of which he has become
aware only after taking possession, but which existed
previously.”51 This option is established without stipulation. When
a person purchases a good with a defect, no matter if it is trivial or
flagrant,52 he may retain the object at its full price or reject it, but

http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/ha
dith/bukhari/034.sbt.html (last visited on September 20, 2009). Narrator Ibn
'Umar states:
Allah's Apostle said, “The seller and the buyer have the option of
cancelling or confirming the deal unless they separate, or one of them
says to the other, 'Choose (i.e. decide to cancel or confirm the bargain
now).” Perhaps he said, 'Or if it is an optional sale.'”Ibn Umar, Shuraih,
Ash-Shabi, Tawus, Ata, and Ibn Abu Mulaika agree upon this
judgment.
The Prophet said, “The buyer and the seller have the option to cancel or
confirm the bargain before they separate from each other or if the sale is
optional.” Nafi said, “Ibn 'Umar used to separate quickly from the seller if he
had bought a thing which he liked.” Id. at n. 320.
AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, no. 31.38.79 at 272. “Yahya related to me
from Malik from Nafi’ from ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar that the Messenger of Allah,
may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, “Both parties in a business
transaction have the right of withdrawal as long as they have not separated,
except in the transaction called khiyar.” Malik said, “There is no specified limit
nor any matter which is applied in this case according to us.”
49. A.Q. ZUBAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC LAW OF CONTRACT 122 (1991).
50. Id. at 137.
51. M.M. Billah, Caveat Emptor versus Khiyar Al-Aib, a Dichotomy, 13
ARAB. L. Q. 278 (1998).
52. N.E. BAILLIE, THE MOOHUMUNDAN LAW OF SALE, ACCORDING TO THE
HUNEEFEEA CODE: FROM THE FUTAWA ALUMGEREEREE, A DIGEST OF THE
WHOLE LAW 99 (1975). Defines a flagrant defect the one that happens if two
valuators agree that the defect lowered the value of the item purchased. “. . . On
the other hand, when one of them insists that the thing is still worth what the
other alleges to be its full value in a perfect state, though he maintains its present
worth to be somewhat less, the defect is said to be slight or trivial.” From page
100 to 119 Baille refers of a list of defects in the slaves and animals similar to
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he cannot retain it and seek for compensation for the defect.53 A
defect is any cause that lowers the value of the object, according to
the custom of experienced merchants and the like.54 Additionally,
Islamic law gives a party the option of pleading defect regardless if
the buyer was ignorant of the defect when he concluded the
contract.55 The general principle of the Khiyar al-‘aib provides the
exercise of option in a way that the buyer might uphold the
contract or rescind it by giving the defective goods back to the
seller without the right to seek any compensation.56
Aib means a defect or a fault impairing the value of a contract.
Had it been known, the contract would not have been concluded.
Therefore, the agreement is not valid and the deceived party has
the right to rescind the contract. Any party can rescind the contract
by a Khiyar without recourse to a court.
As a corollary, a seller is under an absolute duty to correctly
and honestly disclose known latent defects, a duty which is based
on the ban against providing erroneous information that causes
material loss.57 Indeed, in article 336 of the Mejella, which is a

the list included in the Digest: it is noteworthy to stress how two so distant legal
worlds (Islam and Latin) faced the same problems. This inquiry, even if
fascinating, is too broad for the scope of this work.
53. Id. at 98.
54. Id. at 100.
55. Id. Considering the right of the buyer to recover for defects if those
defects were present before the period of sale are, by consensus, valid causes for
litigation and recovery. Scholars differed to those that appear during the period
of sale and before the sale are finalized. Malik established that the buyer has
three days to raise the presence of a defect, after which time the claim must be
dropped; while in the case that the defect is of the type that does not appear
except seasonally (or except over a long period of time) he allotted one year. An
example of this would be the sale of an animal with Mange, the mange having
been treated before the sales period but as it is known that without re-treatment
it will reappear. The three day period was substantiated by a hadith (judged
weak by the opposing opinion) and the period of one year was affirmed by
precedent found in the custom of the people of Medina. This application may be
viewed as similar to the principle of caveat emptor in English Common Law,
although not synonymous.
56. S.C. SIRCAR, AL-SHARI’S: SUNNO & IMAMIA CODES 496 (2006).
57. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 545. Under pre-contractual law, Islamic
jurists made an important distinction between cases where pre-purchased
merchandise is delivered for examination and cases where merchandise is
delivered for agreement on a purchase price. In the former situation, the risk of
defective merchandise is on the sender, especially in cases where the price is not
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complete code on Islamic law dated of year 1876 and connected
with the Ottoman Empire, there is an implied warranty that the
thing sold should be free from any defect: “A sale, without any
stipulation, makes it necessary that the thing sold should be free
from defect.”58 In article 339, the Mejella clarifies this point,
stating that “an ancient defect is a fault which existed in the thing
sold when it was in the hands of the seller.”59 This duty to disclose
exists regardless of whether the parties to the agreement have
between them any fiduciary relationship or whether the
disclosure60 of such defects was requested by the seller. Thus,
when the seller violates this duty, the injured party has the option
to rescind the contract.61 This idea is buttressed by the Holy
Tradition, according to which it is illegal for a seller to sell a thing
if he knows that it has a defect, unless the seller informs the buyer
of that defect.62 In addition, Muhammad warned against selling
goods if defects were not disclosed: “if anyone sells a defective
article without drawing attention to it, he will remain under God’s
anger, or the Angels will continue to curse him.”63
Like its common and civil law counterparts, exercise of the
khiyar al-‘aib is subject to several conditions. First, the defect in
the goods must exist before the goods are given to the buyer.64
Notice that the risk of loss passes with possession. For instance,
Article 340 of the Mejella provides that a defect that arises after

yet fixed. In the second situation, the risk of defective goods is on the buyer.
Even if an Islamic court ensures that parties abide by the terms of the contract,
the court would not compensate a party for damages a mere mistake causes.
Under the principles of Sharia, victims cannot recover damages where the
mistake is exclusive.
Additionally, Islamic law does not grant any
compensation for breaking off negotiations or for the loss of expectation
interests.
58. THE MEJELLE, BEING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MAJALLAHELAHKAM-I-ADLIYA AND A COMPLETE CODE ON ISLAMIC CIVIL LAW 48, art. 336
(Tyser et al. trans., 1980) (1901) (Hereinafter THE MEJELLE).
59. “An ancient defect is a fault, which existed in the thing sold, when it
was in the hands of the seller.” Id. at 49, art. 339.
60. A. Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 337 (1997).
61. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 547.
62. BILLAH, supra note 51, at 287.
63. Id. (quoting Ibn. Mayah).
64. Id. at 99.
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the sale but before delivery, while the thing is in the hands of the
seller, is a ground for rescission.65 In other words, the seller is
liable for all defects that arise before delivery of the goods to the
buyer, even if the goods were in perfect or merchantable condition
when the contract was concluded.66
In addition to the timing of the defect, in order to profit from
the protection the buyer must not be aware of the defects in the
goods.67 This idea is connected with the option for inspection.
The buyer must have an opportunity to inspect the goods, but if he
becomes aware of the defect and still concludes the contract, he
has tacitly waived his option to rescind. Also, the buyer cannot
exempt the seller from liability through an express stipulation.68
Finally, the defect must have existed at the time the buyer
exercised the option.69
The buyer loses his right of option even if the goods are
discovered to be defective in the following situations. First, if the
seller tells the buyer (or otherwise gives him notice) that there is a
defect in the goods.70 This is a counterpoint of the Islamic laws
duty of disclosure. Since the seller has an absolute duty to disclose
the defects in the product he is selling, when he discloses those
defects, the buyer having bought with knowledge has no option to
rescind the contract. Second, a seller has no liability for defects in
his goods when he stipulates with the buyer that he will have no
such liability.71 Nevertheless, if the seller knows of the defects in
65. THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 340 at 49. The meaning of rescission
in the Islamic contract law is a broad one; it encompasses the contract voidable
and the contract valid but not binding. M.A. BAHARUM, MISREPRESENTATION: A
STUDY OF ENGLISH AND ISLAMIC CONTRACT LAW 285 (1986).
66. W.F. Fratcher, Uses of Uses, 34 MO. L. REV. 39, 39 (1969).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. S.R. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN
LEGISLATION IN KUWAITI, BAHRAIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 331
(1991).
70. “If a seller, at the time of the sale, shews a defect in the thing sold, and
the buyer accepts with that defect, he cannot have an option on account of that
defect.” THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, at 49, art. 341.
71. “When a seller sells a property with a condition that he is to be free
from claims for all defects, there is no option for defect for the buyer.” THE
MEJELLE, supra note 58, at 49, art. 342.
See also IMAN MALIK IBN ANAS, AL MUWATTA OF IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS
248 (Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley Trans., 1989). (Hereinafter AL MUWATTA).
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his goods and purposely stipulates with the buyer to protect
himself from that defect, the stipulation in null. He who sells (with
an exemption clause for the defects of the goods) will not be
responsible for any defect unless he knew and purposely concealed
it, the earlier exemption clause shall have no effect and he (the
seller) shall still be responsible for the defects.72
Thirdly, the seller is not liable for defects if, after the contract
is concluded, the buyer agrees to be deemed solely liable for such
defects.73 Fourthly, if the buyer consciously accepts the defects of
the goods, the seller is exculpated from liability.74 Likewise, the
seller is absolved from liability if the buyer knows of the defect75
and exercises ownership over the goods in any of the following
ways: (1) eating any portion of the goods;76 (2) keeping the goods
in his possession for a reasonable period of time; (3) repairing or
demolishing any part of the goods; or (4) disposing of the goods.77
Finally, the seller is not liable if the defects occurred in the hands
of the buyer.78
In the Islamic legal system, two principles coexist. The seller
must disclose the defects in the goods he is selling. The buyer
must also inspect the goods (interpreted as a right and also as a
duty) as a sort of cooperative activity in the sale. Once the goods
have been scrutinized, the Islamic solution focuses on the
simplification of the transaction. In fact, the buyer has the right of
option either to continue or to rescind the contract before or after
the conclusion of the sale and purchase agreement with the aim of
ensuring the quality of the goods.79
72. AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, at 249.
73. “If there’s a property saying ‘it is accepted with all defects,’ there is no
longer a right of action for defect.” THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 343 at 49.
For example, if a buyer purchases an animal stating it is accepted even if blind,
lame and unsound or worthless maybe return it on the ground that it has an old
defect.
74. RAYNER, supra note 69, at 340.
75. BAILLE, supra note 52, at 105.
76. K. BHAVAN, THE HEDAYA: COMMENTARY ON THE ISLAMIC LAWS, 2, at
415 (Charles Hamilton trans., 1985). (Hereinafter THE HEDAYA).
77. “If the purchaser dispose of the thing sold, in a manner, which is an
exercise of the right of ownership in it, after he knows of a defect in it, he has
destroyed his option for the defect.” THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 344 at 49.
78. See AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, no 31.4 at 249.
79. As it has already been pointed out the common law grants the right to
inquire the goods only before the conclusion of the contract.
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Louisiana, following the civil law tradition is very protective of
purchasers when the things they buy contain some sort of flaw or
defect. Because of this increased concern for protecting buyers,
Louisiana extensively uses the duty to disclose in the context of
redhibitory defects. The seller’s obligation to provide an implied
warranty is established in several code articles. First, article 2475
provides that “the seller is bound . . . to warrant to the buyer
ownership and peaceful possession of, and the absence of hidden
defects in, that thing. The seller also warrants that the thing sold is
fit for its intended use.”80 Pursuant to Civil Code article 2520,
“[t]he seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects, or
vices, in the thing sold.”81 That article goes on further to explain
that a defect is redhibitory in three situations: (1) where the defect
renders the thing useless; (2) where the defect renders the thing so
inconvenient that it can be presumed that the buyer would not have
purchased it if he had known of the defect; and (3) the defect
diminishes the purchased item’s usefulness so that the buyer would
have only purchased it at a lesser price.82
Louisiana creates a duty on the seller to disclose any defects
through the imposition of heightened remedies for the purchaser.
For instance, if a seller does not know of the defect in the thing
sold, Civil Code article 2531 allows him several options. First, the
seller has the right to repair the thing, and it is only when he cannot
or refuses to do so that he will be liable for a return of the purchase
price.83 In addition, the seller will have to pay interest starting
from the time that the price was paid as well as reimburse the
buyer for sales expenses and perseveration costs.84 Finally, a seller
in this context has a right to have his liability to the buyer reduced
by the use that the buyer made of the thing.85
Contrast the remedies listed above with those afforded to a
buyer when the seller is in bad faith (i.e., knew of the defect in the
thing sold). To begin with, the seller in this context has no right to
80. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2475 (2007). This article is similar to the
concept contained in the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979, which contains
both a warranty of quality or fitness as well as a warranty of description. Sale of
Goods Act, 1979, 2, §§ 13-14 (Eng.).
81. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (2007).
82. Id.
83. See id. at art. 2531.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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repair the defective product and is immediately liable for a return
of the purchase price.86 In addition to being responsible for the
buyer’s reasonable sales and preservation expenses, the seller will
also have to pay damages and attorney’s fees.87 Finally, the seller
has no right to seek a reduction in his liability for the value of the
buyer’s use of the defective thing. This ability to reduce his
liability is left to the sole discretion of the court.88
The buyer’s ability to recover damages against a bad faith seller
is of significant importance. Pursuant to Louisiana’s general
contract rules, non-pecuniary damages (mental anguish) can only
be recovered in two circumstances: (1) when the contract is
intended to gratify a non-pecuniary interest and the obligor either
knew or should have known that his failure to perform would
cause non-pecuniary damage and (2) when regardless of the nature
of the contract, the obligor breached the contract with the intent of
aggrieving the obligee’s feelings.89 Nevertheless, Louisiana courts
have allowed buyers to recover non-pecuniary damages in the
context of redhibition, even if the claim does not meet the general
contractual standards for non-pecuniary loss.
For instance, in Bourne v. Rein Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,90 the
plaintiff was allowed to recover mental anguish damages after
buying a defective automobile from a dealership.91 The plaintiff
claimed that the seller failed to disclose any mechanical defects in
the car.92 After the car was purchased it began to act sluggish and
the engine frequently died.93 Subsequently, the horn began to
spontaneously activate and the engine began to race.94 In addition,
the door panel fell off and the vinyl roof began to bubble up.95 The
cruise control then broke and a portion of the engine became
disconnected and created a hole in the hood.96 Finally, the air

86. See id. at art. 2545.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1998 (2007).
90. 463 So. 2d 1356 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 1361.
92. Id. at 1357.
93. Id. at 1357-58.
94. Id. at 1357.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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conditioner broke and flooded the interior of the car with water.97
To add insult to the plaintiff’s injury, her frequent trips to the
repair shop invoked taunting and laughter by the service
personnel.98
The court deviated from the general, strict
requirements for the recovery of non-pecuniary damages99 and
found that when a seller delivers a defective product it creates not
only contractual but also delictual liability.100 Therefore, the court
allowed the plaintiff to recover for her emotional damage as well
as her contractual redhibition claim without instituting another
action in tort.
Nevertheless, Louisiana stands by the notion, even in its
articles on redhibition, that it will not save a buyer from a bad
bargain. Thus, pursuant to Civil Code article 2521, a seller is not
liable to the buyer for any defects which are either made known
(disclosed) or “should have been discovered by a reasonably
prudent buyer.”101 Therefore, if the defect is such that the buyer
should have discovered it with a reasonable inspection, the law
will afford him no remedy and it will relieve the seller of any duty
to disclose.102
The importance of Louisiana’s use of redhibition to create a
duty of disclosure in sales cannot be overstated. Whereas general
Louisiana contract theory does not always require the seller to
disclose his knowledge about the thing sold, the state’s law of
redhibition steps up to fill the gap. Thus, through the imposition of
increased liability on the part of a seller who knew the item being
sold contained a defect and failed to disclose it, Louisiana creates a
duty of disclosure that provides an extreme sense of protection to
purchasers.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1360.
100. Id. at 1359-60 (citing Phillippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310
(La. 1981)).
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 (2007).
102. This is not a deviation from the civil law tradition, according to which
the guarantee arises only for hidden defects (the buyer should show some care in
buying: the so called principle of auto-responsibility). In many legislations there
are provisions excluding the remedy for obvious/apparent defects (but the seller
is liable if he expressed some appreciation on the soundness of the good, or if he
hid the defect).
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IV. THE VICES OF CONSENT
A. The Louisiana Perspective
Louisiana does not have a general duty to disclose. In that
sense, it is no different than any of the forty-nine other American
states.
Louisiana does, however, create specific duties of
disclosure in certain instances. The formation of consent is the
first place Louisiana courts have found a specific duty of
disclosure. More specifically, Louisiana’s law on error and fraud
overlap, so that when a person knows another is contracting under
an error, it is very possible that the requirements of fraud may be
met. It is in this gray area where the laws of fraud and error
intertwine that Louisiana creates a contract law based duty of
disclosure.
In Louisiana, error and fraud are seen as vitiating, or creating a
defect in, consent; nevertheless, a contract based on either error or
fraud still produces some legal effects.103 Pursuant to civil code’s
article 1949, error vitiates consent only if the following two
elements are met: (1) the error concerns a cause without which the
obligation would not have been incurred104 and (2) the other party
103. According to theory, error should prevent a contract from ever coming
into existence. However, such a rule totally disregards the reality of business
practice; therefore, in an effort to inject stability in transactions, Louisiana law
views error as a reason for allowing a party to get out of a contract instead of the
prevention of the contracts formation. Id.
104. The first requirement, when an error concerns a cause, is governed
expressly by the code. Pursuant to article 1950, an error concerns a cause in five
different situations: (1) when it bears on the nature of the contract; (2) when it
bears on the thing that is the object of the contract or a substantial quality of the
contractual object; (3) when it bears on either the person, or a substantial quality
of the other party; (4) when it bears on the law; or (5) when it bears on any other
circumstances that the parties either actually or should have regarded in good
faith as the cause. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1950 (2007). It bears noting that this
formulation is almost exactly the same as the Italian rules governing when a
mistake is considered essential. Note, however, that having an error fall into one
of the categories is necessary but not determinative of the issue. The party in
error must still show that they would not have contracted had they not been in
error; this is a heavier burden than just that they would have contracted on
different terms. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1950 cmt. (g) (2007). See also Litvinoff,
Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and Epilogue of Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV.
1, 12-13 (1989). In addition, there are specific cases where the party will not be
allowed to take advantage of his error regardless of whether it meets the
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either knew or should have known of that cause.105 Professor
Litvinoff describes error as creating an impairment that “results
from a sort of accident that takes place in a person’s subjective
process of assembling an act of volition,”106 or more specifically,
“a false or inexact idea that a party to a contract has of an element
of that contract.”107
Pursuant to article 1950, the first requirement for error, that
concerns the principle cause, is met if the error:
[B]ears on the nature of the contract, or the thing that is the
contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing, or
the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law, or
any other circumstances that the parties regarded, or should
in good faith have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.108
The second requirement, that the non-mistaken party either knows
or should have known of the cause, is an objective reasonableness
test, determined on the facts and circumstances of each individual
case.
If the error is one that concerns the principle cause, it is very
likely that the circumstances will be such that each party will
know, by evaluating the circumstances, the principle cause behind

elements: these situations include transactions or compromise made and based
an error of law and payment of a civil obligation when the party was only bound
by a natural obligation. LA. CIV. CODE art 1950 cmt. (h) (2007).
105. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1949 (2007). See also Litvinoff, supra note
104, at 12. A distinction should be made with respect to the non-mistaken
party’s knowledge: it is not knowledge of the error that is important in
determining that consent is vitiated, it is the knowledge of the cause itself- the
reason why the party obligated himself. The non-mistaken party’s knowledge of
the error only becomes important in the determination of who pays damages.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1952 (2007).
106. Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 6. Error is basically a situation in which a
party to a contract is acting under a false sense of reality. Id.
107. S. LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LOUISIANA
JURISPRUDENCE 234 (5th ed. 2000).
108. Surprisingly, this is very similar to the English common law’s notion
of a “fundamental mistake,” which is defined as a mistake “as to the substance
of the whole consideration . . . going . . . to the whole root of the matter.” G.H.
TREITEL, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 100 (4th ed. 1989) (1975).
For a more in-depth discussion of what types of mistakes are considered
fundamental in the English Common Law, see S.A. SMITH, ATIYAH’S
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 172-175 (6th ed. 2005) (1961).
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the other’s consent. In these situations, the test will be met
because objectively the circumstances allowed the parties to know
each other’s principal reason for contracting. However, this is not
always the case, and in some circumstances a party may have a
particular subjective reason for binding himself. In those instances
it would be necessary for that party to take steps to inform the
other party of his unique principal cause; otherwise, the right claim
of operative error will be lost.
For instance, in Bordelon v. Kopicki, a Louisiana appellate
court refused to rescind a contract for the sale of a house based on
the buyer’s unilateral error.109 The purchasers’ principal cause for
binding themselves to buy the house was to convert it into a larger
four bedroom home; the problem was that they did not tell the
seller what they had in mind.110 A short time before the sale was
to close, the purchasers discovered that the house could not be
converted into a four bedroom home because of a right of way held
by the city; thus, unsurprisingly, they refused to buy and conclude
the actual sale.111 The court stated that the apparent, objective
reason for the purchase was for the buyers to get a suitable
home.112 The seller was neither made aware of nor should he be
presumed to have been aware of the buyer’s purpose of converting
the home.113 Thus, the seller had no way of knowing that the
servitude would affect the buyers’ consent, so the requirements of
article 1950 were not met and consent was not vitiated—no
operative error.114
As stated above, there is no general duty of disclosure in
Louisiana, so merely meeting the requirements for error will not
create any duties of disclosure between the parties. This is shown
by looking at article 1952, which states that a party who has a
contract rescinded based on his own error is liable to the non-

109. 524 So. 2d 848 (La. App. 3d. Cir. 1988).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 849.
113. Id.
114. Professor Ronald Scalise sees this case in a somewhat different light.
He thinks that because the servitude was recorded in the public records, the
buyer has constructive knowledge. Therefore, the buyers lost because their error
was inexcusable. This is definitely a valid reading of this case. However, the
court did not discuss either the public records doctrine or duties of disclosure.
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mistaken party for any loss sustained.115 Obviously the law would
not allow a non-mistaken party to recover damages if he violated a
duty he owed to the party in error. Thus, Louisiana’s error rules do
not in and of themselves create disclosure requirements.
Disclosure requirements in Louisiana begin to emerge when
the non-mistaken party’s actions start to approach the level of
fraud. In fact, as alluded to earlier, there is quite a bit of overlap
between Louisiana’s rules of fraud and error. Louisiana defines
fraud as “a misrepresentation or suppression of the truth made with
the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or
to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other.”116 But more
importantly, “fraud may also result from silence or inaction.”117 It
is this silence or inaction language that is at the heart of
Louisiana’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure.
It is common knowledge that silence or inaction does not
always constitute fraud. Louisiana is no exception to this rule; it
does, however, uniformly punish a party who remains silent when
he knows the other is acting under an error, just under different
sets of rules. For instance, when one party knows another party is
operating under an error and remains silent and that silence is not
fraudulent, Louisiana sanctions him by denying him the right to
recover damages when the contract is rescinded for error.
Specifically, article 1952 states that in such a circumstance, the
non-mistaken party is barred from recovering damages from the
other party’s error if he “knew or should have known of the
error.”118 Thus, for non-fraudulent non-disclosures, Louisiana
does not create an express, positive duty of disclosure but does
impose a negative sanction.
The sanction contained in article 1952 presupposes that if a
party knows another is operating under an error there is something
wrong with not bringing it to his attention. This presupposition is
not new; in civil law, if a person had knowledge that another party
115. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 (2007) (emphasis added). One of the
main factors that go into both the court’s decision of whether or not to rescind
the contract and whether it will award the non-mistaken party damages is
whether the error is excusable. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 cmt. (d) (2007).
Thus, if the buyer makes an error which is based on his own negligence, the
court will be very hostile to his claim for rescission.
116. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1953 (2007).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1952 (2007) (emphasis added).
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was making an error at the time the contract was formed, he is
guilty of fraud.119 Obviously, Louisiana does not have such a
broad definition of fraud; however, it recognizes that something is
not right in knowing someone is acting in error and remaining
silent. Louisiana law begins to get interesting when that silence
starts to look fraudulent.
Three things happen when a party knows another is acting in
error and his silence looks like fraud. First, the requirements for an
operative error are lowered.120 Specifically, the error no longer has
to concern the contract’s principal cause, 121 but the lesser standard
of only “a circumstance that has substantially influenced the
contract.”122 Second, the silent party will be liable for damages.123
Damages for fraud include attorney’s fees and so called “bad faith
obligor” damages, which consist not only of the generally allowed
foreseeable damages but also of all damages that are a direct
consequence of the silence, regardless of foreseeability.124 And
third, it is much more likely that the court will find a positive duty
of pre-contractual disclosure. This last item mentioned, obviously,
requires further discussion.

119. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1949 cmt. (d) (2007).
120. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1955 (2007).
121. Louisiana refers to the reason why a party obligates himself as the
“cause” on the contract. See S. Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48 La. L.
Rev. 3, 26 (1987). Professor Litvinoff provides an example of an error vitiating
consent with the following hypothetical:
For example, in need of information on a particular subject, a person
may walk into a bookstore and, after advising the attendant of his
interest, buy a book that, in spite of its misleading title, does not deal
with that subject. It is clear in such a case that the reason that prompted
the person to bind himself to pay a price was to obtain a book on a
certain subject and that an error was made concerning the subject
treated in the book he bought. Such an error should entitle that person
to obtain rescission of the contract of sale he made at the bookstore.
On the other hand, if the book actually deals with the subject of his
interest, the purchaser should not be allowed to obtain rescission on
ground of an error in the quality of the paper of that book, as it can be
readily concluded that the quality of the paper was not the reason why
he bought the book.
Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 13.
122. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1955 (2007).
123. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1958 (2007).
124. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1997 (2007).
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A good example of how “fraudulent” looking silence will lead
a Louisiana court to find a pre-contractual duty of disclosure is
evident in C.H. Boehmer Sales Agency v. Russo.125 In Russo, a
partnership was in need of a commercially zoned property to
continue its business.126 The partners were made aware of a piece
of property for sale that was formerly operated as a service station,
but was currently empty and up for sale.127 Unbeknownst to the
partnership, the service station was in a non-commercial zone even
though an iron works operation was located directly across the
street.128 The station itself was zoned “industrial non-conforming,”
which meant that only the service station could be operated on the
property; if the station was either altered or sat unused for six
months, its zoning would convert into purely residential.129 When
the partners inspected the property, they informed the seller that
they would need to alter the building to make it larger.130 The
seller, who knew of the particular zoning issue, failed to disclose
this fact to the partners and accepted $200 in return for the
partners’ option to purchase the property.131
The court rescinded the option contract on the grounds of error.
More importantly, the court held that the seller was under a duty to
disclose the true status of the property to the partners.132 The court
stated that the partners were reasonable in the belief that the
service station was zoned commercial it was across the street from
a commercial operation and was not located in an obvious
residential area.133 That, in conjunction with the fact that they
made their purposes known to the seller, imposed upon him a duty
to disclose the zoning issue to the partners.
Another example of when Louisiana courts found a duty to
disclose is Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Company, Inc. In
Standard Fur, a lady ordered a fur coat made to her
specifications.134 She gave the furrier instructions that the coat be
125. 99 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 1958).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 476.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 476-77.
133. Id.
134. 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
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made of horizontally running, continuous female furs of the same
width as a sample coat she had been shown.135 The furrier, which
had forty years of experience, failed to inform the buyer that it was
impossible to make a coat pursuant to her specifications.136 As a
result, the lady refused to accept the coat upon delivery because it
was different that what she thought she was going to receive.137
The court rescinded the sale on the grounds of error. Specifically,
the court held that the store was the expert and as such had a duty
to tell the buyer that it could not make the coat in the manner she
specified.138
Both of these cases together shed some light on Louisiana’s
view of pre-contractual duties of disclosure. While there is no
general duty of disclosure, when one party knows that the other is
operating under some error, the courts will take a much closer look
at the situation. At a minimum, if the non-mistaken party knows of
the mistake being made (and of course that mistake meets the error
requirements) and fails to inform the other party of his error, he
will be punished by losing his ability to recover damages when the
However, depending on the
contract is rescinded.139
135. Id.
136. Id. at 221.
137. Id. at 220.
138. Id. at 221.
139. It is vital to understand that the error rules have to be met for this
result, courts have a lot of room to manoeuvre here. For instance, an error in
fair market value of an object is not actionable under the rules of error in
Louisiana. In Dixon v. Bohn, the seller of an automobile was found not to have
a duty to disclose certain information to the buyer. 04-503 (La. App. 5 Cir.
11/30/04); 890 So. 2d 613. The buyer purchased a vehicle for the price of
$20,874.86. Id. at 614. The retail price that was suggested by the manufacturer
was only $17,467.00. Id. Believing that he had been overcharged, the buyer
petitioned the court asking it to award him both damages and attorney’s fees. Id.
The court refused, stating that the purchaser had no cause of action because
there was “no requirement in our law that the seller informs the buyer of the fair
market value of property.” Id. at 615.
This same result was obtained in the context of the sale of an immovable. In
Pioneer Valley Hospital, Inc. v. Elmwood Partners, the court held that the
purchaser of a hospital could not rescind the sale based on the seller’s failure to
disclose the fair market value. 01-453 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/01); 800 So. 2d
932, 935-36. The buyers claimed that a restrictive covenant in the sale contract
lowered the fair market value and being that the sellers had been involved in
similar sales in the past knew of the covenant’s effect on the market value. Id. at
934. The court rejected the claim that the sellers had any duty to disclose. Id. at
935-36. The court stated that “as long as all facts bearing on the nature of a
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circumstances, the non-mistaken party may find himself liable for
fraud, which has the effect of lowering the standards necessary for
an error to be operative and allowing for the recovery of attorney
fees and other bad-faith based damages.
Like all things in the realm of law, this is not an absolute rule.
Louisiana courts are not so friendly to persons who just fail to
make reasoned decisions or take reasonable steps necessary to
protect their interests. Parties in contractual negotiations are
working to protect their own interest and obtain the best deal
possible. Thus, as a general rule, failing to provide a party with
information which he should have found by himself does not
constitute fraud.140 This is expressly stated in Civil Code article
1954, which provides, “Fraud does not vitiate consent when the
party against whom the fraud was directed could have ascertained
the truth without difficulty, inconvenience, or special skill.”141

property are disclosed, the effect of those facts is left of a buyer to determine.
‘[E]rror as to the value of land, which is the object of the contract, is not error of
fact, but error of judgment, for which the law furnishes no relief.’” Id. at 936.
140. Id. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 (2007).
Where the means of knowledge are as hand, and equally available to
both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open to their
inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of these means and
opportunities, he will not be heard to say . . . that he was deceived by
the vendor’s misrepresentations.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 cmt. (a) (2007) (citing Rocchi v. Schwabacher &
Hirsch, 33 La.Ann. 1364, 1368 (1881)). Nevertheless, this rule does not apply
when there is some special relationship of confidence among the parties and
because of such a relation a person is induced to relay on the others
representations. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 cmt. (b) (2007).
141. Louisiana courts will, however, punish a person when their “failure to
inform or to disclose [ ] is a flagrant abuse of the other party’s ignorance.
Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 57. However, if this abuse of ignorance is not
present and the party merely remains silent, there is no duty imposed. Id. at 5758. Professor Litvinoff points out:
[R]eticence . . . does not occur in a void. Strange as it may seem,
silence has a way of exteriorizing itself through the circumstances that
surround it, circumstances that do not consist of an omission, such as
silence, but are positive acts or facts. It is in the light of such
circumstances that silence may appear tainted with fraudulent intent
and therefore becomes fraudulent reticence. Id.
The professor provides the following example and commentary:
Thus, if in the course of negotiations one party states his impression of
the contractual object and asks from the other, “Tell me if I am wrong,”
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The similar jurisprudential based rule that has emerged in the
context of error is called “inexcusable error” and is consistent with
the approach used in fraud.142 Basically, if the party in error did
not take reasonable steps to prevent the mistake, the court will not
save him. While its application is not limited to situations where
someone has failed to speak up when they know another party is
operating under an error, it will act to prevent a court from
imposing any duty of disclosure in those situations. Thus,
inexcusable error is an exception to Louisiana’s willingness to
impose disclosure duties.
The classic Louisiana example of inexcusable neglect is the
case of Watson v. Planter’s Bank.143 In Watson, the plaintiff
contracted with a bank to invest in cotton but did not read the
contract to make sure it reflected his understanding of the terms.144
Unsurprisingly, the contract he signed materially differed from the
agreement he thought he had entered.145 The plaintiff filed an
action in error, asking the court to rescind the agreement and the
court refused.146 In rejecting his claim of error, the court stated, “In
this case the plaintiff has no one but himself to blame for signing
an agreement different from the one which he says he agreed to
make.”147

the other’s silence amounts to an assertion that the asking party is right,
and will constitute fraudulent reticence if the one who remains silent
knows that the other’s impression is false and resorts to silence to
confirm that impression to this own advantage. Courts should enjoy
great discretion is deciding whether a party was under a duty to speak
or to disclose information to the other, and it has been suggested that in
reaching such conclusions the courts should not hold parties to a very
high moral standard beyond what is necessary to see to it that honesty
and decency prevail in legal transactions. Id.
142. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 cmt. (d) (2007) (citing 6 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 227-229 (2d ed. Esmein
1952)). For a much more in-depth analysis of inexcusable error in Louisiana,
see Saúl Litvinoff, “Error” in the Civil Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 222, 226-269 (Dainow ed. 1969).
143. 22 La. Ann 14 (La. 1870). Watson is not a recent case. In fact, the
money used in the transaction was Confederate treasury notes. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Overall, Louisiana is not completely averse to using its rules of
conventional obligations, specifically its rules on error and fraud,
to impose duties of disclosure in certain circumstances. It is true
that Louisiana does not have a general duty of disclosure. It is,
also true, however, that a party remains silent at his own risk if he
knows the other party is operating under an error. In such
situations, it is very possible that he will lose the right to recover
damages if the contract is rescinded for error. It is also likely that
if his silence borders upon fraud, he may be found to have violated
a duty of disclosure and thrown into fraud based liability.
B. The Islamic Perspective
The free consent and truthfulness of the parties to a contract is
a moral obligation which underpins the law of Islam relating to
contract. Thus, the consent of the parties to a contract is a basic
requirement of a valid contract that must be given voluntarily and
free from the impediments of error, misrepresentation and fraud. If
one of these impediments is present a contract is voidable because
the full consent is barred. Therefore, the enforceability of a
contract is based on the integrity and genuineness of consent.
Mistake (al-ghalat) is a cause of pollution of this genuineness and
it is defined as “a state of mind that inspires an erroneous
impression or unrealistic imagination.”148 Islamic doctrine divides
the mistakes into two categories: hidden and apparent mistakes.
The hidden mistake is a situation remaining in the mind of a party
making him believe a different reality. For example, the
contracting party does not show his believed and erroneous ideas
about the item he is buying. The hidden mistake cannot invalidate
the contract and the hidden impressions that are not revealed
cannot be considered. Also the apparent mistake regards a
situation of imagination that exists in the mind of a contracting
party but, in this case, it is expressly revealed (the purchaser stated
that he wants to buy a ring made of gold instead he received a ring
of brass). Muslim jurists agree on the avoidance of the contract in
this case.149
The Islamic world does not have a definition of
misrepresentation that can cover all species of misleading conduct
148. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 240.
149. Id. at 241-242.
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and statements; there is also a lack of systematic approach on the
point.150 Misrepresentation is otherwise defined according the
specific types. It is generally defined as a false assertion of fact,
either by word or conduct, or as the prevention of an existing
defect in the subject-matter from being disclosed, which induces
another to enter into a contract.151
The traditional English classification of misrepresentation as
innocent, negligent and fraudulent is not relevant for the Islamic
world because here the effect of any misrepresentation is the same.
In any case, the way in which the misrepresentation is made is
more important than its effect. So, the classification in Islam
distinguishes between active fraud, false statements, and
concealment of defects of the subject matter (which covers the
contracts uberrimae fidei).152
On the other side, the fact that a party has been induced to enter
into a contract by the misrepresentation of the other contracting
party is not enough to grant the remedy of rescission. Some other
requirements must be fulfilled.

150. A.A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW 1 (3 ed. 1964)
(1947) states:
Islamic law is not a systematic code: but there is amongst its different
schools a large measure of agreement, because the starting point and
the basic principles are identical. The differences that exist are due to
historical, political, economic and cultural reasons, and it is, therefore,
obvious that this system cannot be studied without a proper regard to its
historical development.
The impossibility to create a parallel between English and Islamic law
derives from the different methods of approach.
Under English law,
misrepresentation vitiates consent and so includes both acts and statements, in so
far as they induce the state of mind of the parties to the contract and renders the
apparent agreement unreal. Islamic law, on the other hand, accepts the apparent
agreement as valid but gives the injured party the option to rescind it. See N.J.
COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL
TRADITION 72 (1984).
See generally J. SCHACHT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE
(1959); A. HASAN, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 7
(1970).
151. In the traditional Shari’a, the authorities contain only several examples
of fraud which gives the injured party the right to rescind the contract.
BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 54.
152. Id. at 57.
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First of all, the representation must be false. In general there is
no duty to disclose any fact, except that of a known defect153 or, in
the uberrimae fidei contract, all material fact. If such a duty exists,
anything that is less than a full disclosure amounts to a deliberate
concealment and then the representation must be one of fact. The
statements of opinion, the advices, the laudatory or puffing
statements or the ones made jokingly, are irrelevant except when
the promisor says he will bear the responsibility of his promise. A
peculiar feature of the Islamic legal system is that all statements of
law are considered as statements of fact on the basis that all the
Muslims have a duty to know the law, given its holy origin.
Again, what is needed is an inducement, i.e. the contracting party
would have not entered into the contract without the
misrepresentation; if, on the other hand, the deceived party
discovers the misrepresentation and enters the contract regardless,
he cannot invoke rescission but he may have relief under the
option for defects if the thing is defective.154 Furthermore, the
misrepresentation must be operative, i.e. an average man would
have suffered a real misunderstanding. The lack of diligence may
bar the availability of the remedy (it is said that proof that the party
was deceived must be shown in addition to the proof of the
inducement). Terein lies one of the main differences with the
English system: while in common law the inducement is the
decisive factor, in the Islamic legal system the accent is posed on
the diligence of the deceived party in attempting to ascertain the
truth of the fact (according to the standard of an average man). In
this sense, any loss due to this lack of diligence is not recoverable.
Finally, we must consider the deceived party’s injury being
compensated with damages. In the uberrimae fidei contracts and

153. Imam Malik clarified this point saying, “Who sells with an exemption
clause exempting himself (the seller) from liability of any defects of the goods
will be not responsible for that defect unless he knew about it and concealed it.
If the seller knew and concealed the defect, such an exemption clause will not
exempt him from the liability of such defective product.” AL MUWATTA, supra
note 71, no. 31.4 at 249.
154. BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 166. According to the Hanabali school,
the intention to deceive is not taken into account in giving the right of rescission
it is more important to measure the effect of the contract. The contract can be
rescinded if the representee can prove he suffered damages.
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concealment of defect, the proof of the injury is not required. In
such cases the evidence of the existence of fraud is enough.155
The idea of deception (Al-Ghabn) is defined as “a situation
where one of the two considerations in commutative contracts is
unequal in value to another during the construction of the
contract.”156
Al-Ghabn is divided into two kinds: significant and
insignificant. These two kinds are defined in two different ways
according to the schools. The first interpretation defines the
significant Ghabn as the kind that comes under the appraisal of the
experts of the field.157 Another school of thought says that the
Ghabn is significant if the thing sold is worthy more of the 5% of
the price of purchase according to the appraisal of an expert.158 If
the deception is insignificant the contract remains valid. If the
deception is significant we still have two lines of thoughts. The
majority of the jurists (Hanafi and Handbali schools) maintain that
a significant Ghabn impairs the contract and causes an injury and,
therefore, the deceived party has the right to rescind it.159
The Shafi’i school holds that a contract is validly formed and
that commutative contracts upon which the Ghabn insisted are
established and executed ab initio. The granting to the deceived
party of the right to rescind it will destabilize the commercial
transactions. Furthermore, the protection of the contracting parties
from Ghabn is balanced with their duty to take care and precaution.
Zubir said that the deceived party is liable for his failure because
he acted inadvertently, therefore, he alone shall bear the
consequences of his carelessness.160 In conclusion, contracts
which are concluded with concealment of defects, false statements

155. Id. at 85-93.
156. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 246. The example, that sounds strange to
the ears of a western jurist, is the sale of a book for one hundred naira when its
market value was of two hundred naira. The vendor, in this case, is the deceived
party. On the other side, the buyer would be the deceived party if he buys for a
higher price compared to the market value.
157. Id. at 246-247.
158. Id. at 247. Specifying that not all the things sold are under the same
percentage rule; the 10% for example is the rate required to be significant
difference of price for the sale of animals.
159. Id. at 248.
160. Id. at 248-249.
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when accompanied with lesio enormis, and active fraud are
considered as voidable contracts.161
If fraud (Al-taghrir), i.e. “the use of fraudulent means to induce
a person to enter into a contract in which he has been made to
believe that it will serve his interest but which in actual fact is
detrimental,”162 is successful (i.e. without the fraud the party would
never have concluded the contract) the victim of the trickery (AlMaghur) has a right to rescind the contract.163 The rescission is
granted even if the Ghabn is insignificant.164
As stated before, it is a general principle that the contracting
parties are not obliged to disclose all the information about the
bargain if the silence of the fact does not mislead the other
contracting party.165 Precisely, silence is allowed on knowledge
related to unimportant facts within the exclusive knowledge of the
party, for instance the original price of the thing sold166 Disclosure
(Katman) is, however, necessary when it is a prerequisite of the
validity of the contract; the two main exceptions are the knowledge
of defects and the contract uberrimae fidei.167 Under Islamic law
reticence on facts is allowed only to the extent that it does not
affect the article’s value or the purpose of the contract.168 For

161. BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 133.
162. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 252.
163. Id. at 254.
164. Id. at 255.
165. In the small group of uberrimae fidei contracts in Islamic law (resale
of goods for the exact price originally paid, or with an agreed profit, percentage
or at an agreed discount) the original price paid is essential; so, the seller has the
duty to disclose all the facts that affected the price. COULSON, supra note 150,
at 73.
166. Therefore, the literal truth of the statements is not a defense if they
convey a misleading idea upon the reader. In brief, misleading statements or
advertising depend on the category of person addressed. These liability rules are
the outcome of a religious system that has the aim of protecting moral values. It
is a subjectivity test the one applied to see if the person addressed has been
mislead. Id.
167. In English law the scope of the disclosure is less stringent according to
the maxim of the caveat emptor. Regard to the uberrimae fidei contracts, the
differences with the common law lies only in some details.
168. COULSON, supra note 150, at 72-73. Where is narrated a peculiar case
relates to the disclosure topic. There is an offense called “meeting riders out of
town.” This regards the practice to intercept a caravan which had not reached its
destination. Due to the caravan ignorance of the local prices the tradesman
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example, failing to disclose the color of a car is not a frustration of
the purpose of the contract and it does not affect the car’s value.
The disclosure of defects is required even if the other party
would not have entered into the contract or the acquired knowledge
would have lowered the price because the free consent is one of the
prerequisite for the validity of the contract and the existence of
defects prevents this state of mind. This duty arises during the precontractual stage. Therefore, it is a tortious and non-contractual
claim. This reticence, regarded as fraud, renders the contract void.
The defrauded party may rescind or affirm the contract for the full
price. This option (in the form of khiyar al’-aib or khiyar at tadlis,
i.e. option for fraud) has the purpose to restore the defrauded party
to the position he was in before the contract was made. The
Islamic concept of fraudulent misrepresentation also covers the
deliberate silence of facts which the representor is obliged to
discover, above all the defects on the thing sold.169
The duty to disclose is a moral one and it is not a prerequisite
to invoke the option; the only thing that matters is the existence of
the defect.170 The law of Allah was given to man and society must
adapt itself to the law rather than creating new laws to changing
needs.
The products of the original agrarian society, normally
uncomplicated and produced locally, were dealt with between

could elevate profits. Such activity is condemned as cheating and the injured
party can rescind the contract. Id. A similar case is analyzed by Cicero.
In his work De Officiis, Cicero provides the example of a grain merchant
who had imported a large cargo of grain to Rhodes during a period of severe
famine. Because of the famine, prices had risen to extremely high levels. The
merchant knew that there are other shipments of grain being sent to Rhodes,
having passed them on his voyage. Being an honest man, he is faced with the
dilemma of disclosing the fact that other shipments of grain are coming, and
selling his cargo at a lower price, or withholding the information, and selling his
cargo at a greater profit. Cicero, after analyzing both arguments, concludes that
the information should be disclosed, for otherwise the merchant would be
“shifty, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and
subtlety.” Cicero believed in a general duty of disclosure based in a sense of
morality. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, 3 DE OFFICIIS sec. 12, at 319 (Walter
Miller trans. 1913).
169. COULSON, supra note 150, at 65.
170. The defect is not limited, of course, on the value of the good. If A
buys a pair of shoes of a different size he cannot use them and the contract failed
for the purpose even if the value is not lower of what was estimated.
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sellers and buyers on a relative equal arms length. Nowadays the
products become every day more complex, produced far from the
place of the sale and put in the market through adhesion contracts.
This change in trade methods, sophistication of products, and the
increasing amount of quantity and quality in the “things” sold
creates a challenge for the Shari’a, which stopped developing at
the tenth century.171
From a national perspective, legal systems such as the
Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Mauritanian, Morocco and Algerian172
have been receptive to both foreign and customary legal
principles.173 These legal systems followed a movement of
modernization that has occurred in most Islamic countries through
the influence of European law and has gradually separated
commercial law from the Shari'a. This separation has occurred by
application of two separate bodies of law referred to as “droit
modern” and “droit musulman” (modern law and Islamic law).
The “droit modern” is based on the French civil law codes and
practices.174 It covers civil and commercial areas in general.
Commercial law is the area where the European pattern is most
prevalent because of the need to communicate with the rest of the
world. Commercial and financial transactions by their nature
require flexibility, rapidity, and evolution, which probably cannot
be met in the rigidity of some Islamic rules. But Islamic precepts
in any case require the observance of good faith and they include
disclosure of defects relating to goods sold and also refraining
from misrepresentation, concealment, and fraud in commercial
transactions.
The needs of evolution are mostly required in the transnational
context. But the Islamic law had the solution inside its own nature.
Islamic laws governing business dealings substantially comply
with transnational law notwithstanding the secular imprinting of

171. N. J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 25 (1978). See also
CASTRO, supra note 19, at 13-14.
172. Tunisia adopted a uniformed legal system abolishing the Islamic courts
governing the law of personal status. See J.N. Anderson, The Tunisian Law of
Personal Status, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 262 (1958).
173. See passim CASTRO, supra note 19.
174. This is true above all for Algeria and Morocco. See ZWEIGERT &
KOTZ, supra note 20, at 338; and DAVID, supra note 11, at 391-396.
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state laws.175 In particular, business law benefits from the Shari'a's
power of adaptability that makes treaties like the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods176 fully
compatible with Islamic law principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The classic Islamic legal tradition is now facing the advance of
the western legal tradition. But there is a strong resistance.177 The
scholars were able to implement the Islamic doctrine of religious
duties in a complete legal system. The fact these rules were
formulated a long time ago and traced back, with some fictio, to
the divine authority supported the opinion that they are immutable;
they do not need governmental approval and they cannot be
abrogated.178
The Islamic principles are directed towards the creation of
a fairer business market. The same Qur’an affirms “o ye
who believe! Eat not each other’s properties by wrongful
means.”179 Khiyar al-‘aib rises a shield in defence of the
buyer, ensuring a social welfare in the trade market. The
same Holy prophet put on the businessmen a sort of metalegal protection for the fair dealing transactions when is
said that: [I]f both parties spoke the truth and describe the
defects and quantities (of the goods) then they would be
blessed in their transactions and if they told lies or

175. F. Akaddaf, Application of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries.
Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1,
31-34 (2001). See also DAVID, supra note 11, at 399.
176. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of
Goods (CISG) applies to international transactions involving the sale of goods
and aims to promote international trade by removing legal barriers in
transactions between international traders.
177. See P.J. Riga, Islamic Law and Modernity: Conflict and Evolution, 36
AM. J. JURIS. 103, 103-117 (1991); and D. Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia:
What Foreign Attorneys Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L. L. & ECON. 131
(1992); see also Mallat, supra note 29, at 81-90.
178. B. Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad, 26 AM
J. COMP. L. 199, 210 (1978); B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic Law and the
Common Law: Logic and Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79 (1985).
179. QUR’AN ch. 4:29.

2009]

CAVEAT EMPTOR’S CURRENT ROLE

99

concealed anything then the blessing of their transactions
will be blotted out.180
Khiyar al-‘aib and Caveat emptor share the aim of saving the
business society and the trade market181 from the unfair dealings
around defective products.182 They both have the task to ensure
the quality of the goods.
The Islamic solution, once the goods have been scrutinized,
focuses on the simplification of the transaction. When a person
purchases a good with a defect, no matter if trivial or flagrant,183if
it is not easily removable he may retain the object at its full price
or reject it; but he cannot retain it and seek for compensation for
the defect.184 Islamic commercial law implies the goods sold to be
free from defects, Islamic courts may consider the silence of the
seller fraudulent because Sharia seeks to assert the preclusion of
unjustified enrichment.185 Then in any transaction “ there must be
honest and free consent from both parties to ensure that they both
enjoy maximum benefits from the transaction and that nobody
180. It is a sort of precognition of the prisoner dilemma. See also AlBukhari, supra note 48, Volume 3, Book 34, Number 323: Narrated Hakim bin
Hizam:
The Prophet said:
The buyer and the seller have the option of cancelling or confirming the
bargain unless they separate, and if they spoke the truth and made clear
the defects of the goods, them they would be blessed in their bargain,
and if they told lies and hid some facts, their bargain would be deprived
of Allah's blessings.
181. G.M. Badr, A Survey of Islamic International Law, 76 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 56, 59 (1982).
182. The first element is the centrality of trade, the universal respect it
carries in Muslim civilization, and the importance of commerce as the nerve of
the city and of regional or international exchange. The free movement of goods
is a key element in the intellectual structure of early Islam through to the present
period. The fact that the Prophet Muhammad started his career as a caravan
merchant is unique to the Islamic Prophecy. The original textual tradition of
Islam and of Islamic law acknowledges the importance of commerce, including
the security of long-distance trade and market sanctity, both on the ethical and
the practical level. Whatever the reality of emporia in the early Islamic Hijaz,
the tradition of an Islamic Prophet-merchant is firmly received and developed
across the centuries. The contract of sale, since early Islam, is the measuring
rod for all its “contractual sisters.” See Mallat, supra note 29, at 93.
183. BAILLIE, supra note 52, at 99.
184. Id. at 98.
185. RAYNER, supra note 69, at 229.
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should suffer from any injustice or dishonesty.”186 Allah said to
this effect, “. . . Eat not up your property among yourself in
Vanities . . .”187
Maybe the western legal tradition and the Louisiana Civil Code
of course are more rationality based while the Islamic tradition
focuses more on supreme principles with a scent of natural law
embodied in the ancestral times. I am wondering, is it not the
same way in which the common law started?
The similarities between the above mentioned legal systems’
approach to caveat emptor and duties of disclosure are uncanny.
Regardless of whether the issue is dealt with under the heading of
mistake, misrepresentation, or error and fraud, there is a
commonality of approach that cannot be missed. And yet, despite
this obvious diversity of methods, traditions and styles, it is
possible to notice an element, or better, a tendency common to the
examined regulations, that may be found, as usual, more in
operational rules than in principle statements.
Interestingly, caveat emptor is no longer the default rule in
either Louisiana or Islam. And this is also true under most modern
domestic rules, as well as under the CISG. Today's international
buyer is entitled to expect the goods to possess certain basic
qualities, even if the contract does not expressly so state. Indeed, it
would seem that caveat venditor has also become the
supplementary CISG rule.188

186. Billah, supra note 51, at 295.
187. QUR’AN 4:29.
188. E. Visser, Favor Emptoris: Does the CISG Favor the Buyer?, 67
UMKC L. REV. 77 (1998).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2008, the Québec Court of Appeal in Hocking c.
Haziza1 refused to recognize and enforce an Ontario Court
judgment because it disagreed with how the Ontario judge decided
the case, and found the judgment to be incompatible with
fundamental principles of Québec law.2 By this ruling, the Court
implicitly sought to change not just class action culture, but legal
1. Hocking c. Haziza, (2008), QCCA 800 (CanLII). This class action arose
from a motion for certification filed by Robert Hocking against HSBC Bank on
behalf of all Canadian customers of HSBC who had made an early pay-out of
their mortgage and consequently incurred a penalty. David Haziza, a Québec
resident, filed a similar motion in Québec, limiting the class to Québec residents
only. The Ontario Court approved the class action for settlement purposes a few
months later. Accordingly, the Ontario decision at stake was an order certifying
a multi-jurisdictional class action for settlement purposes. The Québec Superior
Court concluded that the Ontario Court had no jurisdiction over class members
residing in Québec. In her reasons upholding the Superior Court decision, the
Court of Appeal stated that the Ontario Court had no right to get involved in
defining the rights and liabilities of residents of another province, and that the
territorial limits on the scope of provincial legislative authority prevented the
application of the law of a province to matters that were not sufficiently
connected to it. The Court of Appeal held that the Ontario judgment failed to
meet the requirements of the CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC for recognition and
enforcement of personal actions of a patrimonial nature. Interestingly, it
concluded that the Ontario judgment was rendered in violation of the essential
principles that govern civil proceedings in Québec since the interests of the nonresident class members were not taken into consideration by the Court, and the
adequate notice requirements regarding the proposed settlement were not met.
2. Id. at ¶. 223 et seq. (“. . . je suis également d'avis que le jugement
ontarien, en l'espèce, a été rendu en violation des principes essentiels de la
procédure, au sens de l'article 3155, paragr. 3, C.C.Q., en ce que la juge saisie du
recours collectif et, au même moment, de la ratification d'un règlement amiable,
n'a pas examiné la question de savoir ce qu'il en était des intérêts des nonrésidents (dont les Québécois) visés par le recours, de la protection de leurs
intérêts et de sa propre compétence sur ces justiciables.”).
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norms applicable in that area of law. Indeed, it recognized the
importance of protecting class action members’ rights by notifying
them appropriately about proposed settlements through extensive
notice requirements.3 Accordingly, Hocking illustrates how one
Canadian province’s legal culture influences class action law
developments and how class actions and their applicable law can,
reciprocally, influence and affect culture.
In this paper, I will first review the different theories of law
and culture, and define the concept and breadth of legal culture.
Second, I will discuss the relationship between law and culture,
referring to the existing literature on the subject. I will also discuss
how authors have connected culture to civil procedure, and why
the concept of “modern legal culture” is important in the context of
class action law. Third, I will address the main thesis of my paper:
the cultural construction of class action law. I will argue that the
class action encourages the transmission of culture, and discuss
how the history of the North American class action was influenced
by culture. I will thereafter argue that the class action mirrors
society’s structure and culture, in light of the following three
characteristics of North American contemporary culture: access to
justice, managerial judging and the preference for settlements.
Fourth, I will argue that class actions affect North American legal
culture, as evidenced by changes in the legal institutions, in the
role of judges and in the legal profession. Last, I will argue that
the cross-constitutive relationship between class action law and
culture must be studied both theoretically and empirically.
Ultimately, I will demonstrate that the class action is a
disputing institution that is culturally constructed, that plays a role
in the construction and transmission of culture–that is, of social
arrangements, systems of beliefs and values. This project is
ambitious, but distinctive as no author has to my knowledge
related class action law to culture in such a way.4
3. Id. at ¶228 et seq.
4. But see, Steven Penney, Mass Torts, Mass Culture: Canadian Mass Tort
Law and Hollywood Narrative Film, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 205 (2004) (where the
author argues that Canadian mass tort law may be influenced by American
popular culture, and in particular by Hollywood films) and Carole Younes, Le
recours collectif québécois: les réalités collectives à travers le prisme du droit,
15 R.C.D.S. 111,130 (2000). Many authors, however, have examined the
relationship between civil procedure law and culture. See, notably, Daniel Jutras,
Culture et droit processuel: Le cas du Québec (2008) (unpublished, on file with
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II. THE THEORIES OF CULTURE
A. Cultivating Law
Culture is important to our understanding of legal systems. But
what exactly do we mean by “culture?” It is a vague, “amorphous
and diffuse”5 concept that can include both a local culture–such as
the Québecois culture, for instance–and a more global one–such as
the North American culture.
Moreover, it occasionally is
compared to or confused with the concepts of tradition6 and
civilization.7
In fact, the word “culture” originates from the Latin cultura,
The
stemming from colere, which means “to cultivate.”8
dictionary defines culture as “[t]he distinctive ideas, customs,
social behaviour, products, or way of life of a particular society,

author); ANTOINE GARAPON & IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUGER EN AMÉRIQUE
ET EN FRANCE (Éditions Odile Jacob 2003); ANTOINE GARAPON, BIEN JUGER–
ESSAI SUR LE RITUAL JUDICIAIRE (Éditions Odile Jacob 2001); Mauro
Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure–Reforms and
Trends in Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1971). Finally,
Professor Francisco Valdes of the University of Miami School of Law has
recently written about class actions and social justice in his article entitled,
Procedure, Policy and Power: Class Actions and Social Justice in Historical
and Comparative Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 627 (2008) (where
Professor Valdes concludes that “consideration of bedrock social and legal
values . . . can help point the way toward a systemic, principled solution to basic
questions of power, policy, and procedure associated with class action
controversies.”) Valdes’ focus, however, is different from mine, as he
principally seeks to explore why the class action has moved from a “venerable
fixture of procedure” to a device increasingly under attack.
5. Rodney MacDonald, Civil Justice Reform Working Group, Discussion
Paper presented at the Civil Justice Reform Working Group, February 23, 2005,
BRITISH
COLUMBIA
JUSTICE
REVIEW,
available
at
http://www.bcjusticereview.org/working_groups/civil_justice/cjrwg_paper_02_
23_05.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009).
6. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 3 et seq. (3d ed.
2007). Glenn defines tradition as principally including the transmission of
information.
7. Loïc Cadiet, Droit et culture, Journées Louisianaises, Association Henri
Capitant 2008, at 3.
8. DOUGLAS HARPER, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 2001 (“Culture”),
available at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=culture (last visited
August 21, 2009).
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people, or period.”9 The UNESCO refers to culture “as the set of
distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of
society or a social group, and . . . to art and literature, lifestyles,
ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”10
When we think of legal culture, we generally refer not so much
to rituals, systems of belief and habit, language and religion, but to
norms of behaviour such as law and morality. Accordingly, law is
no doubt part of a given society’s culture. And, as will be argued
in this paper, this given society’s culture explains, creates, and is
influenced by its legal system.
Legal academics have acknowledged that the definition of legal
culture is flexible, and may vary depending on the purpose of the
one defining it.11 Lawrence Friedman, for instance, has defined
legal culture as the:
. . . [I]deas, values, attitudes, and opinions people in some
society hold, with regard to law and the legal system.
Every person has a ‘legal culture,’ just as every person has
a general culture, and a social culture; every person has
individual, unique traits, as distinctive as his or her
fingerprints; but each person is at the same time part of a
collective, a group, a social entity, and shares in the ideas
and habits of that group.
Legal culture is the source of law–its norms create the legal
norms; and it is what determines the impact of legal norms
on society. After all the ‘subjects’ of law, the people it
affects, are not robots or inert lumps of clay; they are living
human beings, with thoughts, ideas, minds, habits,
9. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2008, s.v. “culture.” Also see the
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 2008, s.v. “culture:” “the total
of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the
shared bases of social action,” or “the total range of activities and ideas of a
group of people with shared traditions, which are transmitted and reinforced by
members of the group.”
10. PREAMBLE TO THE UNESCO UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON
DIVERSITY
(2001),
available
at
CULTURAL
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf
(last visited
September 26, 2009).
11. OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE AND RITUAL 7 (2005) (noting that the
definition of culture depends on its purposes); David Nelken,
Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An Introduction, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD.
435, 438 (1995).
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behaviours; they react to orders and institutions of laws,
and their reactions determine the effect of these orders and
institutions. . . .
Legal culture is a broad term for attitudes and opinions; the
phenomenon shows up in the literature sometimes as ‘legal
consciousness’ . . ., or as knowledge and opinion about law
. . . We can measure [legal culture] directly, by asking
people questions; or indirectly, by watching what people do
and inferring their attitudes from what we see. . . .12
[emphasis added]
Oscar Chase similarly defines culture as including: “the
‘traditional ideas, values and norms’ that are widely shared in a
social group,” as well as “propositions of belief that are both
normative (‘killing is wrong except when authorized by the state’)
and cognitive (‘the earth is round’).”13 On whether culture should
include the institutions and social arrangements that are specific to
a community, Chase argues that “[d]isputing institutions are at
once a product of, a contributor to, and an aspect of culture.”14
Hence, for Chase, dispute resolution institutions both result from
culture and influence or affect culture.
Generally, academics have noted the difficulty of defining the
concept of legal culture, as well as its specific scope and the
relationship between each of its relevant elements.15 Roger
Cotterrell, notably, has stated that, “[t]he imprecision of the
[various formulations of legal culture] makes it hard to see what

12. Lawrence M. Friedman, Is There a Modern Legal Culture?, 7:2 RATIO
JURIS 117, 118-119 (1994).
13. CHASE, supra note 11, at 6, who quotes MELFORD E. SPIRO, CULTURE
AND HUMAN NATURE viii, 32 (1994). See also Oscar G. Chase, Legal
Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9 (1997) (“.
. . the culture of a community of people includes those beliefs about how to
properly relate to each other that are deeply held, widely shared, and persistent
over time.”).
14. CHASE, supra note 11, at 7.
15. ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY–LEGAL IDEAS IN
THE MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 83 (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2006). See also
GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 4, at 17 et seq.; and generally:
DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE (Denis Alland & Stéphanie Rials eds.,
2003).
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exactly the concept covers and what the relationship is between the
various elements said to be included within its scope.”16
B. The Breadth of Legal Culture
Accordingly, one major obstacle to working with the concept
of legal culture is agreeing on exactly what it encompasses, and on
where its limits should be drawn. What is the most relevant social
unit to legal culture? Exactly which legal culture should be
focused upon? Indeed, as Friedman remarked, “one can speak of
legal culture at many levels of abstraction.”17
North American legal culture includes the legal norms
generated by the two major prevalent systems of justice–the civil
law, applicable in the province of Québec and in the State of
Louisiana and U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, and the common law,
applicable in the rest of Canada and in the rest of the U.S. It also
includes elements of the inquisitorial and adversarial systems,
specific to the civil and common law traditions.18 Moreover, it
incorporates countless ideas, values and norms derived from
provincial, state, territorial, and local (city) or regional legal
activity.
Is ascertaining national culture and distinguishing it from the
more global or international culture necessary and relevant to the
study of law?19 And if it is, what exactly must be included in
national or local culture? For instance, how specific to Québécois
culture is a particular cultural trait that also exists at the North
16. COTTERREL, supra note 15, at 83.
17. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE 204 (1975); cf. Friedman, supra note 12, at 120.
18. Since Québec has adopted most aspects of the adversarial system
regarding its civil litigation procedures and its class action procedure, this latter
issue is less critical to my study, however. See, e.g., W.A. Bogart et al., Class
Actions in Canada: A National Procedure in a Multi-Jurisdictional Society?
(2007), Report prepared for The Globalization of Class Actions Conference,
Oxford
University,
December
2007,
at
1,
available
at:
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Canada_Na
tional_Report.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009). See also, Jutras, supra
note 4, at 3, citing JEAN-MAURICE BRISSON, LA FORMATION D’UN DROIT MIXTE :
L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA PROCÉDURE CIVILE DE 1774 À 1867 (Thémis 1986).
19. See, e.g., John D. Jackson, Playing the Culture Card in Resisting CrossJurisdictional Transplants: A Comment on “Legal Processes and National
Culture”, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 52-53 (1997).
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American level? While each nation has a legal culture,20 there
exists both “a convergence and divergence of cultures” which
“[pulls] against the concept of national culture.”21 In Canada, for
example, there is both a convergence of provincial cultures,
evidenced by the legislative uniformity in some areas of the law,22
and a divergence of cultures, evidenced by the specificity of
certain provincial legal systems.23 This duality makes Canadian
legal culture hard to define. Another difficulty with the concept of
national legal culture is the fact that there is a plurality of legal
cultures, as complex as the society it is associated with.24
Setting aside these difficulties, I will, in this paper, refer to
culture as including the ideas, values and norms conveyed by the
American and Canadian societies and their state institutions. I will
argue that their culture influences the development of the class
action (as a disputing institution) and is influenced by it. When
feasible and relevant, I will also nuance national legal culture and
provincial or state legal culture–distinguishing civil law culture
from the common law culture.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND CULTURE
A. Is there a “Modern Legal Culture”?
Law must reflect the currently accepted values, customs and
habits of society to be deemed appropriate, acceptable, and
legitimate, and to be obeyed by its citizens.25 It must adapt to
social and cultural changes, and must evolve and be reformed to
reflect the contemporary, modern legal culture. Princeton

20. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 209.
21. Jackson, supra note 19, at 57.
22. See, e.g., Uniform Law Conference of Canada Website, available at
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/ (and in particular, list of uniform legislation) (last
visited September 26, 2009).
23. See, notably, the CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, (S.Q., 1991, c. 64.)
[“C.C.Q.”], which codifies the civil law in the province of Québec.
24. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW,
AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 96, 213 (Harvard University Press 1990).
25. On this point, see: Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness
of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25:4 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
983 (2006).

2009]

CLASS ACTION LAW

109

anthropology professor Lawrence Rosen has argued that law is
inherent to culture, and culture to law:
Law is [a] cultural [domain]. Like the marketplace or the
house of worship, the arrangement of space or the
designation of familial roles, law may possess a distinctive
history, terminology, and personnel. But even where
specialization is intense, law does not exist in isolation. To
understand how a culture is put together and operates,
therefore, one cannot fail to consider law; to consider law,
one cannot fail to see it as part of culture.26 [emphasis
added]
Most Western legal theorists interested in legal culture have
presumed that law takes its source in society’s culture, that it is a
“mirror” of society that operates to maintain social order.27 This
so-called “mirror theory” provides that “[l]egal systems do not
float in some cultural void, free of space and time and social
context; necessarily, they reflect what is happening in their own
societies. In the long run, they assume the shape of these societies,
like a glove that molds itself to the shape of a person’s hand.”28
The mirror theory has been challenged, however, notably by
Alan Watson and his legal transplants theory.29 According to
Watson, the laws of one society are primarily borrowed from other
societies; these laws are developed by transplantation of legal rules
between legal systems, or by elaboration and application of
existing legal ideas to other systems by analogy to new
circumstances.30 Hence, Watson essentially argues that law is
insulated or autonomous from its society. Watson’s theory was
criticized by Otto Kahn-Freund, who argued that law is so deeply

26. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 4-5 (Princeton
University Press 2006). Rosen ends his book by stating that “as a marvelous
entry to the study of that most central of human features, culture itself, and
hence an open invitation, whatever one’s ultimate interests, to think about what
and who we are.” Id. at 200.
27. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND
SOCIETY (Oxford University Press 2001).
28. Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of
Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996).
29. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed., University of Georgia Press 1993).
30. Id.
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embedded in a society’s life that it is not possible to effect a legal
transplantation.31
Studying legal culture is crucial to a better understanding of
law and of our legal institutions.32 Indeed, cultural context
explains why certain legislative choices are made. It also helps
interpret laws and regulations, and justifies precedent. Legal
culture determines “when, why and where people use law, legal
institutions, or legal process; and [why] they use other institutions
or do nothing.”33 It is essential to understanding how law works,
and hence, crucial to the development of law reform:
. . . law reform is doomed to failure if it does not take legal
culture into account . . . legal systems are products of
society–more specifically, of legal culture; hence reform is
a subtle and complex task. One has to take into account the
limits imposed by culture; one has to re-examine whether
the ‘failures’ of law are real failures, or whether we are
neglecting to cut with instead of against the grain.34
If a given society’s values, ideas, and norms change, its legal
system will also change. But is it merely law that moulds itself to
culture, or can culture also mould itself and be influenced by law?
There is most certainly a reciprocal influence between class action
law and culture. Since culture is important to law and law to
culture, and since culture evolves through time and place, there is
such a thing as a modern legal culture or “legal culture of
modernity.”35 In this paper, I will focus on the modern cultural
construction of legality, referring to legal developments and
activity from the last few decades in North America.

31. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law, 37 MOD.
L. REV. 1 (1974). See also, Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in
British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L.
REV. 12 (1998).
32. Roger Cotterrell, Law in Culture, 17:1 RATIO JURIS 1 (2004) (arguing
for the use of a “sociologically-informed concept of community” in legal
theory); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (University of Chicago
Press 1999); Friedman, supra note 12, at 130.
33. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 76
(Prentice Hall 1977).
34. Id. at 130.
35. Id. at 120.
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B. Culture and Civil Procedure
Civil procedure is culturally constructed. Civil procedure law
and its disputing institutions contain elements of tradition,
common values and ideas that are attributable to identifiable
cultures. Legal academics have demonstrated an interest in this
relationship since the turn of the twentieth century. Austrian
proceduralist Franz Klein argued in 1901, that “the squalid, arid,
neglected phenomenon of civil procedure is . . . strictly connected
with the great intellectual movements of peoples; and that its
varied manifestations are among the most important documents of
mankind’s culture.”36
Decades later, in the early 1970’s, Mauro Cappelletti published
a seminal article discussing the relationship between culture and
civil procedure.37 In it, he reflected on the intellectual and sociopolitical background of European civil procedure reforms, and
underlined the importance for proceduralists of a cultural study of
law.38 A few years later, William Felstiner also wrote about the
influences of social organization on dispute processing, and argued
that dispute processing practices are a product of society’s “values,
its psychological imperatives, its history and its economic, political

36. As quoted by Cappelletti, supra note 4, at 886.
37. Id. See also Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through
the Courts: A Comparativist’s Contribution, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 643 (1975);
Mauro Cappelletti, La protection d’intérêts collectifs et le groupe dans le
procès civil, 27 R.I.D.C. 571 (1975); Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of
Dispute Institutions in Society, LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 217 (1974). Cappelletti also
later wrote a treatise, MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (OUP 1989), in which he argued in favour of a
“world-wide metamorphosis of the judicial process [in which] new types of
procedures, and indeed new roles and responsibilities for judges, have
emerged.” Id. at xx. This has meant, according to Cappelletti, that “procedural
analysis must become ‘contextual’ analysis, for rules, institutions, and processes
must be seen in their societal and political contexts.” Id.
38. Cappelletti, supra note 4, at 886 (“Procedure is not pure form. It is the
meeting point of conflicts, of policies, of ideas . . . Procedure is, in fact, the
faithful mirror of all of the major exigencies, problems and trials of our epoch–
of the immense challenge of our time.”). Antoine Garapon also wrote about
law’s relationship to culture in: GARAPON, supra note 4, at 149 (“la procédure
est le conservatoire de l’esprit national, plus encore que le fond du droit.”);
GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 4, at 17-37.
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and social organization.”39 In his important book entitled The
Faces of Justice and State Authority,40 Mirjan Damaška similarly
argued that procedural systems reflect the “structure of
government” and the “purpose to be served by the administration
of justice.” 41
In his recently published book on law and culture–Law,
Culture and Ritual42–Oscar Chase similarly argues that society’s
choice of dispute resolution procedures results from the choices it
makes according to its social structure, tradition and collective
beliefs, according to its culture:
Dispute processes are in large part a reflection of the
culture in which they are embedded; they are not an
autonomous system that is predominantly the product of
insulated specialists and experts.
More, they are
institutions through which social and cultural life is
maintained, challenged, and altered, or as the same idea has
been expressed, ‘constituted’ or ‘constructed.’ These
institutional practices importantly influence a society and
its culture–its values, metaphysics, social hierarchies and
symbols–even as those practices themselves reflect the
society around them.43 [emphasis added]
Using the example of the Azande Society living in Central
Africa, Chase argues that ways of resolving disputes both reflect
the cultures in which they arose and affect these cultures. He
argues that the Azandes’ belief system of witchcraft, oracles, and
magic used in their dispute resolution practices is reflective of the
main features of the Azande Society. In his view, the Azande

39. William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute
Processing, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 63 (1974).
40. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (Yale University Press
1986).
41. Id. at 1-15. See also, Mirjan R. Damaška Rational and Irrational Proof
Revisited, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 25 (1997).
42. CHASE, supra note 11. See also, on the relationship between law and
culture: Oscar G. Chase, American ‘Exceptionalism’ and Comparative
Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002); Chase, supra note 13; Oscar G.
Chase, Some Observations on the Cultural Dimension in Civil Procedure
Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 861 (1997).
43. CHASE, supra note 11, at 2.
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disputing institutions and practices mirror the hierarchical and
gender-biased nature of Azande culture.44 He explains that:
[t]he processes the Azande used for resolving their disputes
were a link in a circular chain from belief to authority to
action and back to belief: the central role of the oracle as a
fact finder supported their system of social stratification,
their ideas about appropriate gender relations, and their
metaphysics. This is the ‘lesson’ of the Azande.45
In his book, Chase focuses on “official” outcome-determining
processes, as opposed to settlement, which he characterizes as an
“informal process.”46 I, on the contrary, will discuss class action
trial and judgment, as well as the class action’s most likely
outcome: settlement. North American class action settlements are
subject to court approval47 and are, in my view, hardly
“informal.”48 Furthermore, class action litigation and settlement
are equally important and relevant to culture. In a way similar to
Chase’s main thesis, I will demonstrate the cultural construction of
North American class actions as dispute resolution institutions.
IV. THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLASS ACTION LAW
A. The Class Action’s Nature Encourages the Transmission of
Culture
The class action is a peculiar procedural mechanism that
encourages, by its inherent structure and function, the
communication of elements of culture. It is defined as:
. . . a legal procedure which enables the claims (or part of
the claims) of a number of persons against the same
44. Id. at 22-29.
45. Id. at 29.
46. Chase justifies his choice as follows: “I focus on the ‘official’ outcomedetermining processes precisely because their grounding in culture–and their
constructive power–has been wrongly ignored or denied . . . Informal processes
also reflect social hierarchy, norms, and metaphysics and no doubt capture
different ingredients of culture than the formal processes . . .” Id. at 31.
47. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C), which establishes that a class
action settlement must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to be approved
judicially.
48. This procedure will be further discussed below, in IV.C.3.

114

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 2

defendant to be determined in the one suit. In a class
action, one or more persons (‘representative plaintiff’) may
sue on his or her own behalf and on behalf of a number of
other persons (‘the class’) who have a claim to a remedy
for the same or a similar alleged wrong to that alleged by
the representative plaintiff, and who have claims that share
questions of law or fact in common with those of the
representative plaintiff (‘common issues’).
Only the
representative plaintiff is a party to the action. The class
members are not usually identified as individual parties but
are merely described. The class members are bound by the
outcomes of the litigation on the common issues, whether
favourable or adverse to the class, although they do not, for
the most part, take any active part in that litigation.49
This definition suggests a class action structure that is
eminently social, in a way that encourages sharing elements of
culture. Indeed, the class action involves several different actors: a
class action representative, class action lawyers for the plaintiff(s)
and defendant(s), class members, and one (or more) judge(s).
These actors each have values, ideas, and beliefs they will
implicitly or explicitly disclose during the course of informal
discussions, argument, or judgment. In fact, each party will share
not just its legal arguments and vision, but also, a set of norms.
These norms will be apparent from the questions of law or fact
shared by class members and the class representative. Ultimately,
the judge will decide upon the values, ideas, beliefs, and norms
that should be upheld.50
49. RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL
SYSTEMS–A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 (Hart Publishing 2004). See also,
Harry Kalven Jr. & Maurice Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941).
50. Many authors, however, have argued that class action litigation is
dominated by class counsel: John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large
Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 896-900 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Though Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-678 (1986); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class
Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB.
L. REV. 646, 659-663 (1994). See also, Alon Klement, Who Should Guard The
Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV.
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The class action was originally created–and later used–in
England, as a result of the country’s social, economic, political
structures, and relations “transition[ed] from feudal arrangements
to a more mercantile framework.”51 Indeed, as University of
Miami law Professor Francisco Valdes explains:
In the process of that macro-transition in English society,
powerful institutions and actors, principally the clergy and
the aristocracy, sought to exact from the local population–
the commoners–the tithes and similar types of payments
based on entrenched feudal traditions. The people resisted
and the Lords, the powerful, and the clergy turned to the
law. But of course, it was difficult, cumbersome, and
expensive to go after every little amount due from every
single little labourer or parishioner. So the powerful sought
to go after the whole class of commoners who owed them
something under the legal customs and traditional habits of
feudalism. The courts permitted it, and thus established the
foundations of the class action. . . .
The class action was invented to aid the powerful in
maintaining the social and economic status quo vis-à-vis
the disempowered.52
Accordingly, the class action serves to allow several persons to
take action as a group, changing individual disputes into group
disputes, generating power relations,53 and encouraging the
transmission of culture. Indeed, it gives the class a chance to
develop into “an independent force for change.”54 This “force for

LITIG. 25, 27-28 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (1991).
Accordingly, the power of the class action would then be vehicled through class
counsel’s arguments and actions.
51. Valdes, supra note 4, at 630.
52. Id.
53. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION 1(Yale University Press 1987) (“The very decision to
recognize the claimants as a class–a temporary litigative entity–grants them a
form of power.”).
54. Bryant G. Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action,
26:2 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 237, 256 (1992). See also, Catherine Piché, The
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change” will not only generate elements of culture, but it will
allow for their communication and publication through precedent,
and, when the class action invites publicity, the mass media.
B. The Modern History of the North American Class Action
Evidences Close Ties with Culture
In this subsection, I will argue that each of the major stages of
the more recent historical evolution of the North American class
action evidences a close relationship with cultural developments in
the U.S. and Canada.
The first stage of modern class action history begins with the
birth of the modern-day class action in 1966, as Rule 23 of the U.S.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was enacted.55 Rule 23 was a
significant milestone in the evolution of collective litigation
because it provided guarantees of procedural fairness for
defendants and absent class members, a system of notice to the
latter class members, and opt-out procedures.56 The motivations
behind its enactment were varied. Certain legal scholars explained
that its enactment responded to social and cultural upheavals of the
1960’s:
. . . the race relations echo of that decade was always in the
committee room. If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of
the committee, the energizing force which motivated the
whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class
action system which could deal with civil rights and,
explicitly, segregation. The one part of the rule which was
never doubted was (b)(2) and without its high utility, in the
spirit of the times, we might well have had no rule at all.
The other factor is that 1964 was the apogee of the Great
Society. President Johnson was elected with the most
overwhelming vote ever, as of that time, achieved by
anyone. A spirit of them versus us, of exploiters who must

Power of Class Actions, 2:1 CRITICAL ISSUES IN JUSTICE AND POLITICS 77
(2009).
55. See Catherine Piché, supra note 54, at 77.
56. H. Patrick Glenn, The Dilemma of Class Action Reform, 6 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 262, 266 (1986).

2009]

CLASS ACTION LAW

117

not exploit the whole population, of a fairly simplistic good
guy–bad guy outlook on the world, had its consequences.57
Other legal scholars, such as Professor Judith Resnik, saw the
new rule as having been enacted to respond to the legal
community’s desire to rid of the “confusing” tripartite class action
classification as true, hybrid, or spurious.58 While the Advisory
Committee considered adopting a unitary standard of
classification, it ultimately preserved the different forms of class
actions.59 For the first few years after its enactment, Rule 23
generated criticism and controversy, as companies’ legal exposure
grew and consumers became more litigious than ever with the
availability of this new procedural tool.60 Antitrust, consumer,
environment, securities, and fair employment class actions were
criticized, as they “resounded with Great Society concerns.”61
Whilst Americans abundantly criticized the class action device,
the Canadian province of Québec sought, in 1978, to replicate Rule
23 by enacting class action legislation.62 Québec’s legislation was
57. John P. Frank, “Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on
Class Actions: Memorandum to My Friends on the Civil Rules Committee,”
(December 20, 1996), in Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2 Working
Papers of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on Proposed Amendments to
Rule 23, 266 (1997), as cited in DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (RAND 2000),
available at,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR969
(last
visited September 26, 2009). See also, Valdes, supra note 4, at 640 (“ . . . the
modern class action is an artifact of modernity itself, shaped by the forces of
social, economic, and political modernization: the emergence and consolidation
of “mass” societies.”).
58. Judith Resnik, From ‘Cases’ To ‘Litigation’, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 8 (1991).
59. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at n.16.
60. Id. at 15 et seq.
61. Id. at n. 36.
62. Loi sur le recours collectif/An Act Respecting the Class Action, LQ
1978, c. 8, enacting articles 999-1052, Code of Civil Procedure. For accounts of
the history of the Canadian class action, see: Andrew Borrel, The Evolving
Evidentiary Standard for Certification in Canada, 26:6 CLASS ACTION REPORTS
3 (2005); Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE
COMP. & INT’L L. J. 269 (2001); W.A. Bogart, Questioning Litigation’s Role–
Courts and Class Actions in Canada, 62 IND. L. J. 665 (1986-87); Williams,
Consumer Class Actions in Canada–Some Proposals for Reform, 13 OSGOODE
HALL L. J. 1 (1975); John A. Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada, 11 OSGOODE
HALL L. J. 397 (1973).
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a first in Canada. It contained extensive provisions addressing
interlocutory rights of appeal, the forms of collective recovery, and
the conduct of the lawsuit.63 It also provided a preliminary
screening of the case’s merits–at the so-called “authorization”
stage–and established a governmental agency for the distribution
of public funds to potential class action representatives.64
The advent of the class action in the Canadian province of
Québec evidenced a similar concern for culture. The Québec
legislation was enacted under the Parti Québécois government
headed by René Lévesque, with policy objectives of promoting and
favouring access to justice, and more efficiently enforcing social
and remedial legislation. The legislation was a measure intended
to advance a public interest agenda, along with labour reform and
consumer protection statutes.65 Member of the National Assembly
Fernand Lalonde described it as advancing a “social purpose:”
On behalf of the Official Opposition, we are very satisfied
with the tabling of Bill 39 respecting the class action. The
bill has a social purpose, and is destined to re-establish a
balance between the isolated citizen and companies,
especially the enormous ones with which our society has
become familiar. This bill will provide the citizen with a
tool destined to eliminate the imbalance which sometimes
exists between the consumers and producers of goods . . . 66
[emphasis added]
In the rest of Canada, class action reform followed in 1982,
with the publication of the Ontario Law Reform Commission
Report on Class Actions.67 In this report, the Ontario Commission
identified three objectives for future lawmakers to consider. First,
class actions should ensure judicial economy, because without
63. Glenn, supra note 56, at 267. In Québec, interlocutory rights of appeal
are limited.
64. Id. at 267.
65. Shaun Finn, In a Class all its Own: The Advent of the Modern Class
Action and its Changing Legal and Social Mission, 2(2) CAN. CLASS ACTION
REV. 333 (2005).
66. Id. at 352-353 (citing Journal des débats, Troisième session-31ème
Législature: audition des mémoires sur le projet de loi no. 39 (le 7 mars 1978)
B-262).
67. 1-3 ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS
(Ministry of the Attorney General 1982).
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them, “most of [the] claims would be litigated individually, leading
to duplicative and costly hearings, at least in situations where there
are too many potential plaintiffs for joinder to be feasible.”68
Second, class actions should facilitate access to justice. Third,
class actions should enable behavioural modification or
deterrence.69 Ultimately, the Ontario Commission recommended
that to meet these objectives, provinces adopt a class certification
procedure similar to U.S. Rule 23.70
The Report’s recommendations and statement of class action
objectives is consistent with early legal culture. Indeed, the
Canadian civil justice system is “premised on the maintenance of
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and accessibility
to the civil justice system.”71 It is a legal system that strives to
remain not only accessible, but “effective, fair, and efficient.”72
The Ontario Report’s three class action objectives of access to
justice, judicial economy and efficiency, and deterrence are
consistent with the latter civil justice objectives and fundamental
precepts of Canadian legal culture.
Another stage of Canadian class action history was marked by
the 1983 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Naken.73 This case
slowed judicial acceptance and expansion of class actions,
requiring that collective proceedings be filed only pursuant to
properly enacted provincial legislation. By this judgment, the
68. Id. at 118-119.
69. Id. at 145-146 (“. . . the potential of class actions to provide the
incentives for increased compliance with the law, through the prevention of
unjust enrichment or cost internalization, reinforces the ‘judicial economy’ and
‘access’ arguments in favour of the adoption of an expanded class action
procedure in Ontario.”).
70. Bogart, supra note 62, at 692. What the Commission recommended,
however, was that rather than a separate requirement that common questions
predominate over the individual ones, courts consider predominance as just “one
of the factors employed to gauge whether the class action is superior.” Id.
71. THE CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SYSTEMS OF CIVIL JUSTICE TASK
FORCE REPORT 15 (August 1996).
72. Id. at 15, 26 (“These principles lie at the heart of civil justice and
cannot be imperiled. The principles of equity and access are also central. The
maxim ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ and assertions that ‘justice is only for
the rich’ are warning signals. To avoid a dichotomy between ‘perfect’ justice
and ‘accessible’ justice, we must recognize that there are different ways to
achieve procedural fairness and incorporate this knowledge into our system.”).
73. Naken v. General Motors of Canada (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385
(S.C.C.).
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Supreme Court responded to the then prevalent legal culture
attributing a conservative role to the courts.74 In the years
following Naken, the class action device was profusely criticized,
notably for being a “new form of the arrêt de règlement . . . and a
‘serious judicial usurpation of the functions of the legislature.’”75
The enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,76
however, gave more power to the courts, and brought hope that
Canadian judges would be more receptive to class actions in the
future.77
In the mid-1990’s, a more enthusiastic stage of the modern
North American class action history begun. In Canada, two
provinces enacted class action legislation in response to a new
social impetus favouring collective rights.78 In the U.S., mass tort
and personal injury class actions appeared in great numbers, as did
settlement classes.79 Despite their enthusiasm about the class
action device, Americans also became mindful of its pitfalls. They
grew concerned that it invited, notably, potential conflicts of
74. W.A. Bogart, Naken, The Supreme Court and What Are Our Courts
For?, 9 CAN. BUS. L. J. 280 (1984).
75. H. Patrick Glenn, Class Actions in Ontario and Quebec 62:3 CAN. BAR
REV. 247, 270-73 (1984). See also, H. Patrick Glenn, Class Actions and the
Theory of Tort and Delict, 35 U. TORONTO L. J. 287 (1985) (arguing that class
action is incompatible with tort and delict law); Glenn, supra note 56; Thomas
Cromwell, An Examination of the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on
Class Actions, 15 OTTAWA L. REV. 587 (1983); W.A. Macdonald et al., Ontario
Class Action Reform: Business and Justice System Impacts–A Comment, 9 CAN.
BUS. L. J. 351 (1984). But see, Bogart, supra note 74, at 308 (“. . . I believe it is
the class action . . . which will best answer the needs of group action at the end
of the 20th century.”).
76. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11.
77. Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 2-3.
78. Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 and British
Columbia Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50. See also, The Class
Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01 (Saskatchewan); Class Actions Act, S.N.L.
2001, c. C-18.1 (Newfoundland and Labrador); Class Proceedings Act, S.A.
2003, c. C-16.6 (Alberta); Federal Court Rules, S.O.R./98-106 (Rules 334.1 et
seq.). See also, The Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M. c. C130 (Manitoba).
Today, class action procedures have been implemented by most Canadian
provinces.
79. On this topic, see John C. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); and more generally,
John C. Coffee, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).
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interest between plaintiff attorneys and class members, collusion
between defendants and plaintiff attorneys, and unfair settlements
which award lawyers thousands or millions of dollars in fees and
the smallest amounts of money damages to plaintiffs. These
concerns lead to a renewed interest in class action rule revision and
civil justice reform.80
At the end of the decade, the battle over the utility of class
actions in the U.S. continued,81 reflecting in great part, a
fundamental cultural divide between proponents of individual
versus group rights.82 Indeed, “clashing views on the objective of
Rule 23(b)(3) [were] at the heart of past and present controversy
over revising the class action rule.”83 Nevertheless, the policy
behind the modern class action was confirmed by the Supreme
Court as being to make “marketable” civil claims that otherwise
would not realistically be brought on an individual basis.84
The most recent stage of class action history begun in Canada,
in early 2000, with a trilogy of class action Supreme Court cases.85
In one of them, Dutton, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized
the critical importance of class actions:
The class action plays an important role in today’s world.
The rise of mass production, the diversification of
corporate ownership, the advent of the mega-corporation,
and the recognition of environmental wrongs have all
contributed to its growth . . . The class action offers a

80. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 22 et seq. Notably of interest is the
1995 Castano decision, in which a Louisiana district court certified a nationwide
class action on behalf of smokers asking damages for addiction; see Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995). But see, Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), which effectively
overturned the trial court’s certification on interlocutory appeal.
81. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 35-37. See also, Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559
(1996).
82. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 49.
83. Id.
84. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting
Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp, 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
85. Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton, (2001) 2 S.C.R. 534,
Rumley v. British Columbia, (2001) 3 S.C.R. 184 and Hollick v. City of
Toronto, (2001) 3 S.C.R. 158.
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means of efficiently resolving such disputes in a manner
that is fair to all parties.86
This favourable caselaw caused an increase in the number of
class action filings in Canada, from 15 filings per year five years
ago, to approximately 120-150 per year at present.87 It also
brought high certification rates throughout Canada. Between the
years 2002 and 2007, approximately 57% of all cases were
authorized in Québec, compared to, certification rates of 52%, 75%
and 45% in Ontario, British Columbia, and in the Federal Court of
Canada, respectively.88
By comparison, U.S. controversy over the class action led to
three major class action law reforms–the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,89 Rule 23 amendments of 2003,90
and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,91 which sought to
tighten procedural protections to prevent abuse of the class action
mechanism. They also sought to regulate the selection of class
counsel and limit their fees, encouraged interlocutory appeals, and
limited settlement class actions and coupon settlements. These
reforms were implemented in response to a high level of mistrust
of lawyers–especially class action ones–and of collective
procedural mechanisms.92 Indeed, the PSLRA was adopted to “go
after the greatest abuse . . . lawyers who do not represent the

86. Dutton, at ¶ 26.
87. Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 16.
88. Id. at 25-26.
89. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C.) (“PSLRA”).
PSLRA raised the standard of pleading for securities lawsuits and changed the
selection process of class representatives and class counsel.
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c), (e), (g), (h) (as amended in 2003).
91. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 28 U.S.C.) (“CAFA”).
CAFA significantly expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction over state law
class actions. Indeed, it allows federal jurisdiction over class actions based on
minimal diversity and an aggregate amount in controversy of five million
dollars, and removal by any defendant, even an in-state defendant. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (d) (2), (6) (Supp. V. 2005) and § 1453 (b). The practical result of
CAFA, accordingly, is to allow all large scale class actions to be filed or
removed to federal court.
92. Howard M. Erichson, Symposium: Fairness to Whom–Perspectives on
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2008).
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general public but represent themselves.”93 These reform efforts
and steady concern for procedural abuse, however, have not
affected the number of U.S. federal class action filings or
removals, which have risen steadily over the last decade.94
Accordingly, this most recent stage of class action history
evidences, once more, a true concern for culture. Indeed, in our
mass production, mass consumption economy, concerns for
procedural and contractual fairness and for product safety are now
adequately and efficiently addressed by collective redress for
breaches in various areas of the law such as tort, consumer
protection, or contract law.
C. The Class Action as a “Mirror of Societal Structure” and
Culture
The class action was created in parallel to a decline in the
individualist conceptions of trial and justice.95 It is, and will likely
remain, closely tied to its social and cultural setting.96 W.A.
Bogart argued a quarter of a century ago that the class action
“[reflects] how society functions” and “[mirrors] societal

93. Statement to Congress of Senator d’Amato, quoted in Howard M.
Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593,
1603 (2008).
94. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
2 (2007). This Report explains that there was a 46% increase in federal court
class actions filings or removals during six-month periods from mid-2001
through mid-2006.
95. Cappelletti, “La protection”, supra note 37, at 596.
96. See Yeazell, supra note 53, at 267 (“This chapter, like the entire study,
argues that one cannot understand the nature of group litigation separate from
the social setting that produces and the state that permits and regulates it.”);
Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of
the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 895-896 (1977) (“. . . the interaction
between group and law in the earliest reported instances of group litigation
reminds us that the law’s position as a social artifact, and the courts’ function as
agencies of social and economic control, preclude easy assumptions that
formally similar procedural devices play similar roles in different social
circumstances.”).
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structure.”97 He also argued that class actions respond to a
collective vision of litigation because they:
. . . allow litigation to be brought in a form responsive to
questions concerning the activities of entities whose
conduct can scarcely avoid having mass ramifications.
And seeing alleged wrongdoing by these aggregates in the
light of the consequences for groups is vital in order to
assess and to respond to such conduct. To force litigation
to be brought on an individual basis is to embrace a vision
of the structure of society which–and in many important
ways, regrettably–no longer exists. To force it into the
traditional mold of litigation in the name of individualism
may purport to celebrate formally the value of each one of
us but, in reality, it prevents an effective means of
confronting such aggregates with their capacity to pose a
greater threat to that individuality.
. . . [class actions] reflect a reality that sooner or later
must be mirrored in litigation that affects so significantly
the issues people bring to courts. Canada is a highly
industrialized and regulated society which will repeatedly
generate policies, issues, and consequences that the courts
can only respond to adequately by approaching them with
an understanding of how powerful entities function and
affect, and at times injure, groups and individuals.98
[emphasis added].
Relating the class action to the social and cultural environment
in which it exists and operates is logical, considering the inherent
structure and function of the class action.99 But this relationship is
also questionable in the North American context. Canada has a bijuridical legal system in which common and civil law cohabitate
and interact. Its provinces and territories each have their own
specific legal system and culture. Quebec, however, has a mixed
97. Bogart, supra note 74, at 280-281. See also, Bogart et al., supra note
18, at 2 (where Bogart links class action reform to culture and politics); Bogart,
supra note 62, at 697 (“[c]lass actions claim our attention because they raise
questions concerning how society is structured and run–the manner in which the
nation struggles with the problems that a highly industrialized and regulated
country must face at the close of the twentieth century.”).
98. Bogart, supra note 62, at 699-700.
99. See IV.A.
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jurisdiction, in which criminal law and several other federal
matters are derived from the common law, while most other areas
of the law are codified and of civil law facture. The United States
has one state–Louisiana–and one territory–Puerto Rico–that are
governed for a large part by civil law. In addition, many of its
southwest states such as Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada
were originally Mexican territory, and have inherited several
unique features from the civil law, which applied when they were
part of Mexico.
Accordingly, it is difficult to argue in favour of a unified, truly
Canadian or American legal culture. This difficulty is accentuated
by the fact that social, political, economical and cultural
developments in the United States reciprocally influence those of
Canada, in part because the two countries share a common border,
language, and cultural heritage. In the class action context, U.S.
legal developments also influence the development of Canadian
law. And since the Canadian and American class action regimes
are similar (though not identical), they are subject to a constant
cross-fertilization of ideas.
Setting aside these difficulties, North American class action
law developments in the last decade have been, and will likely
continue to be, culturally constructed. This influence can be
appreciated in light of the three following characteristics of North
American contemporary culture: (1) access to justice; (2)
managerial judging; and (3) the preference for settlement.
1. Access to Justice
This first cultural characteristic of access to justice is a
principal objective of the North American civil justice system, and
is reflected in North American class action developments. In 2006,
then Chief Justice of Ontario Roy McMurtry explained that
[t]here is no doubt that the provision of civil justice is
integral to a viable democratic society. As you know, our
system of civil justice is premised on the maintenance of
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the
openness of the courts, and it can be described as having
two overarching objectives: (1) to provide Canadians with
a means by which they can resolve their disputes peacefully
and in a timely way before an independent and impartial
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decision-maker; and (2) to ensure that this public dispute
resolution “machinery” is accessible to all Canadians, both
in terms of cost and complexity.100 [emphasis added]
Accordingly, access to justice is the foundation of Canada’s
civil society and a major concern of civil justice. It is an important
element of Canadian culture. Indeed, “in a liberal democracy, all
people should have an equal right to participate in every institution
where law is debated, created, found, organized, administered,
interpreted and applied.”101 Access to justice is considered to be
not a goal, but a “process,” a “positive act of creating a more just
society,” an “empowerment that citizens claim for themselves.”102
Consequently, it is also the “principal justice challenge” for the
future.103
Access to justice is, similarly, a fundamental right of primary
concern in American civil justice. It is central to achieving
democracy in civil processes. Access to justice is implicit in the
principle of “equal justice under law:” “[t]he underlying
assumption is that social justice is available through procedural
justice. [But] those who receive their ‘day in court’ do not always
feel that ‘justice has been done’ . . . Formal rights can be
prohibitively expensive to enforce, successful plaintiffs can be
informally blacklisted, and legislatures may overturn legal rulings
that lack political support.”104 Currently, U.S. civil processes fail
to ensure that a lawyer is made available for each and every injured
plaintiff, and that processes are fair and comprehensible to the
average claimant.105 In fact, while access to justice has been
100. R. Roy McMurtry, “Civil Justice Reform Conference: Phase II – Into
the Future,” paper presented to the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, December
7, 2006, available at http://cfcj-fcjc.org/docs/2006/mcmurtry-en.pdf (last visited
September 26, 2009), at 4-5.
101. Roderick A. Macdonald, “Access to Justice in 2003–Scope, Scale,
Ambitions”, paper presented to the Symposium on Access to Justice,
May 2003, Law Society of Upper
Canada, available at
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convjune03_access.pdf (last visited September 26,
2009), at 1.
102. Id. at 6-7.
103. McMurtry, supra note 100, at 3.
104. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 5-6 (OUP 2004).
105. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1014 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles
to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 369 (2003).
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considered critical to Canadian policy debates and legal reform, it
has been largely ignored in the United States.106
In the class action context, access to justice is considered to be
the most important prerequisite and benefit to the class action, and
a principal objective of class action statutes.107 In Dutton, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that:
. . . by allowing fixed litigation costs to be divided over a
large number of plaintiffs, class actions improve access to
justice by making economical the prosecution of claims that
would otherwise be too costly to prosecute individually.
Without class actions, the doors of justice remain closed to
some plaintiffs, however strong their legal claims. Sharing
costs ensures that injuries are not left unremedied.108
[emphasis added]
Similarly, prominent American legal scholars have explained
that: “. . . when Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was amended, . . . the class action device was given the potential
broadly to affect access to court. That appears to have been one of
the goals of the 1966 amendments.”109
Without the economy of scale that class actions afford, many
individuals would otherwise be without recourse because their
claim is too small, complex, or risky to be adjudicated
individually.110 The Supreme Court of Canada Naken case,111 for
example, was one where the plaintiffs could not have sued other
than collectively. Indeed, the cost of proving the validity of the
claim of manufacturing or design defects in automobile products
was too high to have the claim adjudicated individually,
particularly since no personal injury had resulted.
106. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 1013 (“Few issues are more central to our
legal system and more neglected in our legal policy debates than access to
justice.”).
107. See, notably, Hollick, supra note 85, at ¶ 19. See also, ONTARIO LAW
REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 139 (“effective access to justice is a
precondition to the exercise of all other legal rights”).
108. Dutton, supra note 85, at ¶ 28.
109. Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675,
684 (1997).
110. See, e.g., Developments–The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1752, 1806-1807 (2000).
111. Naken, supra note 73.
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Judges and legal academics have confirmed that the use of the
class action promotes and furthers access to justice.112
Accordingly, since the class action is fundamentally influenced by
one of the principal elements of North American legal culture–
access to justice–it is also reflective of culture.
2. Managerial Judging
A second facet of class action law that evidences a concern for
cultural context is the evolution of the role of the judge toward
increased managerial judging. In the last decade, legal culture in
North America–and elsewhere–has required that judges become
active managers of increasingly more complex cases. Class action
law in Canada and in the U.S. has responded to this cultural
context by providing–and sometimes mandating–more active
judicial management in group proceedings.
Traditionally, the judicial system provided that parties to a
dispute controlled its progress, subject only to a loose control by
the courts, the whole in conformity with the adversarial
112. Current Chief Justice of Ontario Warren K. Winkler recognized the
access to justice function of class actions in a speech on April 30, 2008 (“Class
proceedings have created the opportunity for minor lawsuits, which would be
completely impractical if advanced on an individual basis, to be clustered
together and carried forward by experienced, motivated lawyers. Many
legitimate claims, which would never have been brought forward otherwise,
have been recognized and addressed by the courts.”): Warren K. Winkler,
“Access to Justice–Remarks”, paper presented at the Canadian Club
of
London,
April
30,
2008,
available
at
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/accessjustice.htm
(last
visited Sept. 26, 2009). See also Valdes, supra note 4, at 649 (“[t]hroughout the
zigs and zags of time, the virtue of the class action was and is in the effort to
provide access to justice–to deliver justice to those who don’t have access to
justice. It is the virtue that motivates and justifies the modern class action
specifically.”); PIERRE-CLAUDE LAFOND, LE RECOURS COLLECTIF, LE ROLE DU
JUGE ET SA CONCEPTION DE LA JUSTICE: IMPACT ET EVOLUTION 241 et seq. (Yvon
Blais 2006) (“La relative indifférence de la magistrature à l’égard de l’accès des
citoyens aux tribunaux que d’aucuns lui reprochaient a cédé progressivement sa
place à une plus grande conscience de la problématique et à un souci de l’égalité
effective de tous devant le prétoire.”); Schweyer v. Laidlaw Carriers Inc. (2000),
44 CPC (4th) 236 (SCJ), at ¶ 44 (where the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
interpreted the Ontario CPA criterion of preferability to require that the
determination of the common issues advance the proceeding in accordance with
the Act’s objective of promoting access to justice.).
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tradition.113 In recent years, however, this position has changed
dramatically in Canadian and American jurisdictions, as new rules
were enacted regarding case management, rules on pre-trial
conferences, and other judicial activism measures. Judges have
become increasingly involved with parties in chambers,
supervising case preparation and management, helping shape the
litigation, and encouraging settlement.114 They have become
“mediators, negotiators, and planners–as well as adjudicators.”115
This contemporary judicial attitude is the result of a social and
cultural trend characterized by Mauro Cappelletti as the
“massification” of cases:
Our contemporary society . . . is frequently characterized
as a “mass production–mass consumption” civilization.
That characterization reflects, no doubt, a typical feature of
modern economies in all parts of the world–
“massification.” But this feature extends far beyond the
economic sector; it characterizes social relationships,
feelings and conflicts as well. 116
As Cappelletti discusses, the new collective and social rights
created as a result of this “massification” phenomenon require
“active intervention by the state and other public entities.”117
Judicial case management falls into this type of intervention.
In the class action context, judges have revised their traditional
role in litigation, becoming more actively involved in the
prosecution of the class action, in part to protect absent class
parties.118 Their new role has also been motivated by the
113. Hugh F. Landerkin, Q.C. & Andrew J. Pirie, Judges as Mediators:
What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute Resolution in Canada?, 82 CAN. BAR
REV. 249 (2003); Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in
Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
114. Resnik, supra note 113, at 377-379.
115. Id. at 379.
116. Cappelletti, supra note 37.
117. Id. at 646.
118. Glenn, supra note 75, at 268-269; ONTARIO LAW REFORM
COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 445. In fact, the class action represents a new
model of litigation that requires a change in the court’s adjudicating role,
because “[t]he nature of the right asserted based upon a mass harm, the
representation of absentee members whose interests may not coincide in all
respects and the need to protect those interests, the assessment and distribution
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increasing size and complexity of class actions lawsuits–a similar
“massification” of sorts of the class action, necessitating more
“hands-on” management.119 As such, class action judges have
become “active systems manager[s],”120 who are no longer neutral,
passive, and aloof, but are rather, principally involved in the
litigation.121
Today, case management is provided for in legislation such as
the U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(12), which
authorizes the judge to adopt “special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems.” In Canada, Article 1045 of the Québec Code of Civil
Procedure similarly gives judges broad judicial powers to hasten
the progress of the class action or to simplify the proof, on the
condition that they do not prejudice a party or the members. A
Québec class action division was also created in 2006 to help
manage cases. As for Canadian national class action cases, which
require even greater management, courts have used their case
management powers to coordinate class actions in different
provinces that involve the same subject matter, with the explicit
consent of the class action parties, lawyers, and judges involved.122

of monetary relief in innovative ways as well as the fashioning of other relief,
sometimes on the basis of competing representations within the class, and the
procedural aspects of class actions such as the motion for certification, are all
factors which can make the class action, both in appearance and performance, a
clear departure from the traditional model of litigation.” See Bogart, supra note
74, at 303-304. See also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1976) (“I think it unlikely that the
class action will ever be taught to behave in accordance with the precepts of the
traditional model of adjudication.”).
119. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 446.
120. Glenn, supra note 75, at 269, quoting Arthur R. Miller, Of
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the ‘Class
Action Problem, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 667 (1979).
121. Bogart, supra note 74, at 302.
122. Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 21. See Ontario Court
Practice
Direction
Number 8
for
proceedings
under
the
Class
Proceedings
Act,
1992,
available
at
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/scj/en/notices/pd/classproceedings.htm
(last
visited September 26, 2009) (“In accordance with the statutory scheme, the
judge hearing the pre-trial motions will case manage the proceeding.”).
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In sum, the emergence of the contemporary requirement of
class action management is culturally constructed because it was
motivated by the social and cultural phenomenon of
“massification” of litigation in North America and around the
world generally.
3. The Preference for Settlement
A third facet of class action law that evidences a concern for
culture is the preference for settlement, as opposed to adjudication
by trial and judgment.
The recent decade in North America has seen a gradual decline
in trial rates and a corresponding increase in the number of out of
court settlements.123 This trend results from a combination of
different factors: the costs of litigating are high and prohibitive,
litigation is increasingly complex and lengthy, judges implicitly
encourage parties to settle as they are overwhelmed by crowded
court dockets, and there are growing numbers of lawyers able to
achieve negotiated settlements.124 In Canada, for instance, there
has indeed been such a decline in the number of yearly trials.125
University of Wisconsin law professor Marc Galanter
published several articles in which he discussed the disappearance
of “[t]he promise of full-blown adjudication in a public forum, [or
the] ‘day in court,’” in favour of “‘bargaining in the shadow of the

123. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, ‘Most Cases Settle’: Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1387 (1994) (95% of
cases in the U.S. federal system are resolved prior to trial). In Canada, see
Donalee Moulton, “Vanishing Trials: Out-of-Court Settlements on the Rise,”
THE
LAWYERS
WEEKLY,
October
17,
2008,
available
at
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=784
(last
visited September 26, 2009).
124. Marc Galanter, The Hundred Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty
Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1256, 1264 (2005). See also Judith Resnik,
Migrating, Morphing and Vanishing: The Empirical Normative Puzzles of
Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. STUD. 3 (2004).
125. See, e.g., conference papers from the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice,
available at http://cfcj-fcjc.org/publications/itf-en.php (last visited September
26, 2009); Pierre Noreau, La justice est-elle soluble dans la procedure?–repères
sociologiques pour une réforme de la procédure civile, 40 CAHIERS DE DROIT
33 (1999).
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law.’”126 Galanter attributed the gradual decline in trial rates to a
transformation in the judicial culture: “a great increase in judicial
case management at the early stages of litigation, a substantial
increase in nontrial adjudication before judges, and a substantial
dose of outsourcing to ADR providers . . .”127 He argued that the
recent judicial ideology was about actively case managing and
promoting settlements, and considered the primary role of courts to
have grown to be “less enunciating and enforcing public norms and
more facilitating resolution of disputes.”128
In the class action context, statistics about the number of
settlements, before or after certification, are scarce. Even when
statistics exist and are available, their accuracy and reliability is
limited, given the fact that settlements of non-certified class
actions are privately negotiated and completed, and do not need the
court’s approval to be made effective.129 As such, the details of
these private settlements are never scrutinized by the courts or the
public.
Nevertheless, existing statistics provide that trials are rare and
out of court settlements, increasingly prevalent.130 In fact, it
126. Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 13
(2006); Galanter, supra note 124, at 1264.
127. Galanter, supra note 124, at 1265-1266.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1)(e), which make clear that court
approval is required for a settlement or voluntary dismissal only if the class
action is certified. In Canada, the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador similarly allow the
settlement of uncertified class actions without the approval of the court. Ontario
and New Brunswick, however, require the judicial approval of all settlements–
including those of uncertified class actions. See, e.g., Section 29 (2) of the
Ontario Class Proceedings Act.
130. W.K. Branch & J.C. Kleefeld, Settling a Class Action (or How to
Wrestle an Octopus, in CANADIAN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON LITIGATING
TOXIC TORTS AND OTHER MASS WRONGS 2000 Tab XVI, 8-10 (Canadian
Institute 2000); Willging et al., Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four
Federal
District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee
on
Civil
Rules,
1996,
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf
(last
visited September 26, 2009), at 60 (where the authors found that a substantial
majority of certified class actions resulted in settlements. The percentage of
certified class actions ending in settlement ranged from 62% to 100%, while
settlement rates for cases not certified ranged from 20% to 30%.). See also
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 567 (1991); Sylvia R. Lazos,
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appears that only a “tiny fraction” of all class actions (certified or
not) go to trial, a rate consistent with ordinary litigation.131 Class
adjudication occurs mostly at the early stages of litigation, before
trial, either by way of summary judgment or motion to dismiss, or
after settlement was approved at the fairness hearing.132 Moreover,
when a settlement does occur, there is a general tendency for
courts to approve it without substantive changes,133 arguably in
keeping with a certain inclination toward or preference for out of
court settlements, as opposed to often lengthy and complex
traditional court adjudication.

Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian during
Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 308 (1985).
131. Nicholas M. Pace, Class Actions in the United States of America,
(2007), report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference,
Oxford
University,
December
2007,
available
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/USA__Nati
onal_Report.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009), at 91 (“Evidence suggests
that the rate of trial may be lower than what might be seen in non-class litigation
involving similar claims and defenses. Evidence also suggests that outcomes
other than trial or settlement are involved in a larger fraction of class actions
than in non-class litigation. In only those cases with certified class actions, class
settlements are by far the most common result.”); Bogart et al., supra note 18, at
21. Bogart cites in footnote 99 a Québec author, Pierre-Claude Lafond, who
compiled statistics for his book, and argued that in Québec, “there remain very
few final judgments in class action cases. The majority of class action cases end
by out of court settlement. From 1979 to 2004, 151 actions ended by way of
settlement, against 32 judgments favourable to the class. Therefore, more than
three favourable outcomes out of four (82.5%) result in settlement. Moreover,
the data evidences the fact that more cases are organized at the stage of
authorization than at the stage of the lawsuit’s origin or foundation, by a ratio of
2 to 1 (98 against 53)” [translation]. See LAFOND, supra note 112, at 35. Also
see generally Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 79.
132. See, e.g., Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. STUD. 459, 487 (2004).
133. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23
to Address Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 141 (1996) (In an
empirical analysis of Rule 23 practiced in four American judicial districts, the
authors found that “[a]pproximately 90% or more of the proposed settlements
were approved without changes.”). In Canada, there exists no such authority to
my knowledge. However, I can affirm, based on an extensive review of
Canadian class action settlements conducted in the context of my doctoral thesis
project, that Canadian courts do similarly tend to approve settlements without
changes, and in fact do so quasi-automatically.
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In both Canadian and American class action law, court
approval is required to effect class action settlements. The threepart standard for such approval is the fairness, reasonableness, and
adequacy of the proposed settlement as a whole.134 This standard,
however, does not properly help determine what to look for when
scrutinizing class settlements and assessing their fairness–or
unfairness. Hence, courts have developed several factors that they
consider helpful and important in evaluating class settlement
fairness.135 These factors are worded somewhat differently in the
various states and provinces, yet they also contain indeterminate
and subjective concepts that do not offer any account of the
process judges should follow to review such settlements, or any
indicia of which settlements should be approved or denied. As
such, the process by which settlement “fairness,” “reasonableness,”
and “adequacy” of settlement is evaluated is very subjective, and
depends on context–cultural context, notably.
Relating class action settlements to their cultural context is
complex, however, because settlements have many variables that
affect their process. They involve several actors with diverging
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) establishes that a class action settlement
must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to be approved judicially. By contrast,
in Canada, there is no equivalent statutory provision, such that courts have had
to develop a similar standard for the judicial oversight of class action
settlements: Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance (1998) O.J. No. 1598 (Gen. Div.) at ¶
11. See also Killough v. Canadian Red Cross Society, (2007) B.C.J. No. 1262
(B.C.S.C.); Rideout v. Health Labrador Corp., (2007) N.J. No. 292 (Nwfd’l and
Lab. S.C.) at ¶ 138 (adding an element of “good faith” to the test); Sparvier v.
Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) S.J. No. 752 (Sask. C.Q.B.); Pelletier c. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., REJB 1998-05914 (Qc.Sup.Ct.) at 10; Landry c. Syndicat du
transport de Montréal, (2006) Q.J. no. 3043 (S.C.) (QL) at ¶ 31.
135. American caselaw [Federal]: In re Prudential Insurance Co. America
Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316–24 (3d Cir. 1998);
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463, 18 Fed.R.Serv. 2d 637 (2d
Cir. 1974) (implied overruling on other grounds recognized by, U.S. Football
League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Canadian caselaw: Dabbs, at ¶ 13; Jeffery v. Nortel Networks Corp., (2007)
B.C.J. No. 90 (S.C.) at ¶ 18; White v. Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) B.C.J. No. 760
(S.C.); Northwest v. Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) A.J. No. 1612 (Alta. C.Q.B.) at
¶ 23 et seq. See also, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, (Federal Judicial
Center,
4th
ed.
2004),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/mcl4.pdf/$file/mcl4.pdf (last visited
September 26, 2009), at 316, ¶ 21.62 (which lists the factors relevant to
assessing class action settlement fairness).
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interests, ideas, opinions, and values. Moreover, the issue of
settlement fairness differs in importance for the different actors
and for the case at stake,136 and is very difficult to define. As
Rosen rightly argued, the meaning of concepts such as “fairness”
will depend on “assumptions, reinforced across numerous
domains, that characterize the culture of which law is a part:”
. . . context is crucial: When we hear a court speak of “the
conscience of the community,” “the reasonable man,” or
“the clear meaning of the statute,” when we watch judges
grapple with parenthood as a natural or functional
phenomenon, or . . . we know that the meaning of these
concepts will come not just from the experience of legal
officials or some inner propulsion of the law but from those
broader assumptions, reinforced across numerous
domains, that characterize the culture of which law is a
part. And when we seek law outside of specialized
institutions—when a kinsman mediates a dispute or
members of a settlement use gossip or an informal
gathering to articulate their vision of society—the terms by
which they grasp their relationships and order them will
necessarily be suffused by their implications in many
interconnected domains.137
Ultimately, fairness remains a “pragmatic ideal,” and the
fairness of procedures relative, because it “turns on the social ends
that they serve.”138 In the same way, the fairness of class action
procedure in the settlement context will depend on the social ends
that class actions serve. For example, in Epstein v. First Marathon
Inc.,139 the Ontario Superior Court denied a class settlement
because it arose from a strike suit.140 The Court used its powers
under the Ontario CPA to refuse to allow the proposed settlement,
because it would have provided no benefit to the proposed
136. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A
Philosophical and Democratic Defence of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO
L.J. 2663, 2666 (1995).
137. ROSEN, supra note 26, at 6-7.
138. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 979
(1992).
139. Epstein v. First Marathon Inc. (2000), 2 B.L.R. (3d) 30 (Ont. S.C.).
140. A strike suit is a suit based on unmeritorous claims, often brought as a
way to extort from the defendant a favourable or inflated settlement.
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shareholder class and a substantial payment to class counsel. The
Court held that the proposed settlement would make “a mockery”
of the public policy upon which Ontario’s class action legislation is
based and would be counter-productive to “the important policy
objectives of the statute, . . . access to justice, judicial economy
and behaviour modification.” 141 The Court further emphasized its
disfavour of strike suits by barring the plaintiff lawyers from
receiving any money by way of the settlement.
Setting aside the Epstein case, very few class action settlements
are refused in Canada, or asked to be modified for later approval.
Most proposed settlements are accepted and approved “as is.”
This tendency evidences a judicial preference for settlement,
justified by Galanter’s argument of a transformation of the judicial
culture in favour of fewer trials and more settlements.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS ACTIONS ON NORTH AMERICAN
LEGAL CULTURE
Class actions typically involve important topics that have a
significant impact on society. They address issues such as product
liability for defective pharmaceutical products,142 consumer
protection for gambling activities,143 wrongful dismissals,144 or
securities fraud.145 Where social harm is done to a large number of
individuals, class actions are used to redress a large-scale public
141. Epstein, supra note 139, at ¶ 69-71.
142. Deborah Hoisington and Stefanie Puls, and Johnson and Johnson Inc.,
Janssen-Ortho Inc., Canderm Pharma Inc., ABC1 Company, et al., filed
December
9,
2008
(British
Columbia),
available
at
http://www.cba.org/ClassActions/Class_2008/britishcolumbia/main/12-092008_Puls.aspx (last visited September 26, 2009).
143. Chartrand v. British Columbia Lottery Corporation, filed Nov. 16,
2008 (British Columbia); Trowell v. Atlantic Lottery Corporation Inc., filed
November 25, 2008 (Nova Scotia), Manon Cartier and André Bégin v. LotoQuébec,
filed
November
24,
2008
(Québec),
available
at
http://www.cba.org/ClassActions/Class_2008/britishcolumbia/main/11-262008_Chartrand.aspx (last visited September 26, 2009).
144. Lisa Harrison and Herman Pimentel and Augustus Myers v. Simmons
Canada Inc., filed November 24, 2008 (Ontario), available at
http://www.cba.org/ClassActions/Class_2008/ontario/main/11-242008_Simmons.aspx (last visited September 26, 2009).
145. Ménard c. Matteo et al., filed November, 2008 (Québec), available at
http://www.cba.org/ClassActions/Class_2008/quebec/main/11-072008_Matteo.aspx (last visited September 26, 2009).
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wrong. Society benefits from them because they promote the
efficient use of judicial resources and help ensure greater
compliance with laws and regulations, by making wrongdoers
accountable for what they did, and encouraging behavioural
modification.
But do class actions also affect or influence culture? Does
class action reform effect changes in the way people live their
lives; does it lead to cultural change?146 While a definite
conclusion on these questions would ideally need to be supported
by exhaustive qualitative data on the changing culture of litigation
practices in North America, I believe that the answer is “yes.”
Even without such data, I will argue below that evidence of this
culture change can be found in, notably, a) the judicial institutions
and the role of judges, and b) the legal profession. In subsection c),
I will illustrate my argument that class actions influence culture by
discussing the infamous Canadian national Residential Schools
Settlement.
A. The Judicial Institutions and the Role of Judges
The emergence and increasing number of class action filings–
indicative of the popularity of the class action device–has
influenced the organization and philosophy of judicial institutions,
and has changed the role of judges involved in class action
litigation. Indeed, the class action device has required that courts
be better organized, to manage more complex proceedings.
Notably, these courts have created class action divisions or
chambers, and have started using specific codes to refer to class
proceedings in computerized court databases. They have also felt
the need to hire additional staff to manage the large amount of
paperwork generated by the class action device. In the Canadian
province of Québec, for instance, the Fonds d'aide aux recours
collectifs was created to help finance class action suits in first
146. See, e.g., Lynn Mather, Conclusion: The Mobilizing Potential of Class
Actions, 57 IND. L.J. 451 (1982), citing articles discussing attempts to reform–
through class action litigation–services provided by public schools (Rosenberg
& Philips, The Institutionalization of Conflict in the Reform of Schools: A Case
Study of Court Implementation of the PARC Decree, 57 IND. L. J. 425 (1982),
and public hospitals (Paul-Shaheen & Perlstadt, Class Action Suits and Social
Change: The Organization and Impact of the Hill-Burton Cases, 57 IND. L.J.
385 (1982)).
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instance or on appeal, and to publish information about class action
filings.
In fact, the class action has required, by its complexity and
physical volume, not just greater court organization, but better case
management. Furthermore, and as discussed in part above,147 the
emergence and prevalence of the class action has influenced the
role of judges in class action litigation, and along with it, their
philosophy in handling such cases.
For example, in the civil law system of Quebec, the advent of
the class action has forced class action judges to move from a
typically individualistic conception of justice, and of the class
action, to a more collective one. Indeed, the civil adjudicative
process has traditionally been marked by a liberal political
philosophy,148 in which the individual is free to sue or not sue, to
defend himself or not, and during the course of litigation, to choose
which terms and which procedural devices are ideal to argue his
case and present the facts and law.149 As such, Quebec judges
involved in class action litigation originally supported this purely
individualistic conception of collective justice.150 These judges
considered the class action to be a series of individual actions, an
aggregate of individual claims which will be proven by the class
representative.151 In recent years, however, they have begun
setting aside the individualistic conception of the class action in
favour of a more collective one, recognizing the collective
dimension of the individual prejudice and the collective effect of
the breach.152 Accordingly, the advent and evolution of the class
action has, in that province, influenced legal culture because it has
changed the judges’ conception of civil adjudication.
Furthermore, in the United States, common law Canada, and in
some European countries such as Belgium, Germany, and France,
147. See IV.C.2.
148. Glenn, supra note 75, at 264.
149. Id.
150. LAFOND, supra note 112, at 219. See also, CAPPELLETTI, supra note 37
(where he argues that “[e]ven the most sacred principles . . . must . . . be
reconsidered in view of the changed needs of contemporary societies. . . . [A]n
individualistic vision of procedural due process should give way to, or be
integrated with, a social or collective concept of due process.”).
151. See, e.g., Gosselin v. Québec (Proc. Gén.), (2002) 4 R.C.S. 429, 476477.
152. LAFOND, supra note 112, at 229-230.
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the class action has brought a “profound metamorphosis” in
traditional judicial processes and philosophy.153 It has caused:
. . . A real explosion of the traditional concepts, rules and
structures of the judicial process . . . Standing to sue has
been granted to ‘private attorney generals’ or ‘ideological
plaintiffs,’ and such plaintiffs–hether individuals or
organizations–have been regarded as the ‘adequate
representatives’ of numbers and classes of people, most of
whom might not even know that a ‘representative action’ is
being brought ‘on their behalf.’
...
judges [must–and have–become] the protectors not only of
the traditional individual rights, but also of the new diffuse,
collective and fragmented rights and interests which are so
characteristics of our mass civilization. . . . inevitably new
powers and responsibility [have fallen] upon the
judiciary.154 [emphasis added]
B. The Legal Profession
The class action has also brought changes in the culture of the
legal profession. The prevalence of class action litigation and the
higher settlement rates have changed the way lawyers interact with
clients. These lawyers have become “entrepreneurs,”155 seeking
class action representatives actively, almost aggressively. They
continuously search for breaches in tort or contract that will make
a collective suit opportune, interview potential class action
representatives somewhat affected by the breaches, and file the
lawsuit as quickly as possible.
These entrepreneurial lawyers have also changed the way they
interact with clients in both collective and unitary litigation.
Lawyers now broach settlement very early on in the litigation.
They also consider alternative dispute resolution favourably. One
reason for this culture shift is, possibly, the emphasis in Canadian
153. Mauro Cappelletti, The Law-Making Power of the Judge and Its
Limits: A Comparative Analysis, 8 MONASH U. L. REV. 15, 36 (1981).
154. Id. at 36-37.
155. This change in attitude has been the subject of many articles about the
“entrepreneurialism” of class action lawyers. See, e.g., Coffee, The Regulation
of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 50.
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law schools on alternative dispute resolution and on informal
judicial outcomes (such as settlement) in civil litigation.156
Another reason for the cultural shift is the obvious potential for an
earlier payment in attorney fees.
C. One Example of the Class Action Influence on Culture: The
Residential Schools Settlement
I have argued above that class actions serve to influence or
affect Canadian culture. The recent Indian Residential Schools
national class action and settlement serve to illustrate this
argument.157 In this national class action, former students of
recognized residential schools in Canada and their family members
sued the Government of Canada and various church-related entities
for harms and abuses that were committed against Aboriginal
children. The Indian residential schools at stake were schools
supervised by the Federal Government, under policies that resulted
in the removal of Aboriginal children from their families and
communities, their assimilation through practices designed to
extinguish their Aboriginal character, and upon graduation, their
integration into a non-Aboriginal society. In 2006, a Canada-wide
settlement agreement was concluded regarding this class action,
seeking to address the mental, spiritual, and physical harm done to
the former students as a result of the practices of the residential
schools.
This national class action and its settlement were deeply
influenced by culture. Indeed, the Aboriginal students and their
families–identified as the “Survivor Class,” estimated to number
almost 79,000 persons–shared commonly held values, ideas, and
norms that they brought forward by advancing class action claims.
The settlement the students concluded considered the lasting and
profound cultural effects of the residential schools legacy, and
sought to bring closure and compensate the harm suffered by the
Aboriginal community at large.
156. See, e.g., the undergraduate law curriculum offered at McGill
University,
available
at
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/lawstudies/Course_offerings_2008-2009.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009).
157. For information about this class action and the various provincial and
territorial approval orders regarding the national settlement, see Residential
Schools Settlement, available at http://www.residentialschoolsettlement.ca/
(last visited September 26, 2009).
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The class action and its settlement also sought to influence and
probably influenced Canadian culture. Part of the settlement
provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, with a mandate to make a public and permanent
record of the legacy of the schools, in conjunction with taking a
significant portion of the settlement fund for healing and
commemoration programs. It led to a public apology to the
Aboriginal people by Prime Minister Harper on June 11, 2008.158
Hence, although there is no proven evidence yet of the effect of
this settlement on Canadian citizens, the gigantic scope and
specific, culturally-founded conditions of this national settlement
most certainly affected–and will likely continue to affect–the ideas,
beliefs, values, and norms of these citizens.
VI. THE METHODOLOGY TO STUDY CLASS ACTION LAW
Civil procedure is an extraordinarily fertile terrain for the
cultural analysis of law and to learn about law’s place in culture.
The analysis of class action objectives, effects, and trends affords a
clearer understanding of legal culture, and vice versa. But how can
we best analyze these objectives, effects, and trends to ultimately
support suggestions for reform in class action law? What is the
most efficacious methodology to obtain trustworthy data about the
resolution of class action disputes by trial and/or settlement?
In this paper, I have argued that class actions are procedural
vehicles of great importance to our society.
They affect
individuals, businesses, and society at large.
They affect
developments in the substantive law, and in politics, and the
economy. Hence, finding the best methodology to study them is
crucial, especially in a context where procedural reform is
envisaged. Indeed, since the legal system’s effectiveness is in
great part dependant on citizens’ abidance to law and on their
acceptance of the rules, efforts must be made to make this system
coincide with contemporary social values and needs–and with
modern legal culture.
Legal theory, mostly in the form of doctrine, must be given
significant weight in civil procedure reform. Quantitative studies
158. See, e.g., public apology by Prime Minister Harper (June 11, 2008),
available
at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/11/aboriginalapology.html (last visited September 26, 2009).
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based on the judicial outcomes of reported court cases and
statistics based on these outcomes are also useful. There are,
however, many issues in civil procedure that can be more
adequately addressed, discussed and eventually resolved with the
use of empirical research.159 For instance, one way to assess
whether the deterrence objective is met in a class proceeding is by
empirically testing whether the defendant’s behaviour has changed
since the lawsuit was filed. Has the defendant changed its internal
environmental policies, to prevent further toxic waste, for
example? In addition, the effectiveness of the class action–
notably, as a means of getting long-term benefits for particular
groups160–can be evaluated with the use of empirical research.
This type of research could, for instance, look into whether
workers are, in fact, treated more fairly and equally by their
company in the years following judgment in an employment
discrimination class action case.
One example of a study that brilliantly integrated both
theoretical and empirical approaches to civil procedure in the class
action law context is Bryant Garth’s analysis of concluded federal
class actions from the Northern District of California.161 In it,
Garth sought to assess critically the “‘social change’ impact of the
class action.”162 Using case studies and interviews with class
counsel and representatives, Garth organized the class actions he
examined in three categories: Category A - Organizational efforts
159. Bryant G. Garth, Introduction: Toward a Sociology of the Class
Action, 57 IND. L. J. 371, 371-72 (1982) (noting that qualitative research “needs
to be supplemented by more ‘qualitative’ empirical studies that can ‘open . . . to
public view the back regions and activities of processing institutions’.”).
160. Id. at 380.
161. Garth, supra note 54. For further examples of empirical studies of
class action litigation, see, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the NewIssues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 903 (1996) (where the authors reviewed a sample of initial public offerings
that generated class action litigation); Willging et al., supra note 133; Janet C.
Alexander, supra note 130 (where the author studied the size of settlements in
computer and computer-related securities class actions relative to the strength of
the case); Bryant G. Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General:
Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 353 (1987) (where the authors address the ideological concept of “private
attorney general,” using a combination of theory with empirical grounding and
data to explore and highlight ideological assumptions and concerns.).
162. Garth, supra note 54, at 238.
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with incidental clientele (including cases about overpayments of
unemployment
compensation
and
disability
payment
terminations); Category B - Entrepreneurial lawyer with passive
client (including cases about retail price fixing and price fixing to
distributors); and Category C - Energetic and active plaintiffs
(including Hispanic complaints against an employment test,
employment discrimination against Blacks in retail sales, sex
discrimination in employment promotions, etc.). He concluded
that the class action is a “politically empowered legal artifice” and
that empirical research is relevant to the study of class action
litigation because it examines,
the impacts of the full range of empowering and
nonempowering features of class action litigation . . .
investigates particular revelations from discovery, the
denial or granting of various motions in the case, the
judges’ seeming attitude toward settlement or the merits,
the shifting of legal theory or class representatives, or
simply the effect of delay and inactivity; and it
[investigates] how ground-level events affect the lawsuit.163
In another interesting empirical study about class actions, New
York University Professor Geoffrey P. Miller examined the
veracity of the cultural stereotype that class actions are more
popular in the Gulf States of Texas and Louisiana; that these two
states are “favorite havens for plaintiffs’ attorneys and purgatory
for the defense.”164 In his study, Miller wondered whether this
description is true, whether there is indeed something different
about class action practice in these two states, and if there are
differences, what explains them. The empirical evidence Miller
reviewed derived from research conducted in various Westlaw
databases, which essentially inquired as to the frequency of the
term “class action” in the applicable data set.165 Before factoring
in elements such as demographics, economic activity, and income
163. Id. at 269.
164. Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions in the Gulf States: Empirical
Analysis of a Cultural Stereotype, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1681 (2000). For a
discussion of the class actions that were recently been started in Louisiana after
Hurricane Katrina, see Olivier Moréteau, Policing the Compensation of Victims
of Catastrophes: Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, 54 LOY. L. REV.
65 (2008).
165. Miller, supra note 164, at 1688.
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levels, Miller found that the class action explosion in the Gulf
States could be explained by the data reviewed.166 But when the
three factors were taken into consideration, his conclusion was
more mitigated. He found that:
. . . when we control for population, a radical split occurs.
Louisiana’s rate per capita is far above the national
average, while Texas’s rate, even in recent years of
increased class action litigation, is still below the national
rate. This result remains robust when we control for
personal income; indeed, the position of Louisiana relative
to other states becomes even more anomalous. Something
very different is obviously occurring in these two states.167
Interestingly, while Miller did not provide reasons for the
patterns observed in Louisiana and Texas, his empirical analysis
does not just explain developments in class action practice in these
two states, but it serves to reinforce the link I have advocated
herein between class action law and culture. Indeed, Miller’s study
supports the cultural stereotype that Louisiana is a class action
“haven.” Furthermore, his study is informed by the two-pronged
research methodology I have supported, which contains both
theoretical and empirical data.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that law is inherent to culture and
culture to law. I have extended this argument to the civil
procedure and class action context. My cultural construction of
class action law has embraced two ideas: that the North American
class action is a mirror of North American culture–in light of three
of its principal characteristics of access to justice, managerial
judging, and a preference for settlements–and that the class action
influences culture–as evidenced by changes in the legal institutions
and legal profession. Finally, I have argued in favour of a twopronged analysis of class action law, which includes theoretical
and empirical components.

166. Id. at 1699.
167. Id. at 1706.
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Going back to the Hocking case,168 discussed in this paper’s
introduction, serves to once again, reinforce my principal argument
that law and culture reciprocally influence each other. Indeed, in
this case, the Quebec Court of Appeal was able to reaffirm a
stricter standard of notice in class action law, and hence influence
perceptions, opinions, ideas, and legal norms relative to class
action law notice practices in Quebec and Ontario, and perhaps
even throughout the country.
Legal academics have suggested that legal systems are
increasingly characterized by a certain apparent convergence that
makes them evolve in parallel directions.169 In my view, these
systems are also culturally constructed and thus distinguishable
based on their specific legal cultures. Are these two arguments
reconcilable? In the class action law context, there is a certain
amount of convergence between systems, as previously discussed.
But the convergence is limited by the particular legal system’s
cultural specificities. For instance, Europeans are still reluctant to
make class proceedings widely acceptable, in part because their
notions of the role of law and the client are fundamentally
inconsistent with North American class action culture.170
In conclusion, class action law systems will likely continue
evolving at a steady pace. They will also remain deeply influenced
by and attached to legal culture. In that way, they are like fastgrowing grain crops that must be planted, cultivated, and fertilized
consistently with specific agricultural customs and traditions, for
the most fruitful harvest.

168. Hocking, supra note 1.
169. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation
Come to Europe?, Social Science Research Network, NYU Law and Economics
Research
Paper
No.
08-46,
3
(2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296843
(last
visited
September 26, 2009); Friedman, supra note 28, at 72.
170. See Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for
Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217,
289-290 (1992). See also, Linda Silberman, The Vicissitudes of the American
Class Action–With a Comparative Eye, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201 (1999);
Burbank & Silberman, supra note 109.
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SUMMARY
From the economic point of view, common law is more efficient
than civil law. Is this recent statement published in an economic
report valid for mergers and acquisitions (M&A)?
The main objective of this paper is to compare the legal
performance of M&A in France and in the United States. The
purpose is to quantify the impact of both legal systems on the longterm performance of M&A transactions.
To carry out this research, a specific methodology was
developed and the results of which are evaluated. Two legal
structures for M&A transactions were envisaged: the purchase of
shares (share deal), and the purchase of assets (asset deal). Each of
these acquisition structures was then subdivided into eleven steps
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composing the process, for example from preliminary information,
letter of intent, due diligence, stock or asset purchase agreement,
closing, to litigation with formal summons.
Performance was then measured by taking into account time,
cost, and satisfaction factors. The time factor was broken down
into person-days and the number of days, weeks, or months
required to complete each step. French and U.S. respondents were
asked to fill out a questionnaire with reference to a specific
acquisition project. A typical question was for instance: What is
your estimate of working days to complete this step (person-days)?
Radar charts were used to compare the mean of each performance
factor. In order to check for correlations among the performance
factors, an inter-factors analysis (regression) was carried out.
The research findings are presented in this paper. Results show
that a share deal in France is generally cheaper and participants
indicate a significantly greater amount of satisfaction than in the
U.S. However, for the time factor, the results vary. The
conclusion is that the application of Civil Law rules rather than
their Common Law counterparts does not reveal substantial
differences as far as M&A transactions are concerned. One reason
is that in both France and the U.S. these transactions are carried out
following standard procedures in compliance with common
contractual practices.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. From the economic point of view, common law is more
efficient than civil law. This is the somewhat alarming message
transcribed in the Doing Business Reports published by the World
Bank.1 Doing Business addresses elementary business operations

1. See the various reports published since 2004 and available on
http://www.doingbusiness.org (last visited October 20, 2009). See also,
ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT, LES DROITS DE TRADITION CIVILISTE EN
QUESTION–A PROPOS DES RAPPORTS DOING BUSINESS DE LA BANQUE
MONDIALE (Société de législation comparée 2006); S. Valory, Promouvoir le
droit français, 93 DROIT & ECONOMIE 6 (2005), and the interview from
Ms. E. Filiberti (at 9); compare Entretien avec Bertrand du Marais, 79 REVUE
LAMY DROIT DES AFFAIRES 3 (2005); LE MODÈLE JURIDIQUE FRANÇAIS, UN
OBSTACLE AU DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE? (Rouvillois dir., Dalloz 2005);
DES INDICATEURS POUR MESURER LE DROIT? LES LIMITES MÉTHODOLOGIQUES
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such as setting up a company, layoff of workers, etc, and examines
relative time and cost issues. In 2007, France improved its rank by
four points, reaching the 31st position, just after Korea.2 Following
that wake-up call, the French Ministry of Justice and other legal
practitioners and scholars across France launched various research
projects to evaluate the economic attractiveness of French law as
compared to that of American law. A group of these professionals
was mandated to examine the economic attractiveness of M&A in
France.3
2. Discussions on the increase in volume and value of M&A
during the last decade have become common in economic and
business press. According to an article in the Neue Zürcher
Zeitung,4 the M&A carousel turned faster than at any other time
during the last five years.
3. Is the World Bank’s statement from the economic point of
view, common law is more efficient than civil law also valid for
M&A? The main objective of this research is to compare M&A
legal performance in France and in the U.S. The research was
divided into two sub-parts: first, to compare the legal performance
of share deals between the two countries, and, second, of asset
deals.
4. The World Bank’s statement lays down the hypothesis that
the international research team (the “Research Team”) set out to
verify.5 When the Research Team analyzed French M&A rules,
they realized that the reasoning is not always purely legal. For

DOING BUSINESS (du Marais dir., La Documentation Française
2006).
2. France did not score better in 2008, 2009, and 2010, remaining the 31st:
see DOING BUSINESS 2008; DOING BUSINESS 2009; and DOING BUSINESS 2010.
3. See the research program “Economic Attractiveness of Law” (Attractivité
économique
du
droit)
available
at
http://www.gip-recherchejustice.fr/aed/publications_va.htm (last visited October 20, 2009).
4. Mächtiger werdende Wellen von Fusionen und Übernahmen. Nach den
“Mega-Deals“ kommen in Amerika die kleineren Fälle aufs Tapet, NEUE
ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, Oct. 15, 2005.
5. The team was based in Switzerland (School of Business Administration
Fribourg and HEC University of Geneva – Prof. Thomas Straub), the United
States (Louisiana State University – Prof. Olivier Moréteau), and France
(University Lyon 3 – Prof. Yves Reinhard and Georges Cavalier; Christopher L.
Baker, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher and Flom LLP Paris office, and
Xénia Legendre, Partner, Hogan & Hartson Paris office).
DES RAPPORTS

2009]

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

151

example, for a share purchase agreement, the French Supreme
Court (Cour de cassation) (hereinafter “Cour de cassation”)
agreed with a Court of Appeal decision, which upheld for “valid
consideration” (cause réelle) the transfer of 90% of the shares of a
company in difficulty, for a negative price, which would absorb
liabilities.6 Even if the price of the stock was absorbed by the
liabilities, the seller’s advantage in the acquisition would subsist.
5. While it is one thing to use economic analysis to interpret a
contractual concept,7 it is still another to say that there is a general
economic analysis for M&A.8 Even if economic aspects of M&A
are familiar to French lawyers, there is little scholarly production
in France in this field of Law and Economics. The purpose of this
paper is to quantify the impact of the French and the U.S. legal
systems on the long-term performance of share and asset deals.9
6. Improvements to the Doing Business methodology were
suggested (section II), and a specific research methodology was
developed (section III). Results, a tentative explanation, and
proposals for reform (section IV) are presented below.
II. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE DOING BUSINESS METHODOLOGY
7. The methodology of the Doing Business Reports measures
the economic performance of a few legal operations, using time
and cost factors.10 With complex transactions such as M&A, some
authors11 demonstrated that there are other variables that influence
6. Cass. com., Feb. 22, 1983, Bull. civ. IV, no 72, at 61; JCP G 1983 IV
150, which upheld the decision from Paris, 3rd ch., June 24, 1981, D. 1983,
somm. comm. 71, J.-C. Bousquet; see also, among an abundant literature,
C. Freyria, Le prix de vente symbolique, D. 1997, at 51.
7. Like the Romanist concept of causa (cause, often compared to the
common law concept of consideration) or good faith.
8. Recollections of the authors from a lecture given by Mestre on October
2005, on La distinction
du
fait
et du droit en matière
économique at the Cour de cassation; See also O. Favereau, Qu’est-ce qu’un
contrat ? La difficile réponse de l’économie, in DROIT ET ÉCONOMIE DES
CONTRATS 21-42 (C. Jamin ed. 2008).
9. Long-term performance (or effectiveness) is under investigation, not
short-term performance (or efficiency).
10. DOING BUSINESS 2008 changed, to some extent, the methodology: see
DOING BUSINESS 2008 (French version), at 72.
11. D. K. Datta et al., Factors Influencing Wealth Creation from Mergers
and Acquisitions: a Meta-analysis, 13 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 67-

152

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 2

long-term performance of a company.12 In general terms, the
“recent change in the environment of companies, including rules
and regulation, play an essential role in the company’s choice of
strategy and determines the consequences of diverse strategic
decisions.”13
8. First, the time factor is not sufficiently representative. For
instance, five persons can carry out a task in one day, but the same
task may require five days to be carried out by one person.
Therefore, the Research Team divided the time factor into persondays, which represent the amount of work done by one person in a
day, and step-time. This latter measurement estimates the number
of days, weeks, or months required to complete each phase,
irrespective of the number of persons working to complete the
phase.
9. Second, time and cost are essential factors for measuring
economic performance, but may not be sufficient to determine a
transaction’s level of success. For example, a lengthy and
expensive M&A transaction can still be successful economically
speaking, and vice versa. Other authors evaluate economic
performance by interviewing business leaders and M&A
specialists to assess their level of satisfaction following the
transaction.14 Therefore, as an improvement to the Doing Business
methodology, the Research Team included the factor satisfaction.
10. Third, Doing Business Reports are based on a limited
number of answers to a questionnaire.15 The answers are
subjective and may not be statistically representative. Therefore,
as an improvement to the Doing Business methodology, a larger
number of answers were gathered. These improvements are
included in the new model developed by the Research Team.

84 (1992); and T. STRAUB, REASONS FOR FREQUENT FAILURE IN MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS (DUV 2007).
12. See Datta et al., supra note 11, at 72.
13. Id.
14. J. Veiga et al., Measuring Organizational Culture Clashes: A TwoNation Post-hoc Analysis of a Cultural Compatibility Index, 53 HUMAN
RELATIONS 539 (2000).
15. The number of experts interviewed increased in the DOING BUSINESS
2008 report.
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III. NEW RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
11. Three legal methods for implementing M&A transactions
were first identified: the purchase of shares (share deal), the
purchase of assets (asset deal), and the merger. In the U.S. the
merger resembles to some extent a share deal.16 The Research
Team therefore decided to include the merger under this latter
category. Consequently, the main distinction is between a share
deal and an asset deal. Each of these deal classes was then divided
into eleven phases: (1) preliminary information, (2) letter of intent,
(3a) financial due diligence, (3b) legal due diligence, (4) share or
asset purchase agreement, (5) ancillary documents, (6) regulatory
authorizations, (7) closing, (8) post-closing, (9a) litigation without
formal summons, and (9b) litigation with formal summons.
12. The preliminary information phase (1) starts from the first
informal contact with the company being acquired (Target),
including instructing lawyers, investment bank, and identifying
constraints such as timetables, up to the execution of the
confidentiality agreement (included).
13. The letter of intent phase (2) starts from the execution of
the confidentiality agreement, including discussions on the
planning of external communications, preliminary analysis of legal
implications, setting up the deal structure, and ends with the
execution of the letter of intent (included).
14. Due diligence phase (3a and 3b) starts with posting the due
diligence request list, including the audit-investigating process in
the data room, and ends with the share/asset purchase agreement
(excluded). In the due diligence phase, the Research Team
distinguished the financial and the legal steps. The financial due
diligence process (3a) concerns accounting verification, financial
audit, balance sheet and profit and loss account validation, etc.
The legal due diligence process (3b) concerns the audit of
contracts, litigation evaluation, environmental issues assessment,
etc.
16. See G. Cavalier & X. Legendre, Pourquoi et comment une société
française cotée peut-elle utiliser la technique de la fusion triangulaire
« reverse » pour acquérir une société américaine cotée ? – Why and How a
French Listed Company Can Use the Technique of the Reverse Triangular
Merger to Acquire an American Listed Company?, BULLETIN JOLY BOURSE 239
(May-June 2004), available at www.editions-joly.com (last visited October 20,
2009).
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15. The share or asset purchase agreement phase (4) starts with
the negotiation of the agreement, including discussion of drafts,
negotiation of representations and warranties (if any), the
indemnification period, the schedules, the timetable for execution,
and ends with consulting the Workers Council and the execution
agreement (included).
16. The ancillary documents phase (5) starts with the
negotiation of the ancillary documents, which include the escrow
and shareholders agreements, minutes of shareholders’ meeting,
financing and labor contracts, intellectual property licenses, etc.,
up to execution (included).
17. The regulatory approval phase (6) is the process of
obtaining the relevant permits or authorizations from Competition
Authorities and other regulatory approvals to complete the
transaction.
18. Closing (7) starts a week preceding the closing date, at
which time certificates or other documents are delivered, payment
is made, and shares/assets are transferred.
19. Post-closing (8) is the phase after the closing date:
typically, this is where price adjustment (e.g., earn-out) occurs, and
indemnity requests are made. Disputes however are not included
in this phase, as phases 9a and 9b are specifically dedicated to
dispute assessments.
20. The litigation phase (9a and 9b) includes any disputes
which occurred after the deal. Two types of disputes are
distinguished: disputes without formal summons before a court or
an arbitration tribunal, and disputes with formal summons. The
first set of questions (9a) was to evaluate whether disputes without
formal summons had occurred; the second set of questions (9b)
was to evaluate disputes which occurred with formal summons.
21. The performance is measured by evaluating each of the
above phases in relation to cost, time (person-days and step-time),
and satisfaction.17 The responses were reported on a Likert scale,
numbered 1 (very low) to 5 (very high); each number corresponded
to the respondents’ best perception. The main reason why selfperception was used was because M&A detailed secondary
information18 is rarely available. Moreover, the research shows
17. See Veiga et al., supra note 14, at 539.
18. Primary information allows the reader to access original and unedited
information. Primary information requires the reader to interact with the source
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that self-perception measures are dependable, in particular when
evaluated by top managers.19
22. The following questions were asked:
- What is your estimate of the number of working days to
complete this phase (person-days)?
- What is your estimate of the time needed to complete this
phase (days, weeks, or months, depending on the
question)?
- What is your estimate today of the cost (Euros) to complete
this phase?
- How satisfactory was this phase for you?
23. The respondents were asked to answer the questions in
reference to a specific acquisition (the “deal”) that occurred
preferably between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2004,20 and
where both the acquirer and the Target were privately held
companies and located in the U.S. or in France. Therefore,
transnational deals or deals where the Target was listed on a stock
exchange were not included in the scope of the study. Also, the
type of companies under scrutiny was specified in the hypothesis.
The following information was requested: details on the economic
sector (services, industry, both) of acquirer and Target; specific
activity, number of employees, annual turnover (before tax) of the
acquirer after the deal; turnover (before tax) of the Target before
the deal; complexity of the transaction through the number of sites
of Target, number of type of products sold by Target, number of
national markets in which Target operated, number of employees
of the combined company after the deal, etc.
24. In this study a cross-sectional research method based on a
sample survey was used to test a comprehensive model.

and extract information.
Secondary information is “edited primary
information,” that is second-hand versions. They represent someone else's
thinking. For instance, authors writing about the merger between Mercedes and
Chrysler are providing “secondary” information about the merger. “Primary”
information about the merger would be information from the merging
companies themselves.
19. P. R. Nayyar, On the Measurement of Corporate Diversification
Strategy: Evidence from Large U.S. Firms, 13 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
JOURNAL 219 (1992).
20. Both in France and in the U.S., approximately 60 % of the deals under
investigation were legally completed in year 2004: see pie chart on Annex 1.
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According to Churchill (1999),21 a cross-sectional study is the
best-known and most important type of descriptive design if
measured by its frequency of use compared to other methods. It is
the predominate mode of analysis in empirical economic research
(Bowen and Wiersema 1999).22
25. The questionnaire was developed with two phases of pretest. A sample with more than one thousand potential respondents
extracted from the database The Leadership Library23 was
contacted in the U.S., and in France using local professional
organizations.24 The questionnaire was published on the Internet25
and the data was collected on an Excel table. According to the
methodology, the legal factors represented some variables,
independent of one another, which influenced the post-merger or
acquisition economic performance.
26. Because the data on each deal was obtained from a single
respondent, the data quality was highly dependent on the
respondents’ skills. In the survey the respondents’ skills were
tested by a number of questions about tenure and position. Most
respondents were attorneys (partners or associates), C-level
managers, and/or heads of M&A divisions.26 The respondents
were therefore highly qualified to respond to the survey. More
than 70% of the respondents had worked for their current company
for more than six years, which provided additional confirmation of
the participants’ skills. Furthermore respondents’ qualification
was also measured by asking them about their involvement in
21. G. A. CHURCHILL, MARKETING RESEARCH: METHODOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS (Harcourt 1999).
22. H. Bowen & M. Wiersema, Matching Method to Paradigm in Strategy
Research: Limitations of Cross-Sectional Analysis and Some Methodological
Alternatives, 20 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 625-636 (1999).
23. See http://www.leadershipdirectories.com (last visited October 20,
2009).
24. The French Society of General Counsels (Association française des
juristes d’entreprises) [See http://www.afje.org (last visited October 20, 2009)],
and the French Society of Business Attorneys (Association des Avocats Conseils
d’Entreprises) [See http://www.avocats-conseils.org (last visited October 20,
2009)].
25. The questionnaire was available in French and in English at the
following Internet address: http://fdv.univ-lyon3.fr/fusac/ (last visited October
20, 2009), an extract of which is in Annex 2.
26. In the U.S. 80% of the respondents to the questionnaire were partners of
law firms, and 40% in France: see bar chart in Annex 3.
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M&A activities. The results show that all the participants were
involved in M&A activities. More than 60% were much or very
much involved. 27
27. The distribution of transaction years was similar in both
countries. Forty-one responses came from the U.S. and 34 from
France. The response rate was 5.4% of the sample population. In
addition, no significant non-response bias was identified.
IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS
28. This section presents the research findings of the study. A
radar chart details the results and allows identifying all the phases
of the transaction process. These phases are abbreviated as
follows:
- PrelimInfo (step 1): preliminary information;
- LOI (step 2): letter of intent;
- FinDueDil (step 3a): financial due diligence;
- LegalDueDil (step 3b): legal due diligence;
- PurchAgree (step 4): share/asset purchase agreement;
- AnciDoc (step 5): ancillary documents;
- RegApprov (step 6): regulatory authorizations;
- Closing (step 7): closing phase;
- Post-closing (step 8): post-closing phase;
- DispWithout (step 9a): dispute without formal summons;
- DispWith (step 9b): dispute with formal summons.
29. As mentioned (supra § 21) , the results were scaled from 1
up to 5,28 where the result “1” indicates “very low,” and 5 indicates
“very high.” As a consequence, the score of 5 is very good for
satisfaction, but is a bad score for the cost and time (person-days
and step-time) factors. For each country, the scaled results were
reported on the radar chart, using a dotted line (-------) for the U.S.,
and a straight line (_______) for France. The reading of the radar
chart is as follows:

27. See pie charts in Annexes 4 and 5.
28. For scaling details, see Annex 6.
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FIGURE 1
HOW TO READ THE RESULTS

30. Results are discussed below: the main results (A) compare
M&A legal performance in France and in the U.S. irrespective of
the deal structure. The detailed results are then discussed based on
the transaction structure (B) that is the comparison of the
performance of asset deals and share deals in France and in the
United States. An interfactor analysis (regression) was carried out
to test the accuracy of the results (C).
A. Main Results
31. The main objective was to compare M&A transactions,
irrespective of their legal form. The comparative analysis of both
countries provided the following results:
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FIGURE 2
RESEARCH FINDINGS SUMMARY: PERSON-DAYS, STEP-TIME,
EUROS, AND SATISFACTION

32. The results show that in general M&A transactions in
France are cheaper and require less person-days. However, there
is some variation depending on the step. M&A transactions in
France need fewer person-days for all steps, except for the Dispute
without formal litigation phase (9a) where person-days are about
the same in both the U.S. and France. With respect to cost, M&A
transactions in France are significantly cheaper for all steps except
for step Dispute with formal litigation (9b) where costs are about
equal for both countries.
33. The results for satisfaction and step-time are not as
uniform. Satisfaction for steps starting with the exchange of
preliminary information (1) to the drafting of ancillary documents
(5) is approximately the same in both France and the U.S. This is
also true for step Dispute with formal litigation (9b). However,
satisfaction is notably higher in the U.S. from step Regulatory
approvals to Dispute without formal litigation (6 thru 9a). With
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respect to step-time, the results show that neither country has an
overall advantage in the time required to complete each step. The
U.S. requires less time for drafting the purchase agreement, the
ancillary documents, and closing (steps 4, 5, and 7). In France, the
step-time is shorter for the exchange of preliminary information,
drafting and negotiation of the letter of intent, due diligence, and
disputes (steps 1, 2, 3, and 9).
34. In summary, the conclusions are:
1. There is not a significant difference in the legal
performance of M&A between the U.S. and France;
2. M&A appear to be cheaper in France, but this difference
can be explained by the transaction size (see regression infra § 42
et seq.).
B. Detailed Results Based on the Transaction Structure
35. Results are hereafter detailed depending on whether the
transaction is structured as a share deal (1), or as an asset deal (2).
As a preliminary point, one must note the different distribution of
the deal structure percentage:
FIGURE 3
DEAL STRUCTURE: ASSET DEAL (“AD”) AND SHARE DEAL (“SD”)

USA

36
Asset Deal
Share Deal
64
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France
9

Asset Deal
Share Deal

91

36. In both countries, even if the majority of deals are
structured as share deals, the number of asset deals in France (9%)
is significantly lower than in the U.S. (36%).
1. Share Deal
37. The results show that a share deal in France is generally
cheaper and respondents indicate a significantly greater amount of
satisfaction in France than in the U.S. However, for person-days
and step-time, the results vary by step. A share deal in France
needs fewer person-days for the exchange of preliminary
information, negotiation and drafting of the letter of intent,
purchase agreement and ancillary documents (steps 1, 2, 4, and 5).
However, for the due diligence (steps 3a and 3b), the U.S. requires
slightly fewer person-days. For closing, post-closing and disputes
(steps 7 thru 9b) the number of person-days is about the same.
With respect to the length of each step, a share deal in France is
only shorter for the beginning of the transaction process (steps 1, 2,
and 3). The U.S. has shorter lengths for all other steps.
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FIGURE 4
RESEARCH FINDINGS FOR SHARE DEAL (“SD”): PERSON-DAYS,
STEP-TIME, EUROS, AND SATISFACTION

38. Therefore, the following conclusions can be proposed:
1. There is no radical difference in legal performance in a
share deal;
2. Share deals are slightly cheaper in France;
3. Share deals are generally more satisfactory in France;
4. Time to complete the share deal transaction is about the
same in France and in the U.S.
2. Asset Deal
39. The results for asset deals are noteworthy: the radars do not
have the same shape for both countries as they did for the previous
analysis of share deals. An asset deal in France is cheaper (as are
share deals), but generally requires more person-days and is
subject to lengthier step-time. An asset deal requires a greater
number of person-days in France for all steps except financial due
diligence (3a) and dispute with formal litigation (9b). The length
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of each step is longer in France for all steps except for the disputes
(9a and 9b). Although asset deals in France generally require more
person-days and longer step-time, satisfaction is greater in France
for all steps, except for disputes (9a and 9b).
40. Therefore, the following conclusions are proposed:
1. Greater differences are noticed for asset deals than for share
deals;
2. Asset deals are generally cheaper in France;
3. Asset deals are generally more satisfactory in France;
4. Asset deals are generally longer to complete in France.
FIGURE 5
RESEARCH FINDINGS ASSET DEAL (AD): PERSON-DAYS, STEPTIME, EUROS, AND SATISFACTION

41. The above findings were tested through an interfactor
analysis to check whether, for instance, the time to complete a deal

164

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 2

was dependant on the type of the deal, or whether the cost of the
transaction was dependant on the size of Target.
C. Interfactor Analysis
42. An interfactor analysis was carried out to verify the
accuracy of the above conclusions. The analysis was made using
regressions, but also a comparison of averages. Regarding the
economic performance factors, the following relationships were
tested:
1. Relationship between cost (dependent variable) and
company size (independent variable) was tested via linear
regression;
2. Relationship between satisfaction (dependent variable) and
cost (independent variable) was tested via linear regression;
3. Comparison of person-days regarding the deal type was
tested via comparison of averages.
43. Regression analysis refers to techniques available for
studying the relationship between two or more variables. More
specifically it refers to the techniques used to derive an equation
that relates the criterion variable to one or more predictor
variables;29 it considers the frequency distribution of the criterion
variable, when one or more predictor variables remained fixed at
different levels.30
44. The results31 show that a significant positive correlation
exists between cost and company size (+ 0.34/6.64). This
demonstrates that the cost to complete a deal is relative to the
company size.
45. Further it can be observed that satisfaction has no
significant relationship with cost and it is, therefore, not a function
of cost (-0.04/-0.66). This result shows that it is not sufficient to
measure only the cost of the deal in order to evaluate the economic
outcome, but to evaluate other factors as well, such as satisfaction.
Satisfaction is therefore an important measurement of this study.
29. A predictor variable is a “variable that can be used to predict the value
of another variable (as in statistical regression).” WORDNET 2.0 2003,
Princeton University, available at http://wordnet.princeton.edu/ (last visited
October 20, 2009).
30. See CHURCHILL, supra note 21.
31. See Annex 7 (to process the regression analysis, SPSS software was
used).
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46. Another result shows that an asset deal (2.9)32 takes more
person-days than a share deal (2.2) in both countries.33 This
evidences that an asset deal is more complex to carry out than a
share deal requiring (i) identifying the assets, and (ii) applying a
particular set of transfer rules to each asset. This is contrary to
share deals, which do not require identification of the underlying
asset and need the application of only one set of legal rules.
V. CONCLUSION
47. To conclude, some tentative explanations of the research
findings (A), the limits of these findings (B), and a roadmap for
future research (C), are set out below.
A. Tentative Explanations of the Research Findings
48. The research findings show that by and large neither the
French nor the U.S. system seems to be superior to the other. One
example of this conclusion is the similarity shown in the general
shapes of the main radars.34
49. The results based on the structure of the transaction35
indicate a preference for share deals rather than asset deals in both
countries.36 However, asset deals are twice as frequent in the U.S.
(36% of transactions) as in France (18% of transactions).37
France’s apparent preference for share deals over asset deals may
be explained by the tax burden placed on the latter: asset deals are
subject to 5% stamp duty (also called stamp tax or, droits
d'enregistrement), whereas share deals are subject to a 1.1% stamp
duty capped at 4,000 Euros. Therefore, a potential acquirer will
typically favor a share acquisition for tax reasons. In the U.S.
however, asset deals are subject to low stamp duty (if any). In
lowering its stamp duty for asset acquisitions, France would leave
a greater choice between share and asset deals for buyers and
sellers on the basis of the legal merits of each deal structure alone.
32. According to five-point Likert scale: 1 = very low; 5 = very high. For
details, see Annex 6 (Person-Days).
33. See Annex 7 (3).
34. See supra § 31.
35. See question 15 of the questionnaire in Annex 2.
36. See supra § 35.
37. Id.
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50. The first recommendation is that the French legislator
levels the tax playing field between asset and share deals. The
French draft law Modernization of the Economy, which was finally
adopted summer 2008, proposes the harmonization of stamp duty
on the transfer of most business concerns (cession de fonds de
commerce38 which is the archetype of an asset deal) and on share
transfers to a standardized 3% for a share deal capped at 5,000
Euros, and for an asset deal not exceeding 200,000 Euros.39 If
such a provision should lower the stamp duty for most asset deals
(from 5% to 3%), it would raise the stamp duty applicable to share
deals from a 1.1 % capped 4,000 Euros, to a 3% capped at 5,000
Euros.
51. There is another tax dimension in the asset and share deal
choice in the U.S. and in France. This is related to the favorable
business corporation tax regime offered by section 338 of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code, which allows a share deal to be treated as
an asset deal enabling a step-up in basis and therefore in some
circumstances partial goodwill40 depreciation. As a result, the U.S.
allows a step-up in basis not only for asset deals but for share deals
as well.41 In France, this step-up in basis is not available for share
deals.
38. Also translated as going concern.
39. Proposed art. 15 of Draft law relating to the Modernization of the
Economy. See Rev. droit fiscal, no 19-20, May 8, 2008, comm. 312, at 15; cf. P.
Serlooten, Observations sur la difficulté de légiférer en matière fiscale,
l’exemple des cessions de droits sociaux, in LIBER AMICORUM CYRILLE DAVID
53 (LGDJ 2005).
Following the recommendation made on an earlier version of this paper,
that was presented before the French Ministry of Justice on July 6, 2007, art. 64
and 65 of the law Modernization of the Economy were finally adopted on
August 4, 2008. This adoption levelled the tax playing field between asset and
share deals.
40. Goodwill is the positive difference between the purchase cost and the
fair market value of the assets and liabilities acquired with a company.
Goodwill may exist, for instance, where the assets recorded on the acquired
company’s balance sheet are worth more than their historical cost, or where the
gathering of the target company to the buyer creates synergies, either in the form
of cost reduction and / or revenue enhancement.
41. Under 338(h) (10), the Target recognizes gain as if it had sold its assets
to the acquiring corporation. However, no gain or loss is recognized when the
target selling corporate shareholders sell their Target’s stock to the acquiring
corporation. The acquiring corporation thus acquires Target with a stepped-up
tax bases in the target corporation’s assets.
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52. To summarize, the U.S. has taken steps towards equalizing
the tax regime for share and asset deals. This relative tax
neutrality in the U.S. may explain why asset deals are more
frequent than in France. However, from a legal standpoint, France
has a lot to offer by favoring asset deals: France provides potential
buyers and sellers with a unique concept–the fonds de commerce–
simplifying the legal aspects of asset deals. It also offers a
favorable tax regime, but limited to the contribution (in exchange
for stock consideration) of such assets. This could be expanded to
promote the sale (in exchange for cash consideration) of these
assets.
53. The unique concept of fonds de commerce (business
concern) refers to an aggregate of most business assets, both
tangible and intangible, used in a business. The fundamental
characteristic used to determine the existence of a business concern
is a clientele attached to a particular group of business assets (e.g.,
the premises where the activity takes place). In addition to its
clientele, the business concern may consist of leasehold rights,
equipment, tools, merchandise, etc. This concept of business
concern is significant because it reduces the number of regulations
to one single set of rules–applicable to individual assets which
make up the going concern.
54. Along with this favorable legal regime, France extends the
possibility of avoiding capital gains taxation where a business
concern–including all liabilities attached thereto–is contributed to
a newly-incorporated company in exchange for shares.42 This tax
incentive applies to a partial business transfer (apport partiel
d’actif, hereinafter “Partial Business Transfer”), which is the
contribution of a complete branch of business activities, that is “all
the assets and liabilities of a division of a company which, from an
organizational point of view, constitute an independent business,
that is to say an entity capable of functioning by its own means.”43
42. The favorable legal mechanism remains available and allows the direct
transfer, not only of all assets, but also of all liabilities (transmission universelle
de patrimoine) without having to follow each specific transfer rule applicable to
each class of assets or liabilities.
43. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS (French Tax Code) art. 210 B. This text
corresponds to the English version of a European Directive (i.e. Merger
Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990, art. 2(i)). See http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31990L0434:en:HTML
(last visited November 2, 2009).
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55. The French tax code allows the taxpayer to avoid certain
onerous consequences of such transfer: capital gains realized upon
the Partial Business Transfer are exonerated if certain conditions
are met.44 Furthermore, valuation of the contribution is made at
current market value (not at historic cost) if followed by the sale to
a third party of the shares received in exchange. However, this
favorable regime is only available for assets and liabilities
contributed to a company in exchange for shares and is therefore
not available for the sale of assets and liabilities with payment in
cash.
56. Therefore, prior to a recent Cour de cassation decision,
practitioners were accustomed to advising their clients to
contribute their business concern to a newly incorporated company
and to sell the shares received in exchange instead of selling
directly the business concern itself; thereby reducing the uncapped
5% stamp duty on the sale of a business concern to a low 4,000
Euros capped stamp duty imposed upon the sale of the shares.
However, the Cour de cassation recently characterized as abusive
the process of (i) contributing a business concern to a newly
incorporated company controlled by the seller, (ii) immediately
followed by the sale of the company’s shares to the buyer for
lowering stamp duty only.45 Said otherwise, the Partial Business
Transfer regime is not a traditional way of raising cash from the
disposal of assets, but rather to make a contribution in exchange
for shares.46 Therefore, one may suggest the extension of the
Partial Business Transfer regime to the sale of assets. This
improvement would certainly give France competitive advantage
in M&A transactions.
57. The second recommendation to the legislator is to extend
the legal and tax mechanism governing a contribution of all assets
and liabilities to the sale of assets. In this case, asset deals would
be treated on an equal basis with share deals, not only from a legal

44. In particular, depreciation and capital gains on subsequent disposals of
the assets must be calculated under the same conditions that would otherwise be
applicable if the Partial Business Transfer had not occurred.
45. Cass. com., March 20, 2007, SAS Distribution Casino France, n° 2007038111, JCP E 2007, 1698, comments H. Hovasse; Droit des sociétés, June
2007, no 124, comments J.-L. Pierre; Rev. Jur. Fisc., issue no 8-9/2007, no 993.
46. This explains why the non recognition of capital gains is subject to
keeping the shares received in exchange of the contribution for three years.
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standpoint, but also as far as stamp duty and capital gains are
concerned.
58. In conclusion, the economic impact of the application of
the civil code rather than common law is not alarming as far as
M&A transactions are concerned. Both in France and in the U.S.,
these transactions are carried out following standard procedures in
compliance with common contractual practices.
Although
differences exist in both systems, they remain incidental, including
their economic impact.
B. Limitations
59. Not all determinants and dimensions that might affect
M&A performance were taken into account. For example, finance,
accounting, or organizational behavior. Moreover, the study did
not capture all the possible interrelations among the variables. It
was limited to a certain number of companies, to two countries,
and to a specific sample of informants. General limitations of the
statistical methods and the survey design, for example, items for
some variables, might represent additional limitations of this study.
C. Future Research
60. New models with a greater interdisciplinary approach
could be developed and tested, as well as models with a higher
degree of complexity. For example, interrelations between the
different factors. Future research could focus on the difference
between share deals and asset deals in each country. A verification
of industry effects in cross-industry analysis could also be taken
into account. The same study could be repeated in other countries.
Other researchers could replicate this research analysis in the same
context to confirm the stability of these findings.
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ANNEX 1
YEAR OF THE DEAL (%)

ANNEX 2
EXCERPTS FROM THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
THE DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO CONTRACTS IN MERGER OR
ACQUISITION OPERATIONS
This study is designed to produce a better understanding of how the execution of an
M&A transaction is impacted by the legal context. Completing the survey should
not take more than 10-15 minutes.
All information will be maintained as strictly confidential.
12.11.2007.
Conditions:
Please answer this questionnaire with reference to:
- a specific acquisition project (the "Deal") that occurred preferably between Jan. 1,
2000 and Dec. 31, 2004, and
- a Deal where both the acquirer and the target company are located in the United
States.
Do not consider a transnational Deal, or a Deal where the target company is listed
on a stock exchange.
1 - Please indicate the year when the Deal was legally completed:
2000 or before / 2001 / 2002 / 2003 / 2004 or after
2 - Please indicate the turnover of the acquirer company in Euros (turnover before tax)
after the Deal:
≤ 50 million / ≤ 100 million / ≤ 200 million / ≤ 500 million / > 500 million
3 - Please indicate the turnover of the target company in Euros (turnover before tax)
before the Deal:
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≤ 50 million / ≤ 100 million / ≤ 200 million / ≤ 500 million / > 500 million
4 - Please indicate the economic sector (services, industry, or both) in which the acquirer
company operates:
services / industry / mixed
5 - Please indicate more specifically the type of activity of the acquirer company:
6 - Please indicate the economic sector (services, industry, or both) in which the target
company operates:
services / industry / mixed
7 - Please indicate more specifically the type of activity of the target company:
8 - Please, based on your own judgment, assess the complexity of the Deal:
Very complex / Complex / Average / Simple / Very simple / Don't know
9 - To help us to assess the complexity of the Deal in a comparative manner, please
indicate the number of sites of the target company:
≤ 1 / ≤ 4 / ≤ 8 / ≤ 12 / > 12 / Don't know
10 - To help us to assess the complexity of the Deal in a comparative manner, please
indicate the number of type of products sold by the target company:
≤ 1 / ≤ 4 / ≤ 8 / ≤ 12 / > 12 / Don't know
11 - To help us to assess the complexity of the Deal in a comparative manner, please
indicate the number of national markets in which the target company operates:
≤ 1 / ≤ 4 / ≤ 8 / ≤ 12 / > 12 / Don't know
12 - Please indicate the number of employees of the combined company after the Deal:
≤ 10 / ≤ 25 / ≤ 50 / ≤ 100 / > 100
13 - Please indicate the number of Deals you (the Informant) have been involved in your
professional career:
≤ 2 / ≤ 5 / ≤ 10 / ≤ 25 / > 25
14 - Please indicate the number of people (internal and external) who work on the Deal:
≤ 2 / ≤ 5 / ≤ 10 / ≤ 25 / > 25

Step 0 Deal structure:
The purpose of this question is to identify the type of M&A transaction you have
been involved into.
15 - What is the type of M&A transaction you have in mind in answering this
questionnaire?
- Your company acquired or sold a majority interest (>50%) of the shares of a business
("Share Deal")
- Your company acquired or sold a business in an asset deal ("Asset Deal")
- Your company absorbed through merger a target company ("Merger Deal")
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Step 1 Preliminary Information:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate the preliminary phase of the Deal,
starting from the first informal contacts with target (but also, and not limited to,
instructing consultants, establishing initial contacts with business bank, identifying
constraints such as time table, etc...) up to the signing of the confidentiality
agreement (included).
16 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 10 / ≤ 20 / ≤ 30 / ≤ 50 / > 50 / Don't know
17 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (weeks)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 5 / > 5 / Don't know
18 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
19 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
20 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
21 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Step 2 Phase Surrounding the Letter of Intent:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate the phase surrounding the letter of
intent, starting from the signing of the confidentiality agreement (but also, and not
limited to, discussion on the planning of external communication, first legal
implications, Deal structure proposal) and ending with the signing of the letter of
intent (included).
22 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 10 / ≤ 20 / ≤ 30 / ≤ 50 / > 50 / Don't know
23 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (weeks)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 5 / > 5 / Don't know
24 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
25 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
26 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
27 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Step 3 Due Diligence:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate the phase starting from the sending of
the due diligence request list (including the audit-investigating process, the data
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room) to the signing of the asset purchase agreement (excluded). Below are
distinguished the financial and the legal steps of the due diligence process.
Sub-Step 3-1 Financial Due Diligence:
The purpose of this first set of questions is to estimate the financial due diligence
process only, such as accounting verifications, financial audit, balance sheet and
profit and loss account checking, etc.
28 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 10 / ≤ 20 / ≤ 30 / ≤ 50 / > 50 / Don't know
29 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (weeks)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 5 / > 5 / Don't know
30 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
31 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
32 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
33 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Sub-Step 3-2 Legal Due Diligence:
The purpose of this second set of questions is to estimate the legal due diligence
process only, such as reviewing contracts, evaluating litigations, assessing
environmental issues, etc.
34 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 30 / ≤ 60 / ≤ 120 / ≤ 180 / > 180 / Don't know
35 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (weeks)?
≤ 2 / ≤ 8 / ≤ 16 / ≤ 24 / > 24 / Don't know
36 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
37 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
38 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
39 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Step 4 Asset Purchase Agreement:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate the phase starting from the negotiation
of the asset purchase agreement (including, and not limited to, discussing over the
drafts, the time table for execution, consulting the work council, if necessary) to the
signing of the asset purchase agreement (included).
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40 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 10 / ≤ 20 / ≤ 30 / ≤ 50 / > 50 / Don't know
41 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (weeks)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 5 / > 5 / Don't know
42 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
43 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
44 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
45 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Step 5 Ancillary Documents:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate the phase starting from the negotiation
of the ancillary documents (such as escrow agreement, shareholders agreement,
minutes of shareholders meeting, financing contracts, labor contracts, license
contracts, etc...) to the signing of these ancillary documents (included).
46 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 10 / ≤ 20 / ≤ 30 / ≤ 50 / > 50 / Don't know
47 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (weeks)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 5 / > 5 / Don't know
48 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
49 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
50 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
51 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Step 6 Regulatory Approvals:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate the process of obtaining various
regulatory approvals necessary to complete the transaction (competition authority
approval, other regulatory approvals, etc...).
52 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 10 / ≤ 20 / ≤ 30 / ≤ 50 / > 50 / Don't know
53 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (weeks)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 5 / > 5 / Don't know
54 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
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≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
55 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
56 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
57 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Step 7 Closing:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate the phase starting from the week
preceding the closing date to the closing date itself, where proof of ownership or
other documents are delivered, and payment transferred.
58 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 5 / > 5 / Don't know
59 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (days)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 4 / > 4 / Don't know
60 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
61 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
62 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
63 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Step 8 Post-Closing:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate the post-closing phase, after the closing
date: typically, this is–for instance–where price adjustment occurs, indemnification
requests are made, earn-out follow-up is carried out. However disputes must not be
considered in this step, as step 9 is specifically dedicated to disputes assessments.
64 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 10 / ≤ 20 / ≤ 30 / ≤ 50 / > 50 / Don't know
65 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (weeks)?
≤ 1 / ≤ 2 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 5 / > 5 / Don't know
66 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
67 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
68 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
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69 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Step 9 Disputes:
The purpose of these questions is to estimate if disputes occurred after the Deal.
Below are distinguished disputes without any formal summons before a court or an
arbitration tribunal, and disputes with such formal litigation.

Sub-Step 9-1 Disputes without formal litigation:
The purpose of this first set of questions is to estimate if disputes, without any
formal summons before a court or an arbitration tribunal, occurred.
70 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 30 / ≤ 60 / ≤ 120 / ≤ 180 / > 180 / Don't know
71 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (months)?
≤ 6 / ≤ 12 / ≤ 24 / ≤ 48 / > 48 / Don't know
72 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
73 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
74 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
75 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?

Sub-Step 9-2 Disputes with formal litigation:
The purpose of this second set of questions is to estimate if disputes arising after
formal summons before a court or an arbitration tribunal, occurred.
76 - What is your estimate of working days to complete this step (Person-Days)?
≤ 30 / ≤ 60 / ≤ 120 / ≤ 180 / > 180 / Don't know
77 - What is your estimate of time to complete this step (months)?
≤ 6 / ≤ 12 / ≤ 24 / ≤ 48 / > 48 / Don't know
78 - Your estimation of cost to complete this step nowadays (Euros)?
≤ 10.000 / ≤ 20.000 / ≤ 30.000 / ≤ 100.000 / > 100.000 / Don't know
79 - How satisfactory was this step for you?
Very satisfactory / Satisfactory / Average / Unsatisfactory / Totally unsatisfactory / Don't
know
80 - Please, explain the reason for this level of satisfaction / unsatisfaction:
81 - Do you have any specific comments on this step?
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Section IV: Personal information (confidential, for classification purpose only)
82 - What is your current position?
Attorney (partner) / Attorney (associate) / C Level: CEO / C Level: COO / C Level: CFO
/ C Level: General Counsel / Head / responsible for M&A / Management / Other
83 - If you are in the above category "other," please specify your current position and
your level of responsibility:
84 - How long have you worked for this company (years)?
1-5 / 6-10 / 11-15 / 16 or more
85 - How involved are you in M&A activities?
Not at all / A bit / Average / Much / Very much
86 - How clear was this questionnaire?
Not at all / A bit / Average / Much / Very much
87 - Thanks a lot for your contribution! If you are interested in a summary of the
findings, check this box.
88 - Would you like to add any additional comments?
89 - Would you like to inform us about your email address?

ANNEX 3
INFORMANT COMPETENCE: POSITION
Position in %
Attorney (partner)
C Level: CEO
Attorney (associate)
Other

FR
USA

Management
Head / responsible for M&A
0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0
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ANNEX 4
INFORMANT COMPETENCE: YEAR OF EXPERIENCE
Year of Experience in M&A in %

ANNEX 5
INFORMANT COMPETENCE: INVOLVEMENT IN M&A ACTIVITIES
Involvement in M&A Activities in %
A bit
10%

Very much
Much

Average
22%

Very much
44%

Average
A bit
Not at all

Much
24%
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ANNEX 6
SCALING DETAILS

Euros & Satisfaction

Person-Da ys
0

1

2

3

<= <= <=

4
<=

5
>

1.Preliminary Information (PremInfo)

don't know

10 20

30

50

50

2.Phase Surrounding: The letter of Intent (LOI)

don't know

10 20

30

50

50

3. A. Financial Due Diliguence (FinDueDil)

don't know

10 20

30

50

50

don't know

30 60 120 180 180

B. Legal Due Diliguence (LegalDueDil)
4.Purchase Agreement (PurchAgree)

don't know

10 20

30

50

50

5.Ancillary Documents (AnciDoc)

don't know

10 20

30

50

50

6.Regulatory Approval (RegApprov)

don't know

10 20

7.Closing (Closing)

don't know

8.Post Closing (PostClosing)

don't know

9.A. Disputing without Formal Litigation (DispWithout) don't know
B. Disputing with Formal Litigation (DispWith)

don't know

30

50

50

2

3

5

5

10 20

30

50

50

1

30 60 120 180 180
30 60 120 180 180

Step-Time
0

1

2

3

<= <= <=

4
<=

5
>

1.Preliminary Information (PremInfo)

don't know

1

2

3

5

2.Phase Surrounding: The letter of Intent (LOI)

don't know

1

2

3

5

5

3. A. Financial Due Diliguence (FinDueDil)

don't know

1

2

3

5

5
24

B. Legal Due Diliguence (LegalDueDil)

5

don't know

2

8

16

24

4.Purchase Agreement (PurchAgree)

don't know

1

2

3

5

5

5.Ancillary Documents (AnciDoc)

don't know

1

2

3

5

5

6.Regulatory Approval (RegApprov)

don't know

1

2

3

5

5

7.Closing (Closing)

don't know

1

2

3

4

4

8.Post Closing (PostClosing)

don't know

1

2

3

5

5

6 12

24

48

48

6 12

24

48

48

9.A. Disputing without Formal Litigation (DispWithout) don't know
B. Disputing with Formal Litigation (DispWith)

don't know
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ANNEX 7
INTERFACTOR ANALYSIS
7 (1-a) Regression
Satisfaction

Anal ysis for Share

Deal:

Cost

and

7 (1-b) Regression
Satisfaction

anal ysis

Deal:

Cost

and

for

Asset

7 (2) Regression anal ysis: Cost and Compan y Size
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7 (3) C omparison of P erson-Da ys: Asset
Deal (left) and Share Deal (right)
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GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO
(William S. Hein & Co., Inc.: Buffalo, New York, 2008) (1851)
Reviewed by Agustín Parise∗
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III. The Relevance: American and Foreign Impact .....................190
The bicentennial of the Digest of 18081 brought a fresh revival
of studies on the legal history of Louisiana. Many long-time
scholars with interests in Louisiana kept focusing on this peculiar
state of the Union, while newcomers started to look at the rich
legal culture of the region. In this milieu, William S. Hein & Co.
published a reprint of The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico. This
classic work on Hispanic comparative law by Gustavus Schmidt
was originally published in 1851 in the city of New Orleans.
Existing copies of the editio princeps are threatened not only by
time, but also by natural hazards such as hurricanes and floods that
affect the region.
∗

Research Associate, Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State
University Law Center; LL.B. (Universidad de Buenos Aires 2001); LL.M.
(Louisiana State University Law Center 2006).
The author is indebted to Joseph Abraham, Kevin Baggett, Louis V. de la
Vergne, Julieta Marotta de Parise, Olivier Moréteau, and Robert A. Pascal.
Part of the research used for this book review was published in Agustín
Parise, Las bibliotecas jurídicas como herramientas fundamentales del Derecho
Comparado: El caso de Schmidt en la Luisiana del siglo XIX, 15 REVISTA DE
DERECHO COMPARADO 195-241 (2009) (Arg.).
1. Complete English title: A Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the
Territory of Orleans.
See the French and English texts of the Digest of 1808 at:
www.law.lsu.edu/digest (last visited August 16, 2009).
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Hispanic legal history and comparative law are fields of academic
pursuit that are quickly developing in the United States.2 The reprint of

The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico will help to preserve and
encourage the study of the Louisiana legal culture and the vast
Hispanic background of the region.
I. THE AUTHOR: GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT
Few libraries existed in Louisiana during the early nineteenth
century. Even rarer were privately-owned, complete law libraries.3
Nevertheless, the most prominent lawyers in the region were aware
of the importance of the study of comparative law.4 One of those
lawyers was Gustavus (Gustaf) Schmidt. In a fifty-year period,
Schmidt gathered an impressive collection of materials for his
library. His collection was comparable to those of Joseph Story,
James Kent, and Thomas Jefferson.5
Gustavus Schmidt was born in Sweden in 1795;6 he
immigrated to the United States in 1815.7 Like many other
European immigrants, his first contact with the United States was
the port of New York.8 From there he moved to Maryland, and
later to Virginia.9
In Richmond he worked for Judge

2. See Agustín Parise, Slave Law and Labor Activities during the Spanish
Colonial Period: A Study of the South American Region of Río de la Plata, 32
RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 3 (2008); M.C. Mirow, Latin American Legal History: Some
Essential Spanish Terms, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 43, 43 (2001).
An example of the development of this area of study is found in Olivier
Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and Latin America, 83
TUL. L. REV. 1103 (2009).
See also the recent comment about the development of legal history,
Michael H. Hoeflich & Steve Sheppard, Disciplinary Evolution and Scholarly
Expansion: Legal History in the United States, 54 (supplement) AM. J. COMP. L.
23 (2006).
3. See Roger Philip McCutcheon, Books and Booksellers in New Orleans,
1730-1830, 20 THE LOUISIANA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 606 (1937).
4. Ferdinand F. Stone, The Tulane Institute of Comparative Law: First Ten
Year Report, 1 INTER-AM L. REV. 201, 201 (1959).
5. MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH ET AL., THE 1877 SALE CATALOGUE OF
GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT'S LIBRARY 7 (2005).
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 6.
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Brokenbrough, and was then admitted to the bar.10 He finally
settled in New Orleans in 1829,11 where he successfully practiced
law.12
Schmidt not only spoke Swedish, his native language, but was
also fluent in the “working” languages of Louisiana, i.e. English,
French, and Spanish.13
In 1841, desiring to make his comparative law doctrines public,
Schmidt created the first law journal in Louisiana and named it
Louisiana Law Journal.14
In addition, he referred to the
comparative law materials in his library before the courts.15 One
of Schmidt’s chief contributions to the study of comparative law
was the drafting of The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico (the Book)
in 1851.16
II. THE BOOK: THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO
To write the Book, Schmidt used the comparative law materials
in his law library. His library is reflected in the bibliography
(Authors Cited) of the Book. Of the 55 works mentioned in the
10. Kjell Modéer, Mittermaier och broderna Schmidt –Ett bidrag till
1800’talets interkulturella juristkommunikation, in FESTSKRIFT TILL HANS
RAGNEMALM 233, 235(2005).
11. HOEFLICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.
12. Court records show that he appeared on 98 occasions before the
Supreme Court of Louisiana between 1834 [Martin v. Newton, 6 La. 286
(1834)] to 1878 [Ducoing v. Billgery, 30 La.Ann. 250 (1878) (posthumous
resolution)].
13. HOEFLICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.
14. The Louisiana Law Journal devoted to the Theory and Practice of the
Law, Vol. 1, N. 1, (Gustavus Schmidt ed., New Orleans, Johns & Co., 1841).
The journal published four issues in the period 1841-1842, and was then
interrupted.
15. See for example the references to Spanish, Roman, and French law cited
in Gustavus Schmidt, Brief of Appellant, Supreme Court of Louisiana, No.
6473, Abel Mangin vs. Mrs. Nicholas Favre; Gustavus Schmidt, Brief of
Appellant, Supreme Court of Louisiana, No. [Illegible], James Farnet and Noel
& Guiraud vs. Their Creditors; Gustavus Schmidt, Application for a re-hearing,
Supreme Court of Louisiana, No. 6524, Philip Marsoudet vs. Mary Clancy;
Gustavus Schmidt, Brief of Appellant, Supreme Court of Louisiana, No. 2939,
Succession of J.B. Navarro; and Gustavus Schmidt, Brief of Appellant, Supreme
Court of Louisiana, No. [Illegible], Jean Bourbon vs. Louis Castera, et alia. All
briefs are on file with Mr. Louis V. de la Vergne.
16. GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO (William
S. Hein & Co., Inc. ed. 2008) (1851).
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bibliography, only 15 are not found in the catalogue of his
library.17 The authors Schmidt cites in his work were authoritative
at that time, and their works have become classics of legal
literature. No better sources could have been consulted to draft the
Book, not even in Spain. Schmidt’s interest in comparative law
was not limited to North America and Europe. It extended to other
regions that, like Louisiana, had been Spanish territories. In the
preface Schmidt indicates that:
The following work was originally undertaken with a view
to enable the author to acquire a competent knowledge of
the laws of Spain, which once governed Louisiana, and
which still form the basis of large portions of its
jurisprudence . . . The recent acquisition of California and
New Mexico will probably render the work at present of
some practical utility to the legal profession; and the author
also entertains the hope that it may be of some use even to
men of business having dealings with the republics of
South America.18
The Book was drafted in English. It was one of the first works
of its kind accessible to English readers. For that reason, courts
and scholars referred to it early and for many years.
A. Historical Outline
The Book not only reflects the importance of comparative law,
and it also captures doctrines from the German Historical School
of Law.19 Those doctrines are spread thought the entire text
beginning with the very first page: the Book is dedicated to his
friend Christian Roselius, 20 who was one of the first legal
historians in the southern region of the United States.21
The first part of the Book is a comprehensive study of Spanish
legal history. It provides a rich and unique glossary for scholars
17. See Authors Cited in SCHMIDT, supra note 16 and HOEFLICH ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 25-92.
18. See Preface in SCHMIDT, supra note 16.
19. Kjell Modéer, Gustavus Schmidt’s Library: The Swedish Connection, in
HOEFLICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 95, 96.
20. See the dedication in SCHMIDT, supra note 16.
21. Mitchell Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the Slaughterhouse
Cases, 18 TUL. L. REV. 1, 55 (1943).
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today as it did then. The study, referred to by Schmidt as a
historical outline, is extensively developed in 102 pages.22
This historical study is divided into four periods: Spain under
the Romans,23 Spain under the Visigoths,24 Spain under the
Arabs,25 and Spain after the expulsion of the Arabs.26
Approximately 2000 years of history and legislation are included.
Even when brief, the accounts are clear and they cover the basic
information that an English reader would need when researching
the Spanish legal roots of the American colonies.
Currently, the historical outline is used by English-speaking
scholars who study the intricate legal history of Spain and its ultra
mar territories in the Americas.27 Even when Schmidt’s English is
imperfect and several translations are defective, the final result of
the historical outline is certainly positive. Readers get a unique
glossary of the legal terms and institutions that were applied in
Hispanic America.
His comparative law ideas are also present in the historical
outline. His study does not focus on Mexico and Spain alone. At
one point, while analyzing a Spanish area of law, Schmidt makes a
reference to the law of Sweden.28
That first part of the Book contains one of the first English
descriptions of the origins and contents of many Spanish legal
works. It includes succinct descriptions of the Fuero Juzgo, the
Fuero Viejo, the Fuero Real, the Siete Partidas, the Leyes de
Estilo, the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, the Leyes de Toro, the Nueva
Recopilación, and the Novísima Recopilación. The outline also
addresses Mexican legal history. The last chapter of the historical
outline includes a description of the Spanish and Indiano
legislation, with a view focused “more especially of Mexico.”29
22. See Historical Outline in SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 1-102.
23. Id. at 13-20.
24. Id. at 21-42.
25. Id. at 43-75.
26. Id. at 75-85.
27. See, e.g., Jorge Sánchez Cordero, The Reception of Legal Systems in the
Americas: Diversities and Convergences, 24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 231 (2009);
and Georgia D. Chadwick, Schmidt: Civil Law of Spain and Mexico, 57 LA. B.J.
110 (2009).
28. See Historical Outline in SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 36.
29. Id. at 91.
See also the interesting observations by María del Refugio González
regarding the content of the historical outline of the Book, available at
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To finish, Schmidt discusses the overwhelming amount of legal
dispositions that Spaniards enacted over many centuries of
legislative activity. Schmidt provides a chart from an encyclopedic
work of Antonio Pérez y López that indicates the quantity of laws,
books, titles, and volumes from different Spanish legal bodies.30
Schmidt correctly concludes that the legal enactments embodied in
the Spanish legislation probably exceeded 100,000.31
B. Project of a Civil Code
The second part of the Book is a civil code project premised on
the laws of Spain and Mexico. Because it was drafted in English
but based on Spanish texts, the project was a monumental work at
that time. The project is developed in 306 pages and follows the
format of the nineteenth-century civil codes that were inspired by
the Code Napoléon. The project includes concordances (indicating
Spanish and Mexican legislation, and scholarly writing) for the
great majority of the articles, and resembles the work that García
Goyena conducted for Spain that same year of 1851.32
The similarity with the Code Napoléon is not surprising. In
1832, Pablo Gorosábel presented to Spain a project of a civil code
that was inspired by the Code Napoléon.33 Schmidt’s library
contained a copy of a work by Gorosábel that contained that
Spanish project: Redacción del Código Civil de España (1832).34

http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/2/719/2.pdf at 34-35 (last visited August
16, 2009).
30. See 1 ANTONIO XAVIER PÉREZ Y LÓPEZ, TEATRO DE LA LEGISLACIÓN
UNIVERSAL DE ESPAÑA E INDIAS lix (1791). Compare Historical Outline in
SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 102. Schmidt includes figures for the Novísima
Recopilación, which Pérez y López does not include.
31. See SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 102.
32. FLORENCIO GARCÍA GOYENA, CONCORDANCIAS, MOTIVOS Y
COMENTARIOS DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL ESPAÑOL (1852). The work of Schmidt was
developed in one volumen, while the work of García Goyena was presented in
four volumes.
33. 1 JOSÉ PUIG BRUTAU, COMPENDIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 36 (1987).
34. PABLO GOROSABEL, REDACCIÓN DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL DE ESPAÑA:
ESPARCIDO EN LOS DIFERENTES CUERPOS DEL DERECHO Y LEYES SUELTAS DE
ESTA NACIÓN (Tolosa, Imprenta de la Viuda de Lama ed. 1832).
See HOEFLICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 56.
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This work is cited in the bibliography of the Book and was used by
Schmidt when drafting his comparative law study.35
The structure of Schmidt’s project replicates the work
of Gorosábel.36 Schmidt translated Gorosábel’s Spanish
text almost verbatim.37 However, he added
some 20
articles38 and references to Mexican law, and he expanded the
Spanish law references.39 Like the Code Napoléon, the Book
follows a tripartite division, consisting of a preliminary title40 and
three books. Schmidt’s project is divided into Book I, Of the
Domestic Relations;41 Book II, Of Things, and the Rights which
may be Acquired over Them;42 and Book III, Of the Different
Means of Acquiring Property.43 Each book is divided into units:
titles, chapters, sections, and where relevant, paragraphs. Schmidt
introduced the units and most of the 1439 articles in the project
with a detailed account and review of the relevant Spanish and
Mexican laws.44 For example, the note to article 680, on the nature
35. See Authors Cited in SCHMIDT, supra note 16.
36. Both projects have the same structure. The only difference is that Title
8, Book III and Title 9, Book III are inverted in the Book. See Civil Law in
SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 361-373 and GOROSABEL, supra note 34, at 315326.
37. Starting in the sixteenth century, it was not rare for authors to claim
creative imitation as valid. Schmidt may have accepted that doctrine, and
therefore, may have intended to use creative imitation when drafting the project
in his Book. Creative imitation is no longer considered valid, and is mainly
considered plagiarism. About some aspects of the evolution of creative
imitation see, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 49-74
(2007).
About the evolution of borrowing ideas and writings see JUDY ANDERSON,
PLAGIARISM, COPYRIGHT VIOLATION AND OTHER THEFTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 2-3 (1998); THOMAS MALON, STOLEN WORDS 3-24 (1991);
ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 62-94 (1952).
38. Some of those new articles were divisions of Spanish articles. See, e.g.,
the breakdown of article 425 of Gorosábel into articles 426 and 427 of Schmidt.
Civil Law in SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 96 and GOROSABEL, supra note 34, at
95.
39. See, e.g., the reference to Mexican law in Civil Law in SCHMIDT, supra
note 16, at 15.
40. See arts. 1-6 in Civil Law in SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 1-2.
41. See arts. 7-172 in Civil Law in SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 3-41.
42. See arts. 173-395 in Civil Law in SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 42-88.
43. See arts. 396-1439 in Civil Law in SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 89-306.
44. See Civil Law in SCHMIDT, supra note 16, at 1-306. The work of
Gorosábel has 1419 articles. See GOROSABEL, supra note 34, at 314.
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of the contract of mutuum, reads “Partidas, L.1, T.1, P.5.”45
Likewise, the introduction to Title VI, Book III on Deposit
includes references to Spanish scholarly writing and legislation.46
Schmidt also included, as expected, references to the Louisiana
Civil Code that do not appear in the work by Gorosábel. In the
notes to some articles of the project, Schmidt included the English
terms used in the Louisianan text and in the Code Napoléon, surely
expecting they would help readers to understand the Spanish
expressions.47
Finally, the Book includes seven appendices with a selection of
acts by the Mexican congress and decisions by the Spanish courts.
The appendices contain 50 pages and are written in English and
Spanish. The appendices include acts relative to abolition of
entails, authorization of foreigners to take interests in mines,
colonization, passports, and rules of naturalization.48
III. THE RELEVANCE: AMERICAN AND FOREIGN IMPACT
The influence of the Book in the jurisprudence and scholarly
opinions was immediate.49 In 1877, the Book was used at the
shortly-lived Trinity Law Department of what is now the Trinity
University at San Antonio, Texas. There, judge Ewing changed
the curriculum to incorporate the study of the Book.50 The judge
understood that the text ably portrayed the Hispanic laws of the
45. Id. at 145.
46. The note to the unit reads:
See / Escriche, Confianza, Depositante, Depositario, and Deposito. /
Sala, B.2 T.19, “Del contrato literal y de los Reales.” § 11-15 “Del
Deposito.” / Asso y Manuel, B.2, T.10, “Del Deposito y Prestamo.” /
Tapia, Febr. Novis., B.2, T.4, chap.21, “Del Deposito.” / Ib.
Prontuario, P.1, T,7, “Del Deposito.” / Fuero Real, B.3, T.15. “De Las
Cosas Encomendadas.” / Partidas, T.3, P.5. / Novis. Recop., B.10 T.9,
“De los Depositos y Confianzas.”
Id. at 193.
47. See, e.g., the notes to articles 911 and 1016 of his project. Id. at 191 &
215.
48. Id. at 308-359.
49. See, e.g., Peter L. Reich, Siete Partidas in My Saddlebags: The
Transmission of Hispanic Law from Antebellum Louisiana to Texas and
California, 22 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 79 (2007).
50. Mark W. Lambert, The Trinity University School of Law, 1873-1878,
and the Jurisprudence of Texas, 41-DEC HOUS. LAW. 34, 37 (2003).
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United States frontier.51 The judge also recognized that the Book
was important for by 1855, it had been mentioned often by the
Supreme Court of Texas.52
Courts in the United States referred to the Book on several
occasions, both by direct citation and by citing sections of other
cases that referred to the Book. The Book was mentioned in six
instances by the United States Supreme Court from 1894 through
1911 (60 years after its publication).53 In addition, at least 65
federal and state court decisions referred to the Book. The first
reference was by a court in Texas in 1851, the year of the Book’s
publication.54 The most recent reference was by a court in New
Mexico in 2006, more than 150 years after its publication.55 In that
150-year period, the Book has been mentioned by courts of
California,56 Florida,57 Louisiana,58 Missouri,59 New Mexico,60
Puerto Rico,61 Rhode Island,62 Texas,63 and Washington.64
The impact of the Book was not limited to the legal community
of the United States. For example, in 1957, a summary
bibliography of Mexican law was published in Mexico65 under the
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The Supreme Court decisions are: Arnett v. Reade, 220 US 311 (1911);
Tiglao v. Insular Government of Philippine Islands, 215 US 410 (1910); Royal
Ins. Co. v. Miller, 199 US 353 (1905); Hayes v. US, 170 US 637 (1898); US v.
City of Santa Fe, 165 US 675 (1897); and Maxwell Land-Grant Co. v. Dawson,
151 US 586 (1894).
54. Gortario v. Cantu, 7 Tex. 35 (1851).
55. Medina v. Medina, 139 N.M. 309 (2006); citing sections of a previous
case referring to the Book (Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780 N.M.
(1919)).
56. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318 (1926).
57. See, e.g., Blood v. Hunt, 97 Fla. 551 (1929).
58. See, e.g., Williams v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 296 F.2d 569
(1961).
59. See, e.g., Cutter v. Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206 (1855).
60. See, e.g., Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M. 34 (1853).
61. See, e.g., De la Torre v. National City Bank of New York, 110 F.2d 976
(1940).
62. See, e.g., Barrows v. Downs, 9 R.I. 446 (1870).
63. See, e.g., Coles’ Adm’rs v. Perry, 7 Tex. 109 (1851).
64. See, e.g., Board of Trade of City of Seattle v. Hayden, 4 Wash. 263
(1892).
65. MARGARITA DE LA VILLA & JOSÉ LUIS ZAMBRANO, BIBLIOGRAFÍA
SUMARIA DE DERECHO MEXICANO (Instituto de Derecho Comparado de la
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México ed. 1957).
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direction of the Institute of Comparative Law of the National
Autonomous University of Mexico.66 The bibliography includes a
section on the legal history of the Mexican civil law. That section
includes only three works, and the Book is one of those and is the
only one written in English. 67
The Book also had influence in Europe. Schmidt’s brother
circulated copies of the Book to newspapers and law journals in
Sweden.68 Schmidt also sent copies of his Book to his brother to
distribute them to scholars around Europe.69 One of the addressees
was Von Savigny in Berlin.70 With that delivery, Schmidt’s
interest in the German Historical School of Law was united with
its source.
To conclude it may be stated that the Book follows closely the
Spanish law. It could have been used, and may still be, to
determine the meaning of Spanish provisions of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1825. The Book’s English expositions of Spanish
law may be compared to the Spanish works by Febrero and Sala
that continue to be referenced in Louisiana.71
The Book is valuable for its unique contribution to the existing
literature. It has not been eclipsed with more in-depth and up-to66. The prologue of the bibliography states that:
This book does not try to offer a complete panorama of the Mexican
legal bibliography. According to the above mentioned purposes [i.e
drafting of legal bibliographies by the different member countries,
encouraged by the International Committee of Comparative Law], it
attempts to complete an inventory of the legal works that may better
serve foreign jurists who wish to start to explore the study of our
national law, with brief commentaries that may guide scholars in the
consultation of texts and their evaluation.
Id. at v.
67. The other two works, which are well known in Mexico, are Evolución
del Derecho Civil (1942) by Pablo Macedo and La Evolución del Derecho Civil
Mexicano desde la Independencia hasta nuestros días (1911) by Manuel Mateos
Alarcón. Id. at 101.
68.
Kjell
Modéer,
Carl
und
Gustavus
Schmidt
als
Zeitschriftenherausgerber. Zwei schwedische Juristenbruder als Pioniere
juristischer Zeitschriften im 19, in JAHRHUNDERT JURISTISCHE ZEITSCHRIFTEN
IN EUROPA 55, 64 (Michael Stolleis & Thomas Simon eds. 2006).
69. Modéer, supra note 10, at 252.
70. Id.
71. JOSÉ MARÍA CASTÁN VÁZQUEZ, LA INFLUENCIA DE LA LITERATURA
JURÍDICA ESPAÑOLA EN LAS CODIFICACIONES AMERICANAS 149 (Real Academia
de Jurisprudencia y Legislación, Madrid ed. 1984).
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date studies in English.72 The Book also illustrates the perception
that scholars and practitioners had of the laws of Spain in the
Hispanic American former colonies. The use of the Book, together
with related recent works, may help in discovering the evolution of
Hispanic legal studies in the Americas. As important, the Book
proves Schmidt’s worth as a ground-breaking jurist on Hispanic
comparative law. The Book should be embraced by all scholars
interested in this growing area of comparative law.

72. Spanish legal history in English has been developed early in the
twentieth century in complete works by Walton (CLIFFORD STEVENS WALTON,
THE CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH-AMERICA 1-115 (1900)) and Altamira
(Rafael Altamira, Spain, in 1 A GENERAL SURVEY OF EVENTS, SOURCES,
PERSONS AND MOVEMENTS IN CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY 579–702 (John
Henry Wigmore trans. 1912)); and in a doctoral dissertation by Vance (JOHN
THOMAS VANCE, THE BACKGROUND OF HISPANIC-AMERICAN LAW: LEGAL
SOURCES AND JURIDICAL LITERATURE OF SPAIN (1943)).
A recent study, although brief, was elaborated by Merino-Blanco (ELENA
MERINO-BLANCO, SPANISH LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM 1-24 (Thomson, 2d ed.
2006)).
In addition, other valuable works have contributed to the existing legal
literature of the area. See, among others, E.N. VAN KLEFFENS, HISPANIC LAW
UNTIL THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1968); THOMAS WAVERLY PALMER,
GUIDE TO THE LAW AND LEGAL LITERATURE OF SPAIN 26-38 (1915); Charles
Sumner Lobingier, Introduction, in LAS SIETE PARTIDAS xlix-lxxvii (Samuel
Parsons Scott trans. 1931); and 1 JOSEPH M. WHITE, A NEW COLLECTION OF
LAWS, CHARTERS AND LOCAL ORDINANCES 352-356 (1839).
Finally, Louisiana scholars have embarked on related studies while
exploring the legal and cultural roots in the region (e.g., John H. Tucker, Source
Books of the Louisiana Law Part III-Spanish Laws, 8 TUL. L. REV. 396 (1934);
and KATE WALLACH, BIBLIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
SOURCES, ROMAN, FRENCH, AND SPANISH 61-79 (1955)).
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I. FROM THE DIGEST OF 1808 TO THE PRESENT LOUISIANA CIVIL
CODE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
March 31, 2008 marked the bicentennial of the Digest of the
Civil Laws now in Force in the Territory of Orleans (Digest of
1808), the ancestor of the Louisiana Civil Code. With the
promulgation of the Digest of 1808, the Territory of Orleans, later
to become the State of Louisiana, not only confirmed but indicated
to the rest of the world its willingness to keep the civil law
tradition as the foundation of its social and legal order. As a
French colony, Louisiana had been ruled by the French Coutume
de Paris. When it was abandoned to Spain in 1762, Spanish law
was proclaimed to be the applicable law. The laws of Spain in
force at the time of the Louisiana Purchase remained in force in the
Territory of Orleans, by the will of the territorial Legislative
Council and with the approval of the US Congress.
In 1806, the Legislative Council appointed James Brown and
Louis Moreau-Lislet with the mission of drafting a Civil Code.
They used the French Code civil of 1804 and the Projet of 1800 as
a model of form and organization, also borrowing the substance
wherever solutions in the French Code or Projet where matching
Spanish laws then in force in Louisiana. The De La Vergne
Manuscript, with handwritten notes attributed to Louis MoreauLislet, traces the origins of the articles of the Digest into Spanish
law, Roman law, and existing legal literature of the time.
The law of March 31, 1808 promulgating the Digest abrogated
pre-existing laws only to the extent that they were contradicted by
the provisions of the Digest. This caused Louisiana judges to dig
into the old Spanish laws whenever solutions in the Digest were
found unclear or too general.
Such practice defeated the very purpose of the Digest, namely:
to make known the laws which have been preserved after
the abrogation of those which were contrary to the
constitution of the United States, or irreconcilable with its
principles, and to collect them in a single work, which
might serve as a guide for the decision of the courts and
juries, without recurring to a multiplicity of books, which,
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being for the most part written in foreign languages, offer
in their interpretation inexhaustible sources of litigation.1
This caused a call for proper codification, and the adoption of a
Civil Code in 1825. Like the Digest of 1808, the Code of 1825
was written in French and translated into English. It contained a
provision abrogating the ancient laws on all matters governed by
the Code, which makes it a code and not a digest of preexisting
laws. The Civil Code of 1825 was later replaced by a revised Civil
Code in 1870, after the abrogation of slavery. The Civil Code of
1870 was written in English only. It underwent substantial
revisions under the leadership of the Louisiana State Law Institute
and is now the only civil code written in English. The revision
often aimed at finding solutions compatible with the common law
of the neighboring states.
The Civil Code of Louisiana served as a model for codification
in, among others, Latin America, Spain, the Philippines, and
Quebec. It nowadays serves as a model to jurisdictions such as
Estonia or China, in their efforts to adopt legislation meeting the
needs of a global economy and society.
II. ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS
This note gives an overview of activities and events that took
place in Louisiana on the occasion of the Bicentennial, with a
focus on projects conducted at the LSU Law Center.
A. Events at the LSU Law Center
1. The Digest Online Project
The Digest Online project was the kick-off for the Bicentennial
events at LSU. The Center of Civil Law Studies (CCLS)
digitalized the Digest of the Civil Laws now in Force in the
Territory of Orleans, making it accessible online.2 The original
French and the English translation can be viewed separately or
together on the same screen. The typing of both versions was
1. Act of March 31, 1808, by the Territorial Legislature, approving and
putting in effect the Digest of 1808.
2. See www.law.lsu.edu/digest.
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extracted from the first edition of 1808, printed by Bradford &
Anderson, in the city of New Orleans. With the exception of
obvious typos, the Digest Online strictly follows the original
wording and orthography.
In addition, the manuscript notes of 1814, attributed to Louis
Moreau-Lislet who, with James Brown, drafted the Digest of 1808,
are also available, in manuscript form and in typed form, at least
for the Preliminary Title and Book One. These notes are extracted
from the De la Vergne Volume, a copy of the Digest bound in
1808 with interleaves between the English text on the left and the
French text on the right. This volume belonged to the de la Vergne
family for generations, and is presently in possession of Mr. Louis
V. de la Vergne. It was published by the LSU and Tulane law
schools in 1968, and by Claitor’s in 1971, with a bicentennial soft
cover reprint in 2008. The right to reproduce the notes was
generously provided to the CCLS by Mr. Louis V. de la Vergne.
2. Thirty-Fifth Tucker Lecture on Civil Law
This prestigious lecture series reached its 35th edition, while it
keeps recognizing the contribution of Colonel Tucker to the civil
law scholarship and law reform. Professor Emeritus Jacques
Vanderlinden (Free University of Brussels and University of
Moncton, N.-B., Canada) presented From the Civil Code of
Louisiana to Langdell—Some Hypothesis about the Nature of
Legal Systems. A world-known authority on codification and
diverse legal cultures, Professor Vanderlinden raised a
fundamental question: what is a legal system? Considering the
producer, the form, the contents, and the process, demonstration
was made that until the late nineteenth century, the deductive
method prevailed in the United States, not only in Louisiana, but
also in other States. According to Vanderlinden, the adoption of
the Langdellian case method was the decisive factor causing the
common law inductive approach to prevail, which shows that
American law is also a mixed system.
The Tucker Lecture took place at the LSU Law Center on May
16, 2008. With his presentation, Professor Vanderlinden has
joined an impressive list of lecturers that includes, among others,
Julio Cueto Rúa, René David, E. Allan Farnsworth, Helmut
Koziol, Robert A. Pascal, André Tunc, and Alan Watson.
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3. Journées Capitant on Law and Culture
Presented in English on the occasion of the Tucker Lecture, the
Digest Online project was also commented on in French during the
Journées Capitant on Law and Culture, which took place in Baton
Rouge and New Orleans from May 18 through May 23, 2008. The
conference was held in French by the Association Capitant des
amis de la culture juridique française, and attracted to Louisiana
more than one hundred French speaking participants from
countries all around the world.
The opening event took place on May 18, at the Old State
Capitol in Baton Rouge. Professor Olivier Moréteau presented the
Digest Online project and delivered an address on Judge François
Xavier Martin. Professor Alain Levasseur elaborated on the
codifier Louis Casimir Elisabeth Moreau-Lislet and Librarian
Vicenç Feliú helped identify some of the Spanish sources of the
Digest of 1808. Professor Emeritus Jacques Vanderlinden then
delivered a keynote presentation on the origins of French legal
culture in Acadia and Louisiana, showing that it is partly reality,
partly a myth. The event was followed by a reception.
4. LSU Law Library Exhibit
The CCLS and the LSU Law Library presented an exhibition
of Selected Sources of the Digest of 1808. The display included
rare books from the unique collection of the LSU Law Center, and
was accessible in the main lobby of the LSU Law Library in
October and November 2008.
The selection included influential books that were consulted by
the drafters of the Digest of 1808. Many of those books are
referred to in the manuscript notes of the De La Vergne Volume.
Those books were used by nineteenth-century attorneys and judges
in their effort to understand and complement the general rules of
the Digest of 1808, at least until the promulgation of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1825.
5. Civil Code Day
A Civil Code Day was organized by the CCLS and the
International Law Society, a very active student organization at the
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LSU Law Center. The purpose was to promote the unique legal
heritage that the Louisiana Civil Code has fostered, and show the
student community what a formidable asset it is to have a civil
code in English in the age of globalization. The event, entitled 200
Years of Codification in Louisiana: A Global Give and Take, took
place on October 23, 2008. Librarian Vicenç Feliú helped
understand the sources of the Louisiana law with his presentation
on Discovering the Roots of the Digest of 1808; Professor Olivier
Moréteau described the importance of spreading the legal heritage
of Louisiana with his display entitled Disseminating the Louisiana
Experience: The Digest Online; and Mr. Agustín Parise showed
the influence that the Louisiana text had in other jurisdictions
while presenting Exploring the Worldwide Impact of the
Louisiana Civil Codes.
6. CCLS Bicentennial Series
The CCLS created a Bicentennial Series to promote
publications on the civil law of Louisiana and its interaction with
other legal systems. Professor Olivier Moréteau is the General
Editor of the series, published by Claitor’s Publishing Division in
Baton Rouge. Two volumes have been published so far. The first
volume is a liber amicorum in homage of Professor Saúl Litvinoff,
comprised of 46 contributors from 12 different countries.3 The
second volume is a reprint of a book by Richard H. Kilbourne Jr.,
which studies the early period that preceded and followed the
publication of the Digest of 1808.4
B. Other Bicentennial Events
1. Louisiana State Archives
On March 9, 2008, Secretary of State Jay Dardenne
inaugurated an exhibition celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the
Civil Code of Louisiana. Beautifully displayed in the building of
3. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAÚL LITVINOFF (Olivier Moréteau, Julio
Romañach, Jr. & Alberto Luis Zuppi eds. 2008).
4. RICHARD H. KILBOURNE JR., A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
(reprint 2008) (1987).
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the Louisiana State Archives in Baton Rouge, the exhibits included
rare books from their collection as well as prints and art by Jacques
Royal, illustrating all steps leading to the adoption of the Digest, in
parallel with the history of the French Civil Code.
2. Louisiana State Bar Association, Francophone Section
Under the leadership of its President, John A. Hernandez III,
the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Francophone Section
organized a legal seminar on October 10, 2008, in Lafayette, to
celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Louisiana Civil Code-Digest
of 1808. Special guests were Michel Doyon, bâtonnier du Barreau
du Québec, and Jean Marie Burguburu, former bâtonnier of the
Paris Bar Association. The event took place at the Jean Lafitte
Acadian Cultural Center, also featuring an exhibition of art by
Jacques Royal, illustrating in parallel the origins of both the Digest
of 1808 and the Code Napoleon.
3. Celebration at the Louisiana Supreme Court
On October 15, 2008, distinguished LSU speakers participated
in the bicentennial celebration of the Digest of 1808 organized by
the Law Library of Louisiana and the New Orleans Association of
Law Librarians. The event took place at the Louisiana Supreme
Court building in New Orleans, and was coordinated by Ms.
Georgia D. Chadwick, Director of the Law Library of Louisiana.
Professor Alain Levasseur presented his new book, Moreau Lislet:
The Man Behind the Digest of 1808; while Librarian Vicenç Feliú
discussed the Spanish sources of the Digest of 1808. The event
was well attended by members of the different Louisiana faculties,
of the Bar, and by Chief Justice Pascal Calogero and Justice
Catherine D. Kimball. A reception followed in the Supreme Court
Museum where there was an interesting exhibit to view on the
background of the Digest featuring items from the Law Library of
Louisiana’s collection of Spanish law. Also on display was the
Adolph D. Rinck portrait of Moreau-Lislet on loan from the
Mason’s Grand Lodge of Louisiana.
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4. International Colloquium at Tulane Law School
An International Colloquium Celebrating the Bi-Centennial of
the Louisiana Civil Code 1808-2008 was organized by the EasonWeinmann Center of Comparative Law of the Tulane Law School,
and took place in New Orleans, at the Tulane Law School on
November 19-22, 2008.
An initial one-day session focused on the Digest of 1808 and
the Civil Code of 1825. Speakers highlighted historical aspects of
these legal texts, opening a diversity of perspectives on the society
of the time. Papers were delivered by John W. Cairns, George
Dargo, Florence M. Jumonville, Shael Herman, Peter J. Kastor,
Vernon V. Palmer, and Rebecca J. Scott.5
The Colloquium also addressed the present and the future of
codification. A one-and-a-half day session explored the challenges
of recodification worldwide. Speakers from around the globe
made presentations: Aharon Barack, Jürgen Basedow, Xavier
Blanc-Jouvan, Mario Bussani, Martijn W. Hesselink, Nicholas
Kasirer, Zhang Lihong, Olivier Moréteau, Mathias Reimann, and
Symeon C. Symeonides.6
III. RELATED PUBLICATIONS
A. Books
-

2008 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA
(A. N. Yiannopoulos ed. 2008), being volumes 16, 17 &
17A of WEST’S LOUISIANA STATUTES ANNOTATED.

-

DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, BICENTENNIAL EDITION (Claitor’s
Publishing Division 2008).

-

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAÚL LITVINOFF (O.Moréteau, J.
Romañach & A. Zuppi eds., Claitor’s Publishing Division
2008).

5. A collection of papers were published at The Bicentennial of the Digest
of 1808—Collected Papers, 24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 2009.
6. A collection of papers were published at Symposium: The Challenge of
Recodification Worldwide, 83 TUL. L. REV. 2009.
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This includes, among others:
- Jorge Horacio Alterini, Influencia del Código Civil de
Luisiana de 1825 en el Código Civil Argentino de
1871: Acerca de los efectos de la inscripción registral,
at 89.
- Shael Herman, The Public Reveries of a Solitary
Promenader, at 147.
- Olivier Moréteau, The Future of Civil Codes in France
and Louisiana, at 605.
- Vernon Valentine Palmer, Historical Notes on the First
Codes and Institutions in French Louisiana, at 231.
- A.N. Yiannopoulos, From Justinian to Louisiana with
Love: The Legend of the Marital Portion, at 373.
-

RICHARD H. KILBOURNE JR., A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE: THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1803-1839,
(Bicentennial Series Volume 2, Claitor’s Publishing
Division 2008).

-

ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR WITH VICENÇ FELIÚ, MOREAU
LISLET: THE MAN BEHIND THE DIGEST OF 1808 (Claitor’s
Publishing Division 2008).

-

LOUISIANA POCKET CIVIL CODE (Alain Levasseur ed.
2008).

-

JACQUES ROYAL, LOUISIANA HISTORY, 1804-1808 DIGEST
OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF
ORLEANS (ANCESTOR OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE)
(Bilingual edition, Art by Royal and Associates 2008), with
a Foreword by Olivier Moréteau.

B. Law Review Special Issues
-

Symposium: The Challenge of Recodification Worldwide,
83 TUL. L. REV. 2009.
This includes, among others:
- Jürgen Basedow, Transjurisdictional Codification, at
973.
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Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in
Louisiana and Latin America, at 1103.
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Conflicts Book of the
Louisiana Civil Code: Civilian, American, or
Original?, at 1041.

The Bicentennial of the Digest of 1808—Collected Papers,
24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 2009.
This includes:
- John W. Cairns, The de la Vergne Volume and the
Digest of 1808, at 31.
- George Dargo, The Digest of 1808: Historical
Perspectives, at 1.
- James Gordley, Louisiana and the Common Law: Le
Jour de Gloire, Est-Il Passé?, at 191.
- Shael Herman, The Code of Practice of 1825: The
Adaptation of Common Law Institutions, at 207.
- Florence M. Jumonville, “Formerly the Property of a
Lawyer”—Books That Shaped Louisiana Law, at 161.
- Peter J. Kastor, “Adapted to Its Present System of
Government”: Legal Change, National Reorganization,
and the Louisiana Civil Law Digest, at 137.
- Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Strange Science of
Codifying Slavery—Moreau Lislet and the Louisiana
Digest of 1808, at 83.
- Jorge Sánchez Cordero, The Reception of Legal Systems
in the Americas: Diversities and Convergences, at 231.
- Rebecca J. Scott, “She . . . Refuses To Deliver Up
Herself as the Slave of Your Petitioner”: Émigrés,
Enslavement, and the 1808 Louisiana Digest of the
Civil Laws, at 115.

C. Articles & Notes
-

Miriam Childs, The de la Vergne Volume, 6 No. 2 DE
NOVO: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE LAW LIBRARY OF
LOUISIANA 4 (2008)

-

Vicenç F. Feliú, Digest of 1808 Available Online, 56 LA.
B.J. 116 (2008).
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-

Shael Herman, The Louisiana Code of Practice (1825): A
Civilian Essai Among Anglo-American Sources, Vol. 12.1
ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW (May 2008),

-

Shael Herman, The Louisiana Code of Practice (1825): A
Civilian Essai Among Anglo-American Sources–Part II,
Vol. 12.1 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(May 2008; October 2008 supplement)

-

Shael Herman, The Louisiana Code of Practice (1825)–
Part III: The Uses of Analogia Iuris, Vol. 12.1 ELECTRONIC
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW (May 2008; December
2008 supplement)

-

Agustín Parise, The Place of the Louisiana Civil Code in
the Hispanic Civil Codifications: Inclusion in the
Comments to the Spanish Civil Code Project of 1851, 68
LA. L. REV. 823 (2008).

